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global climate change and its consequences
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Introduction
The International Forum on Strategic Thinking is DGAP’s main instrument for 
promoting young professionals and scholars in the area of  foreign and security 
policy. Its annual New Faces Conferences gather 20 promising young profes-
sionals and scholars pursuing an active career in international organizations, 
government, NGOs, think tanks and academia. Participants present their own 
research, compare arguments and approaches, and share feedback and construc-
tive criticism through a forum of  like-minded peers. This workshop-style format 
permits for open dialogue and intense debates, while deepening understanding 
and broadening professional contacts. For more than a decade, DGAP’s New 
Faces Conferences have been a useful tool in creating positive dialogue and have 
contributed to a growing international Alumni Network now comprising over 
600 members worldwide.
DGAP’s 10th New Faces Conference “From Conflict to Regional Stabil-
ity—Linking Security and Development” was hosted by the Toledo International 
Centre for Peace (CITpax), in cooperation with Development Assistance Re-
search Associates (DARA) and the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales 
y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE). It included 22 participants from 17 countries, 
who addressed key challenges in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Middle East and 
presented perspectives for better integrating development and security policy. 
Divided into five panels, the 2007 New Faces thus contributed to current policy 
research on a topic that is now beginning to be addressed and advanced by inter-
national, regional, and local actors.
Panel I overviewed different concepts pertaining to the security-development 
nexus, such as structural violence and human security, provided an inter-organiza-
tional perspective and introduced the notions of  “securitization” of  development 
policy and “developmentalization” of  security policy in the European context. 
The following four panels applied the general topic to the respective regional case 
studies.
Panel II presented approaches to post-conflict resolution and reconstruction in 
Sub-Saharan Africa by propounding institutional capacity building to bring about 
peace and stability to the different regions of  the African continent, and high-
lighted the usage of  the human security concept in the case of  the Democratic 
Republic of  Congo.
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Panel III focused on the complex security and development challenges in South-
East Asia, the EU’s monitoring mission and role in post-conflict Aceh as well as 
implications of  the Aceh experience for other scenarios in Asia, such as India’s 
north-eastern region. The panel was enhanced with first-hand perspectives and 
experience from the Philippines, India and Germany.
Panel IV discussed perceptions and strategies of  post-conflict reconstruction 
in the Middle East, with particular emphasis on the controversial case of  Iraq, 
as well as on Turkey’s emerging role as a geo-strategic cross-roads, bridge and 
regional player in the Middle East.
Panel V critically assessed the European construction and consolidation of  the 
concept of  the Western Balkans, dealt with European activities in security sector 
reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, and analyzed the specific case of  
Mitrovica, Kosovo.
Following the conference, participants were given time to consider their peers’ 
feedback and revise their work for publication through DGAP. This volume 
presents the revised and edited papers presented by participants of  the 10th New 
Faces Conference and makes them available to the interested public. We hope 
that this volume will be a valuable contribution to the debate and literature on the 
security-development nexus and encourage further research for positive imple-
mentation in the future.
DGAP and CITpax would like to thank DARA and FRIDE for their contribu-
tions and willingness to host the 2007 New Faces in Madrid, Spain, on 5–7 No-
vember 2007, with special gratitude extended to H. E. José María Figueres Olsen, 
International Advisor to the Board of  Trustees of  FRIDE and former President 
of  Costa Rica (1994–98), for giving an engaging and encouraging keynote speech 
on environmental security and climate change. Finally, DGAP and CITpax would 
also like to thank the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the Swiss Ministry of  Defence and 
NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division for making possible the 2007 New Faces 
Conference.
Kathrin Brockmann, Hans Bastian Hauck, and Stuart Reigeluth
Foreword
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From Conflict to Regional Stability:  
Linking Security and Development
Foreword by J. Christer Elfverson, former Director, United Nations
I had the opportunity and privilege to attend part of  this year’s “New Faces Con-
ference”, held in Madrid in November 2007. The nexus of  security and develop-
ment – the main theme for the Conference – broadly covers the complexity of  
contemporary conflicts, and, therefore, has become central to the concepts of  
conflict prevention and crisis management. Security cannot be achieved without 
addressing the causes of  instability; and sustainable development can only oc-
cur within a secure environment. Interfaces between security and development 
are widely acknowledged, and in recent years closer cooperation and coordina-
tion have been fostered. However, the mechanisms thus far employed have often 
proved unable to reconcile the multifaceted dimensions of  development and 
security, including impoverishment and unemployment, environmental degrada-
tion and pollution, insufficient education and health care, political corruption 
and ethnic discrimination, as well as eroding state institutions, which can all cause 
despair and frustration, and fuel extremism and violence.
To address this plethora of  destabilizing factors, a more comprehensive approach, 
departing from a simple security policy defined by mere military means, is pri-
mordial. The desired comprehensiveness could be advanced through a multilat-
J. Christer Elfverson
J. Christer Elfverson (FRIDE) listening to Özge Genç from Turkey
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eral approach and by appealing to a wider spectrum of  actors, including interna-
tional and regional organizations, national and local institutions, as well as NGOs 
and civil society. However, a considerable deficit persists in integrating develop-
ment and security policy concepts and instruments to effectively promote peace 
and stability. And a strong need exists for further research and insights from 
the professional and academic domains to better understand the complexity of  
contemporary conflicts, in order to better construct and consolidate the security-
development nexus.
Given my own professional background, I concentrated on and followed with 
particular interest the discussions on Iraq, and was impressed by the width and 
depth of  the deliberations. The papers prepared were of  the highest quality, as 
were the oppositions. The liveliness and level of  the debate strengthened my 
strongly held belief  that the younger generation provides a pool of  knowledge, 
intellectual curiosity, power of  analysis and desire to move things forward that I 
fear is often underestimated and in all likelihood under-utilized.
The title of  the Conference inexorably links security with development, substan-
tiating that the one cannot exist without the other. Nowhere is that more incon-
testable than in the Iraq of  today. As highlighted during the Conference, despite 
frantic efforts by the Government of  Iraq to portray the situation as being better 
than it was as late as six months ago (which is probably true in some parts of  the 
country) with a view to encouraging refugees and IDPs to return in order to help 
get the wheels turning, reality overshadows rosy descriptions.
Not only is the number of  returnees probably smaller than reported, but, in addi-
tion, many seem to be returning not necessarily because of  an improved situation, 
but often out of  necessity, because their visas to neighboring countries have ex-
pired, or they have simply run out of  funds to sustain their families. In addition, 
UNHCR and other agencies advise against their return, because of  the unstable 
situation. Yet it reaffirms the Government’s need to project the vision of  security, 
in order to attract a qualified workforce, to stimulate development. With billions 
upon billions of  reconstruction aid, plus the additional proceeds generated by 
the country’s oil exports, revenue is not lacking. However, Iraq still finds itself  in 
a situation which is probably worse today, in developmental terms, than before 
the war in 2003. The factor that is sorely missing is security and political stability, 
rendering reconstruction and development very difficult.
Similarly, internal security cannot thrive in an atmosphere of  regional instability, 
thus adding an additional link to the security-development nexus, to include also 
Foreword
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the precondition of  regional stability. While the concept that development re-
quires a secure environment to flourish, and that the two are mutually enhancing, 
is not new – it has often been mentioned as a prerequisite for sustainable devel-
opment – the link has become more generally accepted and broadly recognized. 
Still, there are those who maintain that development breeds security, while others 
see security as a necessary precondition for development.
As suggested above, the participation of  new players, including NGOs and civil 
society at large, should be welcomed, to publicly highlight the connection be-
tween security and development, hopefully in that order. Thus this Conference, 
while a tile in a larger mosaic, was particularly timely in that it brought together a 
sizeable number of  very talented young people whose findings will hopefully be 
taken up by other institutions and eventually find their way to decision-makers at 
government level.
I again congratulate the organizers of  this Conference for the high quality of  
the papers presented and the ensuing debate, and wish all participants, who are 
mostly at the beginning of  their professional careers, much success in their future 
endeavours. Without doubt we will hear more about them in the not too distant 
future.
Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider (DGAP), Emilio Cassinello (CITpax) and Carlos Oliver (DARA) 
welcome the “New Faces” to Madrid
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Panel I: The Security- 
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A Structural Violence and 
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The Security-Development Nexus: A Structural Violence and 
Human Needs Approach
Robert Mudida
The security-development nexus is increasingly vital because of  the realization 
that there can be no long-term security without development and vice versa. The 
linkages between the two concepts have evolved over the last few decades to 
eventually exhibit a certain convergence. The rise of  the concept of  human secu-
rity has also, by its very nature, implied closer links to development. Examining 
structural violence and human needs, linkages between these two concepts can be 
explored and policy implications suggested for the security-development nexus.
The Evolution of the Concept of Security
Traditional notions of  security were based on the use of  force if  necessary to 
preserve vital interests, as based on realism or power politics.1 Power in this 
context is defined as the ability to get another actor to do what it would not 
otherwise have done, or to not do what it would have otherwise done. A variation 
on this idea is that actors are powerful to the extent that they affect others more 
than others affect them. The traditional notion of  security was seen as closely 
related to the threat or use of  violence, and as such military means were regarded 
as central to the provision of  security.2
Realist concepts of  security, associated with traditional security, were popular 
during the Cold War, during which many believed that all that stood in the way 
of  a harmonious and peaceful world was a hostile Soviet Union committed to 
a military and economic ideology that was antagonistic to the West.3 However, 
although Soviet intransigence to some extent fuelled the Cold War, many of  the 
world’s problems, especially those of  developing countries, existed independently 
of  superpower hostility. The end of  the Cold War therefore still left some issues 
unresolved and also brought some new issues to the fore.
The post-Cold War period implied several new challenges in international se-
curity. Many of  the conflicts do not fit the traditional pattern of  inter-state war, 
1 Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations, New York [et al.], 2004, pp. 71–78.
2 Michael Renner, State of  the World 2005: Redefining Security, in: Makumi Mwagiru and O. Oculli (eds.), Rethinking 
Global Security : an African perspective? (Heinrich Böll Foundation, Regional Office East and Horn of  Africa), Nai-
robi 2006, pp. 1–11.
 John C. Garnett, Introduction: Conflict and Security in the New World Order, in: M. Jane Davis (ed.), Security Issues 
in the Post-Cold War World, Cheltenham [et al.] 1996, pp. 1–11.
Robert Mudida
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which previously dominated international relations. War between sovereign states 
remains a distinct possibility, but there has been a huge upsurge in intra-state 
conflict where the main actors are ethnic groups. Ethnic conflict is violence 
perpetrated by one ethnic group against another because of  cultural or racial dif-
ferences between them. Ethnic violence has become much more common in the 
post Cold War period. In 199, Sam Huntington foresaw that the fundamental 
source of  conflict in the years ahead would be cultural, and predicted a “clash of  
civilizations”, which had not been a predominant source of  conflict in the Cold 
War period.4
Many of  these intra-state conflicts in turn become internationalized in the sense 
that they have trans-boundary effects. The fundamental agents of  conflict inter-
nationalization include interdependence, ethnic relations, the media and refugees. 
This makes it necessary to adopt a systemic perspective to effectively manage re-
gional conflicts.5 The security challenges of  managing internationalized conflicts 
have been manifested in the Horn of  Africa and Great Lakes regions. The Somali 
conflict, for example, has contributed to insecurity in the entire Horn of  Africa 
region while the conflict in the Democratic Republic of  Congo has destabilized 
the Great Lakes Region.
Apart from the change in trend towards intra-state conflict, more comprehen-
sive notions of  security are developing, for there is an increasing trend towards 
recognizing the importance of  human security and environmental security issues. 
Human security implies protecting vital freedoms,6 and implies protecting people 
from critical and pervasive threats and situations while enhancing their strengths 
and aspirations. Human security also entails creating systems that give people 
the building blocks for survival, dignity and livelihood, and is thus closely tied to 
development. Human security connects different types of  freedoms—freedom 
from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf. 
The state continues to have the fundamental responsibility for security. However, 
as security challenges become more complex and various new actors attempt to 
play a role, a paradigm shift is needed to broaden the focus from the state to the 
security of  the people. Human security complements state security, by being peo-
ple-centered and addressing insecurities that have not traditionally been consid-
ered as state security threats; it furthers human development; and also enhances 
the protection of  human rights, which are at the core of  democracy promotion.
4 Samuel P. Huntington, The clash of  civilizations and the remaking of  world order, New York, NY, 1996.
5 Makumi Mwagiru, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of  Management, Nairobi 2000.
6 Report of  the Commission on Human Security, presented to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 1 May 200.
A Structural Violence and 
Human Needs Approach
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Conversely, promoting democratic principles is also a step towards attaining hu-
man security and development. People are enabled to participate in the process 
on governance and make their voices heard. This requires the building of  strong 
institutions, which establish the rule of  law and empower the people. Human 
security strives to protect and empower people in post-conflict situations, to 
provide them with economic security by addressing extreme poverty, to provide 
adequate health care, and also to enhance knowledge, skills and values. The tra-
ditional focus on state security is therefore inadequate and needs to encompass 
the safety and well being of  a country’s population.7 In situations where individu-
als and communities are not secure, state security will itself  be extremely fragile. 
Security in the absence of  justice will not produce a stable peace. Democratic 
governance is vital in the context of  comprehensive security.
Environmental security has also become critical in recent years, particularly fun-
damental has been addressing ecological degradation and natural resource scarcity. 
Environmental degradation needs to be considered in a more integrative con-
cept of  global security. Environmental security has become a common security 
issue due to the recognition that the environment provides the fundamental life 
support system.8 Security for the planet depends on the structure of  the entire 
system while the conventional concept of  security has exclusive concerns for the 
national level. Any attachment to the nation-state and the conventional doctrine 
of  security becomes a fundamental obstacle to the sustainable management of  
the environment. The essential ingredients for peace lie in cooperation for the 
common good, which is based on the concept of  equality and harmony among 
people who depend on the earth for their survival. In the environmental context, 
security problems need to be interpreted by the way societies are organized and 
connected to the natural world. The main source of  threat is from modern indus-
trialization. For a long time, the view has been that there was a trade-off  between 
environmental protection and development. Now, within the concept of  sustain-
able development, the protection of  the local and global environment is seen as 
integral to the development process in an increasingly interdependent world.
Given the nature of  the challenges posed by the emerging trends on security, an 
approach focused solely on the national level is inadequate. Real security in an 
increasingly globalized world cannot be provided on a purely national basis or on 
the basis of  limited alliances.9 Unlike traditional military threats emanating from a 
determined adversary, many current security challenges are risks and vulnerabili-
7 Renner, State of  the World 2005: Redefining Security, op. cit. (fn. 2).
8 Ho-Won Jeong, Peace and Conflict Studies : An Introduction, Aldershot [et al.] 2000, pp. 95–105.
9 Renner, op. cit. (fn. 2).
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ties, which are shared across state borders. Non-military dimensions also have a 
fundamental effect on security and state stability. States around the globe, espe-
cially developing states, increasingly face a debilitating combination of  increasing 
competition for resources, environmental degradation, the resurgence of  infec-
tious diseases, poverty and growing wealth disparities, demographic pressures and 
unemployment. A multilateral or global approach is needed to deal effectively 
with most of  these challenges, which often have trans-boundary effects.
The Evolution of the Concept of Development
The fundamental goal of  development policy is to create sustainable improve-
ments in the quality of  life for all people.10 There have been three generations 
of  development thinking.11 The first generation of  development thinking was 
dominant in the 1960s and 1970s, and envisaged extensive government involve-
ment in development planning to overcome pervasive market failures, which were 
thought to characterize developing countries. However, by the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, deficiencies in comprehensive planning became acute. Although the 
rationale for government intervention had been to address market failure, the re-
sult of  government failure was associated particularly with the adverse effects of  
price distortions.12 The second generation of  development economics was based 
on the key principles of  neoclassical economics. The emphasis of  this school was 
on removing price distortions and “getting prices right”. Markets, prices and in-
centives became a core concern in policymaking. Structural adjustment programs 
in many developing countries in the 1980s and part of  the 1990s were based on 
the ideas of  the second generation. But the results of  the second generation were 
also disappointing in many developing states, which were unable to attain sus-
tained economic growth and meaningful reductions in poverty. The third genera-
tion of  development economics began to emerge at the end of  the twentieth 
century and emphasized the role of  institutions in development. The emergence 
of  the third generation coincided with greater emphasis on notions of  human 
security and attempted to consider which institutional changes were required to 
achieve improvements in the quality of  life. Development increasingly came to be 
viewed as a process of  expanding the real freedoms that people enjoyed.13 These 
freedoms included political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, 
transparency and protective security. Each of  these types of  freedoms helps to 
10 World Bank, Entering the 21st Century, in: World Development Report 1999/2000, pp. 1–0.
11 Gerald M. Meier, The Old Generation of  Development Economists and the New, in: Meier and Joseph E. Stiglitz 
(eds.), Frontiers of  Development Economics: The Future in Perspective, Oxford 2001, pp. 1–50.
12 Ibid.
13 Amartya Sen, Development As Freedom, Oxford [et al.] 1999, pp. –11.
A Structural Violence and 
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advance the capability of  a person and therefore to improve the quality of  life as 
the fundamental goal of  development.
The Concept of Structural Violence
Conflict is a feature of  human activity and arises when there is an incompatibility 
of  goals,14 which is fundamental to the existence of  conflict situations, whether 
dealing with structural or behavioral violence. Behavioral violence involves the 
deliberate use of  physical force to injure or kill another human being. Structural 
violence is a type of  conflict, which is embedded in the structure of  relation-
ships and interactions.15 For example, structural violence can arise from anoma-
lous legal, social or economic structures in society. Galtung defines structural 
violence as “existing in those conditions in which human beings are influenced 
so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential 
realizations.”16 In a situation of  structural violence, overt violence is absent but 
structural factors have virtually the same compelling control over behavior as the 
overt threat or use of  force.17 In a society prone to structural violence, an actor 
or group is prevented, by structural constraints, from developing its talents or 
interests in a normal manner, or even from realizing that such developments are 
possible. In the contemporary world, this may be manifested in class, race, ethnic 
or religious discrimination.
Violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and life 
chances. The focus on direct violence would lead one to analyze the capabili-
ties and motivations of  domestic and international actors with efforts to create 
institutions that can prevent them from exercising direct violence by punishing, 
for example, those who do.18 A focus on structural violence would lead one to 
a critical analysis of  the structures and possibly an effort to transform violent 
structures into less violent ones. Such structural transformation is revolutionary, 
but not necessarily violent.
Structural violence is often harder to identify than physical violence because it is 
not overt. Structural roots of  violent acts therefore are typically ignored and the 
14 Anthony de Reuck, The Logic of  Conflict: Its Origin, Development and Resolution, in: Michael Banks (ed.), Conflict 
in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations, Brighton 1984, pp. 96–111.
15 Mwagiru, Conflict (fn. 5), pp. 14–15.
16 Ibid.
17 A. John R. Groom, Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher, in: Review 
of  International Studies (Guildford), Vol. 14 (April 1988), No. 2, S. 97–115.
18 Johan Galtung, Twenty-five Years of  Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses, in: Journal of  Peace 
Research, Vol. 22, No. 2, June 1985, pp. 141–158.
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cycle of  violence continues.19 Conflicts are dynamic and have a distinct life cycle.20 
In the context of  the conflict cycle, structural violence, which is not attended to 
eventually, becomes violent conflict. The challenge during the earlier stages of  
the conflict cycle associated with structural violence is that of  peace management. 
If  peace management is not effectively undertaken, the conflict cycle moves to a 
phase of  crisis. At this time the challenge is to undertake crisis management. If  
crisis management is not effectively undertaken, the cycle moves to a stage of  
physical or behavioral violence. Once physical violence breaks out the challenge 
becomes one of  managing it. If  conflict management attempts are successful, 
this leads to peace agreements followed by a period of  post-conflict peace-build-
ing. If  the stage of  post-conflict peace-building is adequately addressed then this 
can lead to peace thus completing the conflict cycle. The conflict cycle illustrates 
the dynamism of  conflict or conflict transformation. The actors, issues and inter-
ests in conflict are being constantly transformed.21 Conflict is an intrinsic aspect 
of  social change.22 Conflict is an expression of  the heterogeneity of  interests and 
values that arise as new constructs generated by social change come up against 
inherited constraints. Social change is structural and may introduce new incom-
patibilities of  goals,23 and is therefore vital to take into consideration.
In order for structural violence to exist, the inequalities must be the result of  rela-
tions between groups, which give differential access to social goods. Structural 
violence may be legitimized by the prevailing political and social norms. Webb 
considers a situation of  negative peace to prevail where there is an absence of  
behavioral violence but where relations are marked by structural violence. Posi-
tive peace is defined in terms of  harmonious relations between or among par-
ties, which are conducive to mutual development, growth and the attainment of  
goals.24 In order for positive peace to be brought about in a society experiencing 
structural violence, a structural change in relations in society may have to take 
place.
19 Marc Pilisuk, The Hidden Structure of  Contemporary Violence, in: Peace and Conflict: Journal of  Peace Psychology, 
Vol. 4, No. , 1998, pp. 197–216.
20 Mwagiru, Peace and Conflict Management in Kenya (Centre for Conflict Research and Catholic Peace and Justice 
Commission), Nairobi, 200, pp. 55–64.
21 Raimo Väyrynen, To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of  National and International Conflicts, 
in: Väyrynen (ed.), New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, London 
1991, pp. 1–25.
22 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary conflict resolution : the prevention, manage-
ment and transformation of  deadly conflicts, Cambridge 2005, p. 1.
23 Galtung, A Structural Theory of  Aggression, in: Journal of  Peace Research, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1964, pp. 95–119.
24 Keith Webb, Structural Conflict and the Definition of  Conflict, in: World Encyclopedia of  Peace, Vol. 2, Oxford 1986, 
pp. 41–44.
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Structural violence, if  not addressed, may eventually lead to violent conflict as life 
in the structure becomes unbearable.25 Indeed, the strongest predictor of  physi-
cal or behavioral violence is stagnation in economic and social development.26 In 
conditions where relative social equity exists, productive growth will generally 
result in improved access to goods and services needed for human well-being 
thereby reducing the potential for physical violence. However, where social equity 
declines, there is a greater difference between the “haves” and “have-nots”, as 
structural violence becomes more deeply embedded in societies. Governments 
in such countries tend to grow more rigid in limiting options to redress social in-
equalities, thus creating a social pressure cooker. This occurred in Liberia and Ni-
caragua where structural conflict eventually led to physical violence. Nevertheless, 
the measures of  normal levels of  equity are specific to the history and culture of  
a particular society. Acceptable levels of  social differentiation vary widely from 
one country to another.27 As such the intensity of  structural violence tends to 
vary among societies, which engage in it, from very low to very high. These varia-
tions reflect differences in social values and in degrees of  inequality with respect 
to key institutions of  social life in particular societies at particular times. The 
25 Mwagiru, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of  Management, op. cit, (fn. 5), p. 25.
26 Richard Garfield, Indicators of  Social System Vulnerability and Resilience to Violent Conflict, Paper Presented at UN 
Expert Group Meeting on Structural Threats to Social Integrity: Social Roots of  Violent Conflict and Indicators for 
Prevention, 18–20 December 2001, United Nations, New York, pp. 1–.
27 David G. Gil, Understanding and Overcoming Social-Structural Violence, in: Contemporary Justice Review, Vol. 2 (1), 
April 1999.
Robert Mudida enriches the debate with insights from Kenya
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higher the degrees of  inequality, the higher also are likely to be the levels of  coer-
cion necessary to enforce the inequalities, and the levels of  structural violence.
Hoivik demonstrates how demographic concepts can be used to develop a clear 
definition of  structural violence, and argues that the distribution of  a society’s re-
sources affects not only the standard of  living but also the chances of  survival.28 
A more equitable distribution will normally increase the average length of  life 
in society as a whole. Hoivik argues that the loss of  life from an unequal distri-
bution is an aspect of  structural violence. He develops measures of  structural 
violence based on the potential increase in life expectancy. Whenever significant 
inequalities are prevalent in a society concerning the key institutions of  social life, 
its ways of  life involve domination, exploitation, injustice and widespread under-
development. In such cases, the people are not free in a meaningful sense and its 
political institutions are essentially undemocratic, coercive and structurally violent, 
in spite of  the existence of  formal democratic structures.
A Human Needs Approach
Christie argues that systematic inequalities in the distribution of  economic and 
political resources deprive needs satisfaction for certain segments of  society. 
Human needs theory posits that there are certain ontological and genetic needs 
which will be pursued and that socialization processes, if  not compatible with 
such needs, will lead to frustration and anti-social personal and group behavior.29 
The whole basis of  law and order is threatened in circumstances in which basic 
needs are frustrated. 30 These needs are universal motivations that are an integral 
part of  the human being. In addition to the biological needs of  food and shelter, 
there are basic human needs, which relate to growth and development such as 
needs for personal identity and recognition.31 Institutions and political structures 
often frustrate these ordinary and well-recognized needs what sometimes leads to 
aggressive responses.32
Fundamental needs, such as individual and group identity, are compulsive and in 
many cases will be pursued even at the cost of  physical violence. If  conflicts are 
to be resolved institutions have to be adjusted to human needs. Although there is 
28 Tord Hoivik, The Demography of  Structural Violence, in: Journal of  Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1977, pp. 59–7.
29 Daniel J. Christie, Reducing Direct and Structural Violence: The Human Needs Theory, in: Peace and Conflict: Journal 
of  Peace Psychology, No. (4), 1997, pp. 15–2.
30 John W. Burton, Violence Explained : the sources of  conflict, violence and crime and their prevention, Manchester 
1997, pp. 2–40.
31 Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Prevention London, 1990, pp. 6–48.
32 Burton, Conflict Prevention as a Political System, in: John A. Vasquez et. al. (eds.), Beyond Confrontation: Learning 
Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era, Ann Arbor, MI, 1996, pp. 115–127.
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no precise definition of  needs, some behaviors cannot in certain circumstances 
of  structural violence be controlled by threat or coercion. Basic needs are onto-
logical while interests and values are temporal. A group’s ontological needs can-
not be bargained away and should be treated differently from negotiable interests. 
Theories of  basic needs reject a priori the assumption that violence originates 
in the aggressive nature of  human beings or unconscious psychological dynam-
ics;33 needs provide objectives and rational criteria for analyzing and evaluating an 
emergent social situation that may contain the potential for generating conflict.
There are certain political and economic conditions that are essential for the 
fulfillment of  human needs. The institutional set-up in a country should aim 
as much as possible to provide an enabling environment for basic needs to be 
achieved. The mal-distribution of  power in societies has provided the opportu-
nity for need gratification on the part of  some at the expense of  others.4 As long 
as a state represents sectional interests, rather than common interests, thereby 
creating divisions in society, the use of  differential power will remain the order-
ing principle and the needs of  many citizens will be unsatisfied. As the crisis is 
recognized in the manner that power is distributed, the state will either become 
increasingly coercive, or manipulative and continue to serve sectional interests 
or become only an administrative structure serving the common interest. If  the 
common interest is to be served, it must be recognized—and basic human needs 
are one basis for such recognition. The extent to which basic needs are being met 
provides one basis for judging the legitimacy of  an existing order.
The Linkages between Structural Violence and Human Needs
Structural violence is closely linked to the inadequate satisfaction of  basic hu-
man needs because structural violence is closely related to the people’s inability to 
develop their full potential.5 When people’s basic needs are not met adequately, 
there is a gap between their potential and actual realization. This gap is the cen-
terpiece of  structural violence. The distribution of  a society’s resources affects 
not only the people’s standard of  living, but even the chances of  survival.36 A 
fundamental source of  protracted social conflict is the denial of  elements re-
quired for the societal development—the pursuit of  which is a compelling need.7 
Conflict arises from the denial of  those human needs, which are common to all 
33 Jeong, op. cit. (fn. 8), pp. 70–71.
4 Paul Sites, Legitimacy and Human Needs, in: John W. Burton and Frank Dukes, Conflict: Readings in Management and 
Resolution, Basingstoke [et al.] 1990, pp. 117–141.
5 Peter Iadicola and Anson Shupe, Violence, Inequality and Human Freedom, Lanham 200, pp. –66. 
36 Hoivik, The Demography of  Structural Violence, op. cit. (fn. 28).
7 Edward E. Azar, Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions, in: Burton and Dukes (eds.), op. cit. (fn. 4), pp. 
145–155.
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and whose pursuit is an ontological need. In countries where the basic needs of  
the majority of  the population are not being met, human development is very 
low as measured by the UNDP human development index, which is based on life 
expectancy at birth, educational attainment and standard of  living measured by 
real per capita income at purchasing power parity.8 While augmenting per capita 
income and consumption is vital to improving the quality of  life, other objectives 
especially reducing poverty, expanding access to health services, and increasing 
educational levels are also vital.9
Policy Implications
Approaching the security-development nexus from a structural violence and 
human needs perspective provides some valuable insights. It illustrates from a 
conflict perspective that development and security are closely related. It reaffirms 
the argument that there cannot be development without peace or peace without 
development. The adequate satisfaction of  human needs is vital to overcom-
ing structural violence, which leads to the more adequate provision of  human 
security and development. Approaching the security-development nexus from 
a structural violence and human needs perspective illustrates the importance of  
conflict prevention. Conflicts progress through a cycle and conflict prevention 
is always a less costly option than addressing fully blown conflicts. Parties in a 
particular situation may conceptualize conflict prevention as third party actions 
to avoid the likely threat, use or diffusion of  conflict. Conflict prevention is also 
fundamentally about overhauling conflict-generating structures.40
Essentially this is about having appropriate institutions to address structural 
conflict. A solid network of  effective institutions is also vital to holistic develop-
ment. Effective institutions are increasingly recognized as being the centerpiece 
of  development.41 Institutions in this context refer to formal and informal rules 
governing the actions of  individuals and organizations in the process of  devel-
opment. The current emphasis is therefore on “getting the institutions right.”42 
Having proper institutions for good governance and regulation is vital to over-
come intra-state conflicts. Legitimacy of  governance is a fundamental issue and 
effective governance ensures that human needs are adequately met and structural 
8 Anthony P. Thirlwall, Growth and Development: With Special Reference to Developing Economies, Houndmills [et 
al.] 200, pp. 51–70.
9 World Bank, op. cit. (fn. 10).
40 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, Conflict Resolution, op. cit. (fn. 22), pp. 118–11.
41 World Bank, op. cit. (fn. 10).
42 Ha-Joon Chang, Institutional Development in Historical Perspective, in: Chang (ed.), Rethinking Development Eco-
nomics, London 200, pp. 481–497.
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violence in society is reduced. Consequently, this improves human security and 
development.
Democratic governance has usually been considered basic to political legitimacy 
although what constitutes adequate democratic governance has been a subject of  
lively debate. In many cases, the issue of  what kind of  democracy is established 
is more crucial than whether a policy is democratic. Avoiding conflict depends on 
whether local domestic institutions can provide models for dealing with conflict 
and fostering development. Where governance is legitimate and accountable to 
citizens, and where the rule of  law prevails, conflict is less likely. Development 
can prevent conflict and thus also enhance security.
However, although agreeing that certain institutions are necessary, one should 
be careful about specifying the exact form they should take.4 Thus there is an 
agreement that good property rights are vital but in practice this principle needs 
to adapt to the realities of  individual states. Effective institutions need to be 
homegrown, rather then externally driven. Such institutions should take into ac-
count the historical, political, economic and social realities of  particular countries. 
Above all, institutional development takes time and the process requires patience.
4 Ibid.
Discussions continue well into the coffee break
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Conclusion
Gradually evolving, the concepts of  security and development have increasingly 
converged on the fundamentals required to attain both. A structural violence ap-
proach reaffirms the importance of  overhauling anomalous structures in society 
so as to achieve security and development. A human needs approach reinforces 
the structural violence approach by suggesting that anomalous structures can 
only be overcome by addressing fundamental human needs. This is in line with 
current conceptualizations of  both security and development, which consider 
needs-based approaches as central. At a policy level, effective institutions that 
promote good governance are vital to overcoming structural violence and achiev-
ing fundamental human needs. Such institutions will promote both security and 
development in the long-term. However, institutional frameworks that enhance 
both security and development should be carefully constructed. This implies 
upholding certain principles like good governance while taking into account the 
unique realities of  individual states.
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Towards Effective and Integrative Inter-Organizationalism
Joachim Koops
The end of  the Cold War brought about a rudimentary shift in the structure 
of  the international system, and gave rise to unprecedented pressures and 
opportunities for a fundamental and unconstrained reassessment of  the root 
causes of  war, conflict and human suffering, as well as appropriate response 
mechanisms. The end of  the ideologically distorted and congealed bipolar world 
order also opened possibilities of  activity for international organizations and 
other non-state actors. In the early 1990s, the debates on the preconditions 
and dimensions of  international security resulted in renewed emphasis on the 
inextricable link between development and security, coupled with heightened 
expectations towards international organizations as the principal agents 
behind the promotion of  the so-called security-development nexus.1 The 
proliferation of  failed states on the African continent, as well as the international 
community’s failure to respond effectively and holistically to the crises in the 
Balkans—and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan—intensified the need 
for a more integrated approach to combining economic aid initiatives to 
long-term, structural peace-building and security sector reform (SSR). Indeed, 
multi-functional international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), 
European Union (EU), African Union (AU), and transatlantic bodies such as the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), with their wide pool of  resources and 
expertise, were seen as the most suitable for promoting such an ambitious and 
multi-faceted agenda. Consequently, a plethora of  policy frameworks, norms 
and activities have been initiated by these international actors with the aim of  
promoting a more integrated approach to international security and development.2
Ironically, those very international organizations themselves have become 
responsible for one of  the key institutional challenges behind the security-
development nexus. With overlapping mandates and frequently competing 
mission agendas, the lack of  efficient coordination amongst these key 
international actors has been a major cause for the delay, and often even 
failure, of  the attempt to provide adequately effective and sufficiently holistic 
post-conflict reconstruction schemes. Outlining the inherent institutional 
1 See Necla Tschirgi, Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of  Opportunity 
Closing?, New York, NY, 200, pp. 2–5.
2 See the UN’s Agenda for Peace, 1992, <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>; the OECD’s DAC Guidelines 
Helping Prevent violent Conflict, 1997, 2001, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/55/92028.htm>; and the EU’s 
European Security Strategy, 200, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/7867.pdf>.
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and conceptual difficulties of  inter-organizational cooperation in the context 
of  combined socio-economic and civil-military post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts, and assessing the potentials of  a more effective and integrative inter-
organizationalism, key insights can be drawn from sociological-institutionalist, 
economic and international relations (IR) theories. Additionally, drawing on 
lessons learned from the emerging EU-NATO and EU-UN cooperation schemes, 
a more synergetic approach between the main international organizations could 
indeed be realized within the framework of  the security-development agenda.
Institutional Challenges behind the Security-Development Nexus
One of  the most fundamental institutional challenges behind a coherent and 
effective promotion of  an integrated security-development policy is the lack 
of  coordination within and between the many key international actors, which 
are increasingly getting involved in the rapidly expanding area of  post-conflict 
development and security policies. In addition to the widely active and almost 
notoriously uncoordinated non-state humanitarian agencies community, the UN 
system and other international organizations like the EU, NATO and the OECD 
have, during the last decade, added their numerous activities and initiatives to 
the security-development agenda. With overlapping mandates and duplication 
of  efforts, a lack of  coordination and collaboration often leads to inefficient 
and counter-productive outcomes. While policy makers and several studies have 
already criticized the often acute competition between NGOs, as well as between 
the various agencies and organs within the UN system in times of  severe 
crises,3 the implications of  the growing number of  international organizations 
involved in any given conflict area or underdeveloped region complicates the 
picture even further. Not only do those international organizations that have 
advanced the security-development agenda in the first place find themselves 
at inter-organizational competition for scarce resources, but also the effects of  
organizational incoherence further hamper their efforts. Indeed, the UN and 
the EU—in theory the most capable actors for pursuing and implementing a 
comprehensive security-development strategy—suffer from considerable intra-
organizational conflicts and inter-departmental rivalry. In the UN’s case, the 
creation of  the Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
was intended to allay some of  the most pronounced inter-agency quarrels, but 
it so far has enjoyed only limited leverage over other UN bodies and possesses 
no central authority to impose a top-down coordination scheme.4 Similarly, EU 
 See Antonio Donini, Norah Niland, Rwanda: Lessons Learned: A Report on the Coordination of  Humanitarian Activities, 
UN, New York 1994; and Larry Minear, The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries, Bloomfield, 2002.
4 Nicola Reindorp and Peter Wiles, Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience. A study 
commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), London 2001, p. 47, 
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effectiveness as a security-development actor is limited by constant competition 
between the Member States as well as between the Commission and Council, 
including the Council Secretariat. Taken together, intra-organizational rivalries 
within an international organization as well as inter-organizational competition 
between the various international actors themselves pose a fundamental 
institutional challenge to a coherent and effective promotion and implementation 
of  the security-development nexus. Thus, developing mechanisms for increased 
inter-organizational cooperation and coherence seems to be of  paramount 
importance. As long as these institutional difficulties are not overcome, the 
security-development nexus will continue to remain mostly a paper tiger. 
However, promising developments between the EU, NATO and the UN in the 
practical realm as well as a growing—albeit still highly compartmentalized—body 
of  economic, sociological and IR theories on inter-organizational relations and 
networks could offer some valuable insights and overall guidance as to how such 
institutional challenges might be overcome.
Theory and Practice of Effective and Integrative Inter-Organizationalism
Research on inter-organizational relations remains highly scattered and is rarely 
directly applied to the security-development area. Scholarly discourse is also 
marked by the distinct absence of  dialogue between the disciplines: sociological 
approaches remain largely disconnected from economic organization theories, 
while both disciplines are still very much ignored by IR theory. Several initial 
insights can nevertheless be gained by combining the theoretical insights and 
key variables from inter-organizational studies in the fields of  economics, 
institutionalist sociology and IR with the initial practical lessons learned so 
far from the emerging inter-organizational forms of  EU-NATO and EU-UN 
cooperation in crisis management. While the key variables of  the theoretical 
approaches highlight the “ideal-type” elements of  successful organizational 
networks, the lessons learned from the EU-NATO and EU-UN dyads could 
demonstrate in a more pragmatic way which actual steps need to be taken in order 
to overcome the institutional challenges behind the security-development nexus 
towards more effective and integrative inter-organizationalism on the ground.
Lessons from Theory
In economics and management studies, the study of  alliances and multi-party 
joint ventures points towards two important aspects for successful collaboration 
schemes between independent organizations and agencies. First, trust between 
the “linkage partners” seems to be a fundamental and recurrent variable, without 
<ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&DocId=1004152>.
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which stable alliances could not be formed. Theories of  interpersonal attraction, 
in particular, focus on trust and on what attracts groups or individuals to each 
other, such as status similarities, complementary needs, aspects of  personality, 
goal congruence and interpersonal fit.5 Second, a stable alliance or joint venture 
ideally requires clear leadership of  a “focal organization”, in order to provide 
the alliance with direction and cohesion. Such a leading focal organization would 
need to possess some form of  legitimacy and exert some degree of  power 
and authority within the alliance. In addition, successful joint ventures and 
business alliances not only require a legal and contractual formalization of  the 
collaboration schemes, but often also a clear division of  tasks and, in many cases, 
a hierarchy of  actors.6
In contrast to the hierarchical and focal-organizational emphasis of  the 
alliance and joint venture approach, an important aspect of  the institutionalist-
sociological approach is the focus on so-called inter-organizational networks 
and organizational learning. While inter-organizational networks are bound 
together by shared norms, the exchange of  information and the process of  
learning from the organizational activities and design of  a partner organization 
(or indeed a rival) lead to what P. J. DiMaggio and W. W. Powell have been 
referred to as “institutional isomorphism”, or the process of  organizations 
becoming similar in functioning and design.7 One of  the most important factors 
behind organizational modeling, mimicking and convergence is the process of  
epistemic isomorphism—the tendency of  organizations to converge due to 
shared epistemic values, norms or experiences of  the organizations’ staff  and 
leaders. Applied to the problem of  the institutional challenges behind the security-
development nexus, one central assumption of  this sociological approach is that 
the more organizations learn from each other and the more similar they tend 
to become, the easier their cooperation will become. Also, similar to attraction 
theories, the interpersonal factor of  shared goals and complementary between 
individuals plays an important role.
The role of  individuals for successful inter-organizational cooperation is 
indeed also a key feature of  the third and last theoretical approach: inter-
organizationalism from an IR perspective. While many of  these studies also take 
5 Ken G. Smith, Stephen J. Carrol and Susan J. Ashford, Intra- and Interorganizational Cooperation: Toward a Research 
Agenda, in: Academy of  Management Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1995, pp. 7–2, especially p. 18.
6 See Ranjay Gulati and Harbir Singh, The architecture of  cooperation: Managing coordination costs and appropriation 
concerns in strategic alliances, in: Strategic Management Journal, 12, 1998, pp. 8-10; and Esteban García-Canal, Ana 
Valdés-Llaneza and Africa Ariño, Effectiveness of  dyadic and multi-party joint ventures, in: Organization Studies, 
Vol. 24, No. 6, 200, pp. 74–770.
7 Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality 
in Organizational Fields, in: American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, April 198, pp. 147–160.
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network analysis as the starting point, key variables for successful cooperation 
on the organizational level are the existence of  a linking-pin organization, which 
serves as a communication channel between organizations, while on the personal 
level, the significance of  interpersonal links, trust as well as the central importance 
of  “boundary-role occupants” is singled out as elements for strengthening inter-
organizational links.8 Boundary-role occupants are individuals who form the 
interface between their own organization and other organizations in the external 
environment. In addition, the so-called “alumni effect,” i.e. the switching of  key 
personnel from one organization to the other and thus the facilitation of  inter-
organizational understandings through personal links—increased diffusion of  
knowledge about the former employer’s organizational culture and the creation 
of  epistemic inter-organizational communities, is also identified as an important 
factor for reinforcing inter-organizational links and cooperation.9
When coalesced, the key variables of  the three branches of  theories emphasize 
the role of  trust and attraction between individuals, contractual formalizations 
of  collaboration, strong hierarchy and a powerful and authoritative focal 
organization or linking-pin organization. Furthermore, interpersonal links, 
particularly the exchange of  “boundary-role occupants” and key staff  from 
one organization to another, can increase inter-organizational understanding 
and could facilitate the growth of  epistemic communities and organizational 
convergence. These elements would contribute, at least in theory, to integrative, 
durable and effective inter-organizational cooperation schemes. But to what 
extent could these insights be applied to the institutional challenges behind the 
security-development nexus in practice?
A central problem with the alliance and joint venture approach are the practical 
constraints on agreeing on a clear and rigid hierarchy amongst formally 
independent organizations. Several authors have recurrently called for more 
coordination through a single, powerful coordinating organization. The UN 
often is suggested as the most authoritative and legitimate organization for 
performing such a role. This seems however to be unachievable in practice: not 
only are NGOs inherently suspicious of  too much UN dominance, but also 
even UN agencies themselves resist such an approach.10 Similarly, the emphasis 
of  alliance and joint venture theories on pre-defined legal and contractual 
formalizations of  cooperation schemes would seem to be difficult to achieve in 
8 Christer Jönsson, An Interorganization Approach to the Study of  Multilateral Institutions: Lessons from Previous 
Research on international cooperation, Development and Multilateral Institutions Programme, Working Paper No. 1, 
1995, p. 2–.
9 Ibid., p. 5.
10 L. Minear, op. cit. (fn. 3), p. 22.
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practice between international actors. Not only would such detailed agreements 
reduce flexibility and innovation, but also a too detailed and rigid formalization 
would severely curtail an organization’s autonomy. The problems encountered 
between NATO and the UN during their cooperation efforts in Bosnia during 
the early 1990s are an important reminder that international organizations will 
jealously guard their operational independence, resist a functional division of  
labor and may only assent to collaboration schemes on a more flexible and less 
formal basis. The experiences between the EU, NATO and the UN in the realm 
of  crisis management during the last decade point towards the emergence of  a 
more broadly defined and flexible collaboration scheme, where the role of  dense 
interactions and individuals is primordial.
Lessons from EU-NATO and EU-UN Inter-organizationalism
The emergence of  relatively stable cooperation patterns between the EU, 
UN and NATO would have been unthinkable during the Cold War, where 
ideological constraints imposed a strictly functional division between these 
organizations. After a decade of  approximate ad-hoc interaction since the end 
of  the Cold War, during the last five years the EU has managed to establish 
close inter-organizational links and coordination mechanisms with both NATO 
and the UN. As a result, the EU has already conducted three civil-military crisis 
management operations in close cooperation with the UN11 and two integrated 
military missions with NATO under the so-called Berlin Plus agreement.12 
These dense interactions in the field led to important lessons learned between 
the organizations and promoted inter-organizational convergence and a more 
nuanced understanding of  the partner organization’s culture and workings.
While several fundamental areas of  conflict exist, the degree of  cooperation and 
coordination is remarkable when viewed against the background of  the suspicion 
and inherent competition, which had previously marked the relations between 
these three international organizations. In addition to dense interaction and inter-
organizational learning on the ground, the relations between the EU and NATO 
and between the EU and the UN are tightened and guided by written agreements. 
The EU-UN Declaration on Cooperation in Crisis Management of  2003, as 
well as the NATO-EU “Berlin Plus” arrangement, can be seen as instructive 
precedents and examples of  a flexible, yet more predictable institutionalized 
framework of  inter-organizational cooperation.
11 The ongoing EUPM police mission in Bosnia, as well as two military missions in the Democratic Republic of  Congo 
(DRC) in 200 and 2006—with a further military mission currently in its initial phase in the Chad.
12 EU Concordia in Macedonia in 200 and the ongoing EUFOR Althea mission in Bosnia, launched in 2004.
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Indeed, a key variable in the formation and conclusion of  these agreements, 
particularly in the case of  the Berlin Plus agreement, was the personal factor 
and the trust between two boundary-role occupants: the intimate relationship 
between the EU’s High Representative Javier Solana, who previously served as 
NATO’s Secretary General until 1999, and NATO’s Secretary-General at the 
time, George Robertson, was of  key importance for advancing the cooperation 
agreement.13 This confirms 
the theoretical findings 
that personal affinities 
and pre-established links 
between individuals can be 
pivotal to lasting and more 
formalized inter-organi-
zational coordination and 
cooperation schemes. So-
lana’s case also highlights 
the effectiveness of  the 
“alumni effect:” as former 
NATO Secretary General, 
Solana knew the partner 
organization’s culture and 
workings intimately and 
understood the needs of  
both organizations. What 
remains remarkable about 
the agreement is that it was 
entirely pre-negotiated out-
side any formal context by 
both Solana and Robertson 
in the early stages.14
A key lesson learned 
and consequence 
for overcoming the current institutional challenges and facilitating more 
institutionalized inter-organizational cooperation schemes should be the 
active facilitation of  exchange (and indeed frequent rotation) between key 
organizational and bureaucratic leaders. This should not only include joint 
courses, conferences and desk-to-desk contact, but joint training missions 
13 See Martin Reichard, The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective, Aldershot [et al.] 2006.
14 Interview with Council Secretariat Official, Brussels, 7 March 2007.
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and general inter-organizational exchange regimes through, for example, 
visiting sabbaticals. This would not only lead to greater inter-organizational 
understandings and trust building, but also to the creation of  more integrative 
epistemic communities.
Apart from the individual factor, the experiences of  EU-NATO and EU-
UN cooperation schemes on the ground also highlights that the process 
of  inter-organizational cooperation is essentially incremental and depends 
on an integrative focal organization. The cooperative relationship and the 
inter-organizational understanding between the EU and NATO and the UN 
deepen with every new mission. These dense interactions help consolidate the 
flexible and effective institutionalization of  cooperation. Moreover, the EU has 
managed to establish itself  as an integrative focal and linking-pin organization 
without imposing an overly rigid hierarchy. Instead, broadly defined memoranda 
of  understandings, which nevertheless aid the consolidation of  permanent 
arrangements, have guided inter-organizational coordination and cooperation 
schemes. These might eventually even lead to the creation of  combined 
institutional systems. Though still in its infancy, the EU-AU Peace Facility seems 
to be another instructive and promising example of  such a more coordinated 
and institutionalized system. Kosovo, on the other hand, serves as an important 
reminder of  how the lack of  inter-organizational cooperation and coordination, 
with the absence of  personal links and inter-organizational informal agreements, 
lead to sub-optimal results in the promotion of  the security-development nexus.15
Conclusion
Theories of  inter-organizationalism and practical experiences with collaboration 
schemes between the EU, UN and NATO highlight the importance of  mutual 
understanding of  partner organizations’ workings, peculiarities and functioning. 
A convergence of  organizational self-interests may be induced structurally 
and externally (through the changing nature of  the international system or the 
increase of  conflicts), but also depends on organizational change, adaptations 
and increased interaction. While a clearly pre-defined hierarchy and fully 
institutionalized arrangement of  inter-organizational cooperation is the most 
desirable, it also remains the most unrealistic and improbable. International 
actors compete for scarce resources and international prestige; and diverging 
interests of  their donor countries might also lead to competitive dynamics 
and inefficient outcomes. Instead of  insisting too much on strict hierarchies 
and clearly defined functional divisions of  labor, the creation of  less formal 
15 See Dominik Tolksdorf, Implementing the Ahtisaari Proposal: The European Union’s future role in Kosovo, in: CAP 
Policy Analysis, No. 1, May 2007, <http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2007/CAP-Policy-Analysis-2007-01.pdf>.
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but nevertheless guiding memoranda of  understanding, ideally advanced by an 
integrative focal organization, between autonomous international organizations 
would be an important step towards furthering coordination and collaboration. 
Overcoming the inherent constraints on inter-organizational cooperation 
depends above all on the personal level at the agenda-setting bureaucracies 
within each organization. The facilitation of  greater interaction and socialization 
between key leaders and boundary-role occupants of  international organizations 
is as important as greater inter-organizational interaction on the ground in the 
form of  joint training exercises and desk-to-desk dialogue. Sabbatical exchanges 
between leaders should be encouraged, as it may increase inter-organizational 
learning and preference-shaping, which may in turn facilitate an increase in inter-
organizational trust, understanding and therefore in the general willingness to 
coordinate and cooperate.
 
New Faces Conference 2007 32
Panel I: The Security- 
Development Nexus
Pierre Antille, discussant on the Europe Panel, listens to Stephanie Ahern’s feedback to the intro-
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EU Institutions’ and Member States’ Approaches to 
Promoting Policy Coherence of Development and Security
Isabelle Tannous
Since 9/11, the problem of  fragile states has surged to the top of  development 
and security policy agendas. These states have been linked to threats such as 
transnational crime, intra-state and regional violent conflict, genocide, and terror-
ism. The risks emanating from these states can no longer be seen as purely local 
or humanitarian in nature, but rather as having potential ramifications for region-
al and global security. International decision-makers therefore have placed the 
problem of  fragile states at the centre of  their development and security policies.2 
Security and development are defined as inherently intertwined, and have become 
increasingly so.
The new paradigm—“No development without security, no security without de-
velopment”—came via significant changes in the ways in which development and 
security were conceived during the 1990s when actors from both sectors began to 
interact increasingly. Security actors have learned that short-term, ad-hoc military 
responses are insufficient for multi-dimensional state building and post-conflict 
peace-building processes. At the same time, development actors have realized 
that, after decades of  effort and hundreds of  billions of  dollars spent in develop-
ment aid, long-term development in impoverished nations is impossible or even 
counterproductive when incapacitated states cannot deliver the collective goods 
of  basic security and effective governance.
EU Member States and European institutions have played a leading role in the 
international debate on the security-development nexus. Some member govern-
ments, regional organizations, and international institutions have taken practical 
steps with the aim of  improving the nexus between and even joining develop-
ment and security. They have established new strategies, structures, and programs 
that aim to:
– bridge the institutional and policy gaps between development and security;
– integrate civilian and military capabilities and responses;
– enhance coordination, complementarity and coherence at various levels; and
1 The paper is part of  a post-doctoral project within the EFSPS framework (European Foreign and Security Policy 
Studies), jointly financed by the The VolkswagenStiftung, The Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and The Compagnia di San 
Paolo.
2 See European Security Strategy 2003, National Security Strategy 2003, United Nations Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change 2005, OECD-Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, April 2007.
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– formulate better and more integrated strategies to respond adequately to 
each phase of  the crisis response cycle by improving the links between short-
term and long-term crisis response.
These new approaches are often referred to as “joined-up government approach-
es” or “whole of  government approaches” and are closely aligned to the catch-
word of  policy coherence. The fundamental challenge is the same; the approach-
es to promoting coherence between development and security, however, vary. 
Fragile states are seen as a development and security challenge, nonetheless, the 
motivations and objectives fall along two extremes: policy coherence for national 
security versus policy coherence for development.3
Development policy is still struggling to find its position in the concert of  Eu-
ropean external relations. The debate on a potential subordination of  develop-
ment—and thereby the rationale between short-term and long-term prevention 
and crisis management—is far from being settled.4 This raised well-known fears 
and concerns about a securitization of  development, and a strengthening of  the 
security-first approach instead of  putting more effort and resources in prevention, 
structural stability and sustainable development. Up to now, little is known about 
the impact of  impulses of  agenda-setters and why different strategies towards 
precarious states result in the specific way the EU is constructing its relation-
ship of  security and development. This paper reflects the joined-up government 
approaches to foster policy coherence among development and security of  four 
“pioneers” among the Member States—Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden 
and Germany—and of  EU institutions in order to conclude on the direction 
taken on the European level.5
Pioneering EU Member States and their Approaches to Foster Policy Coherence of 
Development and Security
A closer look at the national approaches of  pioneering states and the European 
level approach to linking security and development displays the difference among 
the approaches.6
 See Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater than the sum of  its parts? Assessing “whole of  government” ap-
proaches to fragile states, in: International Peace Academy, New York 2007.
4 See Stephan Klingebiel and Katja Roehder, Subordination or cooperation? New interfaces between development and 
security policy, in: Peace, Conflict and Development, <http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/civil-military%20
cooperation%20final%20version%20edited.pdf>.
5 Since it is not the aim to analyze how the EU agenda is implemented in the face of  resistance or how Member States 
can foster other interests following this agenda, non-pioneers will not be analyzed in depth. However, their interven-
tions as well as the international debate are well known.
6 This builds on a project carried out by the Center of  Applied Policy Research (CAP) and is reflected in Kurt Klotzle, 
International strategies in fragile states: Expanding the toolbox?, Gütersloh / München 2006. For more detailed coun-
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– The United Kingdom pioneered an inter-ministerial pooling approach. The 
establishment of  the Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the Africa Con-
flict Prevention Pool in 2001 has been pivotal as these Conflict Prevention 
Pools integrate the expertise of  the DFID (Department for International 
Development), the MoD (Ministry of  Defense), and the FCO (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office), and provide pooled funding for joint initiatives to 
promote security, development, and good governance in states threatened 
or affected by violent conflict. A Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) 
was established in September 2004 and incorporates inter-departmental staff  
from DFID, MoD and FCO. The PCRU is tasked with improving civilian-
military links in planning and implementing post-conflict reconstruction 
policies and strengthening coordination between the United Kingdom and 
other international actors.7
– Germany established the Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict 
Resolution, and Post-conflict Peacebuilding” in May 2004, which defines 
conflict-related activities as cross-departmental tasks. An inter-ministerial 
steering group, comprised of  representatives from all federal ministries and 
under the supervision of  the Foreign Office, was established in September 
2004. The German government also made the effort to institutionalize the 
participation of  civil society actors in governmental decision-making pro-
cesses by creating a civilian advisory board to the inter-ministerial steering 
group.8
– The Netherlands introduced and implemented a Stability Fund that com-
bines resources from the development and foreign policy budgets to provide 
support for specific conflict-related issues, such as security sector reform 
(SSR), developing peacekeeping capacities, and small arms control in 2004. 
The Stability Fund is under the authority of  the Directorate for Human 
Rights and Peace Building (DMV) in the foreign office, established in 2000 
try case studies, see Tobias Debiel, Daniel Lambach, and Dieter Reinhardt, ‘Stay Engaged’ statt ‘Let Them Fail’. Ein 
Literaturbericht über entwicklungspolitische Debatten in Zeiten fragiler Staatlichkeit, INEF-Report 90, Duisburg 2007; 
OECD / Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC), Whole of  Government Approaches in Fragile States, 
Paris 2007; Andrea Warnicke, Early warning – early action, Enwicklungspolitische Instrumente zur frühzeitigen Ein-
dämmung von Gewaltkonflikten (Länderstudien, Bonn International Center for Conversion—BICC), Bonn, Decem-
ber 2006; Royal Norwegian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting 
Their Act Together, in: Overview report of  the Joint Utstein Study of  Peacebuilding, Evaluation Report 1/2004, Oslo 
2004.
7 DFID, Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for Security and Development, London 2005; MOD/
DFID, The Global Conflict Prevention Pool. A joint UK Government approach to reducing conflict, London 200; 
Greg Austin / Emery Brusset / Malcolm Chalmers / Juliet Pierce (Principal Authors), Evaluation Report EV647. Evalu-
ation of  the Conflict Prevention Pools. Synthesis Report, London 2004.
8 See the Federal Government, Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building, ad-
opted by the German Federal Cabinet, 12 May 2004; the Federal Government, 1st Federal Government Report on 
the Implementation of  the Action Plan: Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Build-
ing, Berlin 2006; and Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Development-Oriented 
Transformation in Conditions of  Fragile Statehood and Poor Government, Bonn 2007.
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The DMV is tasked with the coordination of  initiatives in the area of  “hu-
man security—human rights—human development.”9
– In Sweden, conflict sensitivity is a long-standing aim of  the Swedish Inter-
national Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). SIDA’s Shared Respon-
sibility Unit and the Division for Peace and Security (Department for Coop-
eration with NGOs, Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management) are 
responsible for the mainstreaming of  conflict prevention into development 
assistance and the implementation of  the Conflict Management Interven-
tions (CMI). Prior to CMI are a comprehensive conflict assessment of  the 
respective region and a conflict sensitive impact assessment.10
These exemplary cases are only 4 out of  the 27 Member States of  the European 
Union, and already this cursory overview reflects the differences among the key 
supporters of  this agenda. Joined-up approaches vary according to the specific 
political, institutional and administrative context in which a particular govern-
ment or institution operates. The relationship between development and security 
can be categorized in distance, cooperation or complementary strategies, depen-
dent on the rationale of  the cooperation mechanisms between the departments. 
An illustration: Germany has traditionally relied on a concept consisting of  
independent sectors (development, foreign policy and defense), and the UK has 
been working for some time with a pro-active model which provides for strategic, 
inter-ministerial cooperation and cross-funding between development policy and 
the military (Conflict Preventions Pools). Consequently, while Germany primarily 
emphasizes socio-economic projects and widely neglects security issues, the situa-
tion in the United Kingdom is reversed.11
The European Union: Agenda-Setter and Late-Comer
Since the mid-1990s, conflict prevention became a crosscutting issue on the 
European level, and the mainstreaming of  conflict prevention was defined as a 
priority for foreign and security policy. The drive within the EU towards institu-
tional, procedural, and strategic coherence of  development and security was led 
by the UK, with the establishment of  the Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID) in 1997, and two Conflict Prevention Pools in 2001. Other Member 
States—primarily Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands—followed-up in recent 
9 Dutch Ministry of  Foreign Affairs: Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities: Dutch Development Cooperation en 
route to 2015, The Hague 200.
10 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Promoting Peace and Security through Develop-
ment Cooperation, Stockholm 2005; Government Bill 2002/0:122: Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global 
Development, Stockholm, 15 May 200.
11 Tobias Debiel, Wie weiter mit effektiver Krisenprävention? Der Aktionsplan der Bundesregierung im Vergleich zu den 
britischen Conflict Prevention Pools, in: Die Friedens-Warte, Vol. 79, No. –4, 2005, pp. 25–298.
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years. Besides steps taken on the Member State level, a wide range of  initiatives 
were also taken by the EU to strengthen the consensus on the security-develop-
ment nexus in general as well as to foster coordination and merging of  security 
and development,12 namely via the establishment of  the Conflict Prevention Unit 
in DG Relex, the integration of  the development council in the General Affairs 
Council (GAERC), the Göteborg Program on Preventing Violent Conflict, and 
the set-up of  a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with its respective 
structures, guidelines and capacities. These factors stimulated the process at the 
European level, which conceptually culminated in the “European Security Strat-
egy” (200). The allotment of  an additional €00 million from the 10th Euro-
pean Development Fund (EDF) to the African Peace Facility, the new Stability 
Instrument of  the Commission, and the definition of  “security” as one of  the 
priority areas of  the Policy Working Programme, were defined as being of  major 
relevance for achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Other areas such as 
agriculture, energy, migration, and security in the Country and Regional Strategy 
Papers are more recent examples that illustrate the ongoing changes.
In parallel to enhancing conflict sensitivity within development policy, develop-
ment policy is defined as only one among other instruments in the “tool-box” 
available to the EU as an emerging international actor. Responding adequately 
to each phase of  the crisis response cycle implies improving the links between 
short-term and long-term instruments as well as adopting a more comprehen-
sive approach. Consequently, the dividing lines between development policy 
and foreign, security and defense policy—Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) / European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)—are blurring, and this 
set off  the debate on the nexus of  security and development. It is not the aim 
here to minimize the relevance of  the securitization debate, nonetheless, it should 
be brought into focus that the debate about the sensitive boundaries between 
security and development tends to neglect several major factors that actually im-
ply a strengthening of  development concerns in EU Foreign and Security Policy. 
Most prominent among these are:
– First, the formation of  civil-military instruments at the European level 
(ESDP), widely acknowledged conceptually as an “add-on” instrument to 
12 For a study carried out for the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) on the security-
development interfaces in European foreign and security policy, see Isabelle Tannous, Schnittstellen von Entwicklung 
und Sicherheit der Europäischen Union – Strategien und Mechanismen für mehr Politikkohärenz (Bonn International 
Center for Conversion—BICC), Bonn 2007, <www.ifsh.de/pdf/aktuelles/ESDP_Schnittstellen_tannous.pdf>. On 
the issue of  conflict prevention and crisis management of  the European Union, see EU Crisis Response Capability 
Revisited, in: International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 160, 17 January 2005, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/
home/index.cfm?id=220>; Vincent Kronenberger / Jan Wouters (eds.), The European Union and Conflict Preven-
tion. Policy and Legal Aspects, The Hague 2004; and Emma J. Stewart, The European Union and Conflict Prevention, 
Berlin 2006.
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the tool-box of  European foreign and security policy, an indispensable short-
term instrument to assist long-term and structural conflict prevention;
– Second, after decades of  resistance in the European integration process, 
ESDP was—once the compromise between France and the UK was reached 
in St. Malo—only made possible with the support by the European Com-
mission, as well as by neutral and civilian-oriented Member States;13
– Third, only a handful of  pioneering EU members foster pro-actively the 
idea of  joining security and development—and even among the key sup-
porters this agenda differs substantially—while others do not dispose of  
a conflict-sensitive development policy or even strongly reject the idea of  
pooling security and development.
Conclusion
More research is required in order to give more reliable indicators if  these factors 
mentioned above can be seen as only “retarding factors,” or if  we actually can 
assume a “developmentalization” in the specific construction of  the EU as an 
international actor. Development issues traditionally have a strong position in the 
argumentation of  the EU as “soft power” and as “stability exporter,” a conse-
quence of  the issue-driven integration process and the functional set-up of  the 
European Economic Community with the Treaty of  Rome 50 years ago. None-
theless, development has not fully recovered from the conceptual crisis in the 
1990s and the fundamental change of  the international system, the loss of  legiti-
macy of  the Santer Commission, discrediting European development policy, ten 
years later has its share. Only recently, especially since 9/11, and the “upgrade” 
of  European development policy with the European Consensus on Develop-
ment in 2005 did that development policy become en vogue again. Despite the 
fact that there is only a handful of  pioneer states that are actively supporting the 
joining-up of  security and development—and their approaches vary—the com-
mon understanding of  “jointness” has been strengthened on the EU level during 
the last years, and new instruments and procedures have been established. Even 
if  there is no technocratic formula for achieving greater policy coherence, the 
EU has appealed to its Member States to adjust their strategies accordingly and to 
provide additional support for this task.14
13 Tannous, Decision-Making by Antagonistic Representation: On the Path to Conflict Prevention and Crisis Manage-
ment, in: Dirk De Bièvre / Christine Neuhold (eds.), Dynamics and Obstacles of  European Governance, Cheltenham 
2007, pp. 187–229 (with Mariano Barbato).
14 Recent Council Conclusions on Security and Development: 281st External Relations Council meeting Brussels, 19/20 
November 2007.
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The European Union has often been criticized for its lack of  coherence as an in-
ternational actor, and accordingly is said to not be in a position to develop consis-
tent structures for conflict and post-conflict areas, and reacts solely on an ad-hoc 
basis. Critics go as far as to say that the EU lacks the qualities of  a political actor 
or defining coherence as a prerequisite of  “actorness.”15 Citing specific character-
istics of  the EU, especially with respect to the inter-pillar coordination, the inter-
governmental and the supra-national decision-making process often explain the 
alleged incoherent picture, which the EU presents in reaction to new threats, and 
the competencies shared at national and European levels.16 These explanations 
shall not be dismissed, but considering the challenges indicated in fusing develop-
ment and security for all actors involved, their scope is too limited when it comes 
to explaining why and in what way policy change occurs. It is not the institutional 
particularities of  the EU that explain the decisive coherence problems, but rather 
the merger intricacies of  the two policies as such. Neither the EU nor any one 
of  the Member States has managed to merge development and foreign / defense 
ministries into a new department of  conflict prevention and crisis management. 
Instead, a plethora of  existing mechanisms to enhance policy coherence between 
15 See Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union As a Global Actor, New York, NY, 2006.
16 See Hans-Georg Ehrhart, The EU as a civil-military crisis manager, Coping with internal security governance, in: 
International Journal, Spring 2006, pp. 4–450; Paul Gauttier, Horizontal Coherence and the External Competences 
of  the European Union, in: European Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2004, pp. 2–41; and Catriona Gourlay, European 
Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management, in: International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. , pp. 404–421.
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pre-existing organizational bodies—the development and security departments 
of  the EU Member States and / or the existing structures for development aid 
within the Community and the CFSP / ESDP capabilities—are strongly embed-
ded in their own institutional logic and bureaucratic rationality.
While such a super-ministry is far from being desirable, the status quo and the 
internal dynamics of  the debate show to be insufficient, sometimes even wicked: 
without engaging in a controversial and inconvenient debate to respond adequate-
ly to basic strategic and institutional questions on how to deal effectively with 
the multifaceted problems associated with fragile states, both development and 
security actors are more or less willingly supporting the security-first approach by 
referring to the relevance of  security and stability. Ignoring the blind spots of  the 
debate on the security-development nexus, by reducing it to civil-military coop-
eration within the narrow ESDP framework, and obeying to the logic of  securi-
tization result in neglecting the potential of  developmentalization in European 
foreign and security policy. Consequently, the discursive connotation linked to 
the nexus of  security and development will remain problematic, since it is often 
unclear whether it is referred to “our” security (stability in third countries in this 
chain of  argumentation limits the danger of  terrorist attacks) or to security and 
stability as a prerequisite for the sustainability of  development efforts in third 
countries (relevance of  the rule of  law or security sector reform). Security and 
development actors need to intensify dialogue, instead of  exploiting the concept 
of  security to their own advantage, coming from different angles and sometimes 
not even referring to the same subject. The European Union can provide a 
unique platform for this task to promote dialogue among its Member States.
Post-Conflict  
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Critical Review of Approaches to  
Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa
Richard Akum
Introduction
As violent conflicts ceded to the prospects for a sustainable peace within the con-
flict systems which proliferated across Africa in the 1990s, concern simultaneous-
ly shifted from conflict resolution towards post-war reconstruction. Crossing the 
conflict relapse vulnerability threshold has remained a pre-occupation in policy 
and academic circles, given the number of  studies which showed that a major-
ity of  countries emerging from violent conflict relapsed into conflict within five 
years after the signing of  a peace accord.1 As some scholars debated the cause 
of  conflict relapse, Collier grappled with breaking the conflict trap through the 
infusion of  development policy into conflict resolution processes and beyond.2 
Emerging from this problematic has been the development of  approaches which 
seek to merge political, social and economic considerations to design a sustain-
able post-conflict peace in Africa.
While conflict relapse vulnerability could be studied in abstraction, the realities 
of  conflict relapse in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of  Congo and Sudan 
remain all too glaring and necessitate further exploration of  post-war reconstruc-
tion. The carnage of  war leaves in its wake broken infrastructure, fissured inter-
personal relational dynamics, and a resource deprived community dependent on 
the benevolence of  external forces for social, economic and political sustenance. 
Thus from the resource level, the point at which post-war reconstruction takes 
off  is an asymmetric power dynamic between the victimized community emerg-
ing from conflict and the donor community. The realities of  the post-conflict 
environment therefore necessitate an understanding of  the endogenous and ex-
ogenous actors and structures involved in post-war reconstruction efforts. These 
actors and structures have definitional, assumptive and derivative frameworks 
which underpin their post-war interventions, which in turn hold clues to prevent-
ing conflict relapse vulnerability.
Over the past decade, post-conflict reconstruction in Africa has taken the form 
of  an admixture of  approaches which include approaches of  democratic recon-
1 Roy Licklider, The Consequences of  Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars 1945–9, in: American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 98, No. , 1995.
2 Paul Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, The World Bank, Washington, DC, 200. 
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struction, security sector reform, rule of  law/institutional reform and community-
driven development. These approaches are not mutually exclusive and there is 
even a tendency for them to overlap spatially at the level of  implementation. This 
paper seeks to provide a conceptual description of  these approaches through the 
identification of  the actors involved within specific approaches, the conceptual 
and operational assumptions which guide each approach as well as the potential 
implications on post-conflict reconstruction. This paper seeks to locate the space 
for a sustainable peace at the point of  intersection of  all the above approaches, 
thereby calling for the harmonization of  post-war reconstruction in societies 
emerging from protracted conflict. Given the complexity underpinning conflict 
causation in Africa, it would be foolhardy for any single approach to claim to pro-
vide the panacea against conflict relapse vulnerability.
The Democratic Reconstruction Approach
The democratic reconstruction model is premised on the perception that the 
structural elements of  governance were part of  the causal edifice of  conflict. The 
end of  the Cold War and the rise of  intra-state conflicts in Africa are not coin-
cidental occurrences in international affairs. Since independence, many African 
states had witnessed the creation of  monolithic repressive polities, with state-
planned economies. Hence the end of  the Cold War ushered in a transitional era 
when contending forces for the status quo and forces for change pushed against 
and for the liberalization of  political systems and for the accommodation of  new 
global forces of  change. Fukuyama optimistically saw Western victory at the end 
of  the Cold War as pointing to a liberal democratic and capitalist economic end 
to human history, with different countries at different stages on that journey.3 
Meanwhile Huntington pointed to a third wave of  democratization which would 
not elude the African continent this time around.4 These dominant post-polar 
perspectives explain the inclination of  donor and international Non-Governmen-
tal Organization (NGO) communities, to construct democratic institutions from 
the rubble of  intractable conflict.
Many of  the conflicts which exploded unto the African scene post-Cold War 
initially were driven by forces which claimed to be working to replace the mono-
lithic old guard with new and more accountable, representative and legitimate 
systems. What started in most places as revolutionary transformations responsive 
to the developmental, security and access needs of  the majority quickly faltered 
as belligerent parties differed on objectives, tactics and end goal, as was evident 
 Francis Fukuyama, The End of  History and the Last Man, New York 1994.
4 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman [et al.] 199.
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with the fractioning of  Taylor’s National Patriotic Forces for Liberia; Laurent 
Kabila’s Alliance for Democratic Forces in Congo, while unified in their vision to 
dethrone Mobutu, lacked a unified vision on the future of  the DRC; meanwhile 
postponing of  the 1995 presidential elections in the Republic of  Congo led to 
the unleashing of  militia forces loyal to former President Denis Sassou Nguesso, 
Brazzaville mayor Bernard Kolelas and incumbent democratically elected presi-
dent Pascal Lissouba. The infusion of  ethnic dichotomization into these conflicts 
also made them even more intractable. Hence a major challenge of  post-conflict 
peace-building is the creation of  an accommodative and responsive governance 
system which is legitimate and accountable.
The argument can be taken further to state that most of  Africa’s civil wars are 
the product of  years of  authoritarianism, disenfranchisement and lack of  av-
enues for participation. Given this premise, it would only be fair for mediators 
to dangle the democratic reconstruction model as a viable option for legitimate 
and representative governance in Africa. While this may be widely acceptable as a 
possible option for moving from conflict to a sustainable peace, the time, meth-
ods, structural and relational dynamics ought to be synchronized to meet African 
post-conflict realities. Responding to this structural governance need, Bloomfield 
and Reilly develop a conceptual definition of  democracy with three essential 
conditions—meaningful competition for political power amongst individuals and 
organized groups; inclusive participation in the selection of  leaders and policies, 
at least through free and fair elections; and a level of  civil and political liberties 
sufficient to ensure the integrity of  political competition and participation.5 From 
their perspective, the choice of  appropriate democratic institutions—forms of  
devolution or autonomy, electoral system design, legislative bodies, judicial struc-
tures—designed and developed through fair and honest negotiation processes are 
vital ingredients in building an enduring and peaceful settlement to even the most 
intractable conflict.
Despite the problems akin to budding democracies, they argue that democratic 
systems of  government have a degree of  legitimacy, inclusiveness, flexibility 
and capacity for constant adaptation that enables deep-rooted conflicts to be 
managed peacefully. Building on the constructs of  Waltzian “democratic peace 
theory,” the assumption is made that by building norms of  behavior of  negotia-
tion, compromise and cooperation amongst political actors, democracy itself  has 
a pacifying effect on the nature of  political relations between people and between 
governments. These assumptions fall short of  accounting for the lack of  fear, 
5 David Bloomfield and Ben Reilly, The Changing Nature of  Conflict and Conflict Management, in: Peter Harris and 
Reilly (eds.) Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators (Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance—IDEA, Handbook Series ; ), Stockholm 1998.
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trust and compliance required to dispel the potential of  a security dilemma within 
democratic societies.
However, this over-optimistic view on the healing and participatory potential 
of  democracy in post-conflict peace-building efforts is tempered by Horowitz’s 
assessment of  dilemmas of  majority inclusion and minority exclusion resulting 
from democratic processes and the potential for these dynamics to create endur-
ing rivalries between groups in divided societies.6 He notes that when democratic 
elections produce ethnic exclusion, undemocratic reactions can be expected from 
it. This nuanced view of  the pervasive effects of  ill-conceived organizational 
structures to power nascent democracies points to the requisite organizational 
and human capacity needed to ensure participatory democracy.
All the peace agreements signed in Africa between 1990–200 have recognized 
the importance of  democratic institution-building as a key component in the 
management and resolution of  protracted social conflicts. However, Call and 
Cook observe that of  the 18 countries that experienced UN peacekeeping mis-
sions, with a political institution-building component, between 1988–2002, 
thirteen (72%) were classified as some form of  authoritarian regime as of  2002.7 
This sobering statistic points to the fact that even the most well-intentioned inter-
nationally-engineered post-conflict democratization processes do not always turn 
out right. Many reasons could be advanced for this problematic in engineering 
democratic reconstruction into post-conflict peace-building.
The absence of  clear conceptual linkages between peace-building and democra-
tization remains evident. The confluence of  post-conflict peace-building and de-
mocratization theory is necessary, taking into account the relational dynamics of  
the groups and structures which emerge from protracted social conflicts. Starting 
off  with transitional processes, generally the time frame for the establishment 
of  a transitional government and the holding of  elections has been precipitated. 
Acting under pressure for immediate results, most peace processes in Africa have 
sought to placate the belligerents which control large swathes of  the country 
without taking a holistic approach to the problem of  post-conflict democratic 
institutional engineering. For warlords, peace negotiations in Africa have been a 
barter of  land and terrorism for the legitimization of  their monopoly on the use 
of  force through transitional leadership and then the manipulation of  elections 
to power.
6 Donald Horowitz, Democracy in Divided Societies, in: Journal of  Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 4, 199, pp. 28–29.
7 Charles Call and Susan E. Cook, On Democracy and Peacebuilding, in: Governance After War: Rethinking Democrati-
zation and Peacebuilding, Special Issue of  Global Governance, Vol. 9, No. 2, 200.
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The creation of  democratic societies assumes the existence of  participatory orga-
nization structures across Lederach’s pyramid of  groups from the community to 
the elite level.8 The absence of  cross-level interaction which was a characteristic 
of  the pre-conflict state is often replicated in post-conflict peace-building. Hence 
the creation of  elite democratic structures which remain disconnected from the 
masses, apart from being the recipients of  effusive campaign promises. This dis-
connect has been evident in both 1997 and 2005 Liberian presidential and legisla-
tive elections. According to the Carter Center and National Democratic Institute, 
more than 1. million Liberians, 50% of  whom were women, registered to vote, 
representing 90% of  a UN estimated 1.5 million voters.9 They also noted a num-
ber of  challenges which cast a cloud over the elections (a principal democratic 
hallmark) in immediate post-conflict societies. These challenges included: the en-
forcement of  campaign finance law and regulations; vote buying; civic education 
in a country with an illiteracy rate of  85%; the de-ethnicization and de-personal-
ization of  political campaign rhetoric; the disenfranchisement of  internally dis-
placed people and returning refugees; and the challenge of  hiring 18,000 polling 
staff  for the 3,212 polling places around the country.10 In immediate post-conflict 
situations, elections have been plagued with the same security dilemmas which 
escalated into conflict in the first place. Intangible forces of  fear, mistrust and 
uncertainty drive voter attitudes. Belligerents use democratic practice to legitimize 
and co-opt a monopoly on the use of  violence. These challenges are issues which 
need to be addressed across the board if  the international community is truly 
committed to democratic reconstruction in post-conflict societies.
The democratic reconstruction model holds great promise for post-conflict 
reconstruction in Africa. The novelty of  democratic processes in societies which 
have suffered over four decades of  post-independence monolithic rule could be 
an asset for its prospects. The democratic ideal needs to be understood as a dia-
lectical process hence the institutions created to support this process ought to be 
amenable to change. From the thesis of  the immediate post-conflict environment, 
the international community could play a central role in political party develop-
ment, civic education, encouraging the creation of  longitudinal linkages from 
communities, through mid-level civil society constituencies to the top leader-
ship. Open dialogue, also a hallmark of  democratic processes, is important in the 
transformation of  attitudes, behaviors and structural contradictions which cause 
and sustain conflict. However, there is the need for greater conceptual and appli-
cative clarity in the infusion of  democratic models in post-conflict peace-building.
8 Fukuyama, op. cit. (fn. ), p. 14.
9 First Carter Center Pre-Election Report on Liberia National Elections, October 2005, Atlanta, GA.
10 Geoffrey T. Harris, Reconstruction, Recovery and Development: The Main Tasks, in G. Harris (ed.), Recovery from 
Armed Conflicts in Developing Countries: An Economic and Political Analysis, London 1999, pp. 6–8.
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Rule of Law / Institutional Reform Approach
Emerging from and inalienably linked to the democratic reconstruction model is 
the institutional reform model. Institutional failure is one of  the root causes of  
conflict in Africa. The inability of  the state to marshal its institutional assets to 
the service of  its citizenry has led to intra-state and cross-border security dilem-
mas, which have pushed many states in Africa towards collapse. The institutional 
reform model for post-conflict reconstruction is an approach, which seeks to 
strengthen institutional capacity across areas such as the institutionalization of  
the rule of  law, institutionally engendering post-conflict reconstruction, institu-
tionalization of  transparency and accountability in public finance and the creation 
of  safeguards against abuse. Solid institutions are the bedrock of  good gover-
nance. Institutions are the key which unlock the mysterious grids belying conflict 
prevention, sustainable conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction. 
Well-lubricated, self-corrective, innovative and malleable institutions mediate the 
interaction between contending groups; regulate the transactional landscape; and 
provide a prism for consensus building in the face of  discord.
Rothman’s ARIA framework is premised on functional institutions to mitigate 
antagonism, resonate disparate views, invent creative solutions to problems and 
act upon these inventions.11 Meanwhile, institutional reform also plays a central 
role in Azar’s (1990) understanding of  post-conflict peace-building, since insti-
tutional development is a dynamic process which depends on both endogenous 
and exogenous inputs.12 From a macro-economic perspective, Rodrik, Subrama-
nian and Trebbi claim that institutions play important market-regulating, market 
stabilizing and market legitimizing roles, which when coupled with the design of  
sound macroeconomic reconstruction programs, provide sustainable anchors for 
post-conflict reconstruction.13 This institutional role in post-conflict economic 
reconstruction responds to the pressures of  unemployment, capital flight, and 
inflation which characterize immediate post-conflict economies.
The failure of  peace agreements to create institutions addressing the security di-
lemmas, which fuel polarization and the resort to hostile action, often are strong 
factors in conflict relapse vulnerability. Lake and Rothchilds note that collective 
fears of  the future persist, when states lose their ability to impartially arbitrate 
11 Jay Rothman, Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations and Communities, San Francisco, CA, 1997, 
pp. 7–9.
12 Edward E. Azar, The Management of  Protracted Social Conflicts: Theory and Cases, Aldershot, 1990, p. 15. 
13 Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, Francesco Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The Primacy of  Institutions over Geography 
and Integration in Economic Development (National Bureau of  Economic Research, Working Paper No. 905), Cam-
bridge, MA, 2002. 
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between groups, or to provide credible guarantees for the protection of  groups.14 
These fears are exacerbated by the use of  violence as an extension of  inter-group 
political interaction. With the state fragility, these functional deficiencies raise 
the concern of  physical security. This perspective is supported by Ignatieff, who 
asserts that there is one type of  fear more devastating in its impact than any 
other—the fear that arises when a state begins to collapse. He further contends 
that ethnic hatred is the result of  the terror which arises when legitimate author-
ity disintegrates.15 These intangibles point to structural deficiencies which ought 
to be corrected as a country emerges from a protracted social conflict. Hence 
post-conflict institutional reform plays a central role in mitigating the intangibles 
of  fear, mistrust and uncertainty which shape inter-group relational dynamics.
Africa’s record of  post-conflict institutional reconstruction is dismal. While non-
governmental organizations work to strengthen the non-state institutional sector, 
state institutional structures suffer under the weight of  inadequate funding and 
mediocre functional capacity. Hence within the post-conflict environment the 
state in Africa remains unable to deliver on political, regulatory, welfare and par-
ticipatory promises to its citizens. According to Adebajo the 1997 Taylor govern-
ment inherited a state treasury with 17,000 Dollars and over 500 million Dollars 
in domestic and foreign debt.16 This pecuniary fiscal position does not meet the 
threshold for the delivery of  the most basic services expected of  the state.
The importance of  institutional reform in post-conflict peace-building cannot be 
overstated. However, there is the need to merge theories on institutional reform 
with theories of  post-conflict peace-building. This merger should aim to address 
the root causes of  conflict and seek to provide structures which protect individu-
als and vulnerable groups within societies and provide them with avenues for par-
ticipation in processes which are of  concern to them. Post-conflict institutional 
reform should be geared towards strengthening institutions of  states and creating 
avenues for the creation of  non-state institutions which would operate within an 
interactive nexus. The investment required in developing the organizational and 
human capacity to harness post-conflict institutional reform is enormous, given 
the heavy human costs of  contemporary conflict.
14 David Lake and Donald Rothchilds, Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of  Ethnic Conflict, in: Interna-
tional Security, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1996. 
15 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, London 199.
16 Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau (International Peace Acad-
emy Occasional Paper Series), New York, NY, 2002.
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Security Transformation Approach
The security transformation model emerges from peace agreements as a direct 
response of  addressing the security crises posed by civil wars. In the immediate 
post conflict emergency environment, focus has been placed on the demobiliza-
tion, demilitarization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) of  former com-
batants, many of  whom are children. The security transformation model seeks to 
reconstruct a standing national army and police force which would meet specifi-
cally assigned roles in the service of  the state, recreating the state’s monopoly 
over the use of  violence. Africa has a mixed history of  civil-military relations. In 
the immediate post-independence environment, the military made incursions into 
politics in Nigeria, Ghana, Gabon, Togo, Congo, Chad, Zaire, the Central Afri-
can Republic, Uganda and Egypt among others. In many of  these states, like in 
other African states, the ethnicization of  the security establishment has meant the 
cooptation of  security services by specific ethnic groups loyal to leaders in power. 
Doe filled the ranks of  the army in Liberia with members of  his ethnic Krahn 
group, while Taylor filled the ranks of  his Anti-Terrorist Force with former 
NPFL fighters upon taking power in 1997. Meanwhile, even in countries which 
have avoided the scourge of  protracted social conflict like Cameroon, Paul Biya 
has flooded the elite presidential guards with members of  his ethnic Beti group. 
These issues, which have affected the efficiency of  the army and police forces, 
are central to the security reform models adopted post-conflict thereby eliciting 
tensions between regime security and state security.
Call and Stanley observe that although public security reforms are unlikely to be 
implemented if  not written directly into peace agreements, police reform matters 
for medium and long-term public security and democratization. They also note 
the tensions and trade-offs that confront local and international decision-mak-
ers regarding longer-term public security issues.17 Looking specifically at African 
peace agreements, there is the neglect of  public security sector reform clauses. 
While attention is paid to the modalities for disarmament and demilitarization, 
none of  the peace agreements seeking an end to the conflict in Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of  Congo (DRC) and Rwanda 
make extensive reference to the structure of  immediate post-conflict public secu-
rity forces.
Despite this deficiency of  public security clauses in Africa’s peace agreements, 
the cases of  South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique show various models of  
17 Charles Call and W. Stanley, Military and Police Reform After Civil Wars, in: John Darby and R. MacGinty (eds.), Con-
temporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, London 200.
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post-conflict security reform. The military merger model18 has entailed limited ef-
forts to build smaller national militaries that integrate former civil war adversaries, 
while developing a higher level of  professionalism. The success of  the military 
merger model is predicated upon the ability of  third party training to build trust 
and professionalism within the new post-conflict army and make it responsive to 
external threats exclusively. Hickson proposes in the case of  the DRC, establish-
ing security through demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of  armed 
groups and the creation of  an integrated Congolese armed forces and effective 
police force.19 In the DRC case, the new national army has lacked the requisite 
professionalism in its dealing with populations in the eastern part of  the country 
where it has been accused of  terrorizing local communities and raping women 
and children. The verdict is still out on the success of  the military merger model, 
because while it has created the requisite military force in places like Mozambique, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe, it has failed in Liberia and Sierra Leone where iden-
tifiable “spoilers” exist.
There is also the military re-composition model, which seeks to build a new 
military force from the ground-up. Given that civil wars often witness the demo-
bilization of  state armies as their ethnic and other loyalties push them to serve 
different fighting factions, the need often arises to recompose the military. This 
process is currently under way in Liberia where the United States has contracted 
private firms to train and equip a new Liberian military. This model takes into 
consideration the complexities of  civil war realities and seeks to create a distinctly 
new army breaking with the past, where the army was a violent tool for politi-
cal oppression as the Doe army was in its brutalization of  the Mano and Gio 
communities of  Nimba County in Liberia. Hence, like in all other cases of  post-
conflict peace-building, there is the need to fashion the security reform model 
according to local realities.
Public safety and national security are inalienably linked to human security. The 
post-conflict security environment, with the lingering presence of  small arms and 
the ability for former militia brigades to be reconstituted into criminal enterprises, 
security ought to be taken seriously in peace agreements and their implementa-
tion. It would be fallacious to think of  post-conflict security reform as separate 
from democratic and institutional reconstruction. Public security forces—the 
military for national defense and the police force for civil defense—are contribu-
tors to post-conflict peace-building processes. There is a need for greater focus 
18 Op. cit.
19 Claire Hickson, Evidence and Analysis: Overview Paper on Strengthening Conflict Prevention, prepared for the Com-
mission for Africa, London 2004, p. 11.
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to be paid post-DDRR, on the sustainable reconstruction of  public and national 
security within emergency, transitional and consolidation phases of  post-conflict 
reconstruction. This is one area where third party partnerships could play a pri-
mordial role in providing guarantees against the abuse of  the state’s monopoly on 
the use of  violence. Hence the salience of  mission, compositional, structural and 
operational synchrony between security and non-security institutional establish-
ments within post-conflict spaces.
Community Driven Development Approach
Civilian populations suffer the brunt of  contemporary conflicts in Africa. The 
pre-war conditions of  disenfranchisement and the lack of  avenues for political 
and economic participation are exacerbated by conflict situations where civilian 
populations become explicit targets of  the different belligerents. This makes local 
communities key stakeholders in the post-conflict reconstruction process. The 
inherently elite nature of  peace agreements in Africa, which often fail to address 
issues of  violence on civilian populations, further marginalize communities from 
the post-conflict peace compact. There is therefore the need to develop innova-
tive ways to incorporate community perspectives and indigenous inputs in the 
post-conflict reconstruction process. Community-driven development approach-
es, which are fairly new to peace-building, are seen to create opportunities for 
the infusion of  participatory, accountable, partnership-formation and inclusive 
tenets in post-conflict reconstruction. The Community Driven Development Ap-
proach seeks to explore the potential for peace-building and conflict mitigation 
in development projects, which members of  targeted communities identify and 
prioritize. This seeks to increase individual participation in post-war reconstruc-
tion from the community level through collective decision-making and eventual 
inter-community interaction. The assumption is that this level of  interaction 
would decrease levels of  mistrust, fear and uncertainty which are both a cause 
and by-product of  protracted conflict.
Cockell observes that a sustainable peace can only be founded on the indigenous, 
societal resources for inter-group dialogue, cooperation and consensus.20 Harris 
underlines the necessity for a phased and sequenced approach to post-conflict 
development endeavors.21 This approach ought to be sustainable and address the 
root causes of  the conflict. This is a theoretically sound approach which hopes to 
make local communities custodians of  post-conflict reconstruction. International 
NGOs are increasingly creating partnerships with local community based organi-
20 John G. Cockell, Conceptualising peacebuilding: human security and sustainable peace, in Michael Pugh (ed.), Regen-
eration of  War-Torn Societies, London 1999, p. 2.
21 Harris, op. cit. (fn. 10).
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zations to address the participatory needs of  these local communities. While this 
direct interaction with international partners creates avenues for participation in 
health care, education and economics, it does not necessarily lead to inclusive-
ness in the creation of  intra-state partnering. This runs contrary to the goal of  
post-conflict peace-building which seeks to harmonize and facilitate the exchange 
between state and civil society organizations for sustainable peaceful coexistence.
However, community driven development approaches hold the promise of  using 
the development medium to harmonize state goals with those of  its local com-
munities through sustained dialogue between both groups. Sen noted the inter-
related nature of  development, institutions and security when he underscores the 
importance of  freedom as a means and an end to development.22 This interac-
tion between freedom and development ought to be the bedrock upon which 
countries emerging from protracted social conflict are built. Community driven 
development approaches challenge the state to look beyond the capital city and 
strengthen service provision in peripheral regions and to provide avenues for 
cross-communal interaction in meeting similar needs.
Conclusion
The different models for post-conflict reconstruction need to be harmonized 
for inclusion in peace-building processes in Africa. This highlights the need for 
the creation of  specific structures within the African Union and NEPAD to 
focus specifically on contextualizing the democratic reconstruction, institutional 
restructuring, security reform and community driven development models to 
the specific country realities. While these entities may provide the organizational 
capacity for the design and implementation of  post-conflict reconstruction pro-
cesses, there is also the need for considerable sustained financing for post-conflict 
peace-building programs. To make peace agreements extend beyond cease-fires, 
these approaches need to be discussed during peace processes. It does not suffice 
for belligerent parties to sit together and try to maximize their gains in political 
power and resource control through peace agreements. Addressing post-conflict 
reconstruction specifics during peace processes would challenge parties to look 
beyond the specifics of  personal gains made by the barrel of  the gun to respon-
sibilities they owe to the citizens of  the countries they aspire to lead. They need 
to be challenged to come up with ways of  ensuring a sustainable peace in the 
immediate post-conflict environment.
22 Amarya Sen, Development as Freedom, New York 1999, p. 16.
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… and debates its implications with discussant Teresa Cravo during a stroll through the nearby 
Retiro Park
Benedikt Franke presents his paper on Africa’s security architecture …
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Helping a Continent to Help Itself:  
Institutional Capacity Building in Africa
Benedikt Franke
Introduction
The disappointing performance of  the African Union’s peace operations in 
Darfur and Somalia has rekindled widespread skepticism about the wisdom of  
relying on African institutions for promoting peace, security and development on 
the continent. While acknowledging a wide range of  difficulties, this paper rejects 
such pessimism and argues that the unique, multi-level structure of  Africa’s cur-
rent institutional landscape offers an exciting window of  opportunity for capac-
ity building which the international community cannot afford to ignore. To this 
purpose, the paper first elaborates on Africa’s current institutional architecture, 
the international community’s ongoing support as well as the key challenges to its 
implementation; and then points to the rationales for expanding capacity building 
support before offering some specific policy recommendations to this effect.
Doubts about Africa’s ability to take over responsibility for peace and security on 
the continent are as old as the attempts by African organizations to do so. Dur-
ing the Cold War, the dismal performance of  the Organization of  African Unity 
(OAU), which had been founded in May 196 in order to “achieve a better life 
for the peoples of  Africa,”1 certainly proved the skeptics right. Since the early 
1990s, however, Africa’s organizations have shown an increasing willingness and 
capacity to provide “African solutions to African problems” or, in the words of  
former French President François Mitterrand “to finally resolve their conflicts 
themselves and organize their own security as condition for the continent’s de-
velopment.”2 While critical voices continue to doubt the practicability of  region-
alizing the responsibility for peace and security in Africa—usually citing insuf-
ficient institutional resources and a lack of  political will—this paper argues that 
the continent’s current move from ad hoc initiatives to institutionalized security 
frameworks has created an unprecedented chance for the international commu-
nity to help Africa to help itself.3
1 OAU, Charter of  the Organization of  African Unity, Article 2b.
2 Former French President François Mitterrand, in: The Washington Post, 10 November 1994.
 For a particularly seething critique, see Walter Dorn, Regional Peacekeeping Is Not the Way, in: Peacekeeping and 
International Relations, Vol. 27, No. 2/1998. For a response, see Benedikt Franke, In Defence of  Regional Peace 
Operations in Africa, in: Journal of  Humanitarian Assistance, No. 185/2006.
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Africa’s Current Institutional Architecture
Increasingly aware of  the link between widespread insecurity and stalling devel-
opment, African governments made important steps towards creating a viable 
institutional architecture through which to tackle the continent’s many perils in 
the late 1990s. While such efforts were certainly not new, previous attempts at 
creating a favorable climate for development through institutionalized coopera-
tion had failed miserably.4 With the end of  the Cold War, however, conditions 
changed. The deteriorating security landscape in Africa, the international com-
munity’s diminishing interest in the continent as well as a discernible change in 
the continent’s self-perception forced the OAU to reconsider its own role with 
regard to Africa’s security and development. This jump-started a process that in 
July 2002 led to the replacement of  the OAU with a structurally more promising 
African Union (AU) modeled in many ways after the European archetype. At its 
first session, the assembly of  the AU established a Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) as a standing decision-making organ including “a continental early-warning 
system (CEWS) to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis 
situations in Africa” as well as an African Standby Force (ASF) and Panel of  the 
Wise to respond to such crises.5 The incorporation of  the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as well as the formulation of  a Common Afri-
can Defense and Security Policy, which delineates the member states’ collective 
responses to both internal and external security threats, completed this institu-
tional architecture in February 2004.
While the creation of  this arrangement in itself  constitutes a major achievement 
in institutional reform, it is the AU’s underlying acceptance of  the normative 
commitment to protect that distinguishes it from its feeble predecessor. Where 
Articles II and III of  the Charter OAU had placed a premium on sovereignty, ter-
ritorial integrity and non-interference in member states’ internal affairs, the AU’s 
Constitutive Act imposes important limitations on state sovereignty.6 Under the 
AU, member states enjoy the privileges of  sovereignty such as the non-interfer-
ence in its internal affairs only as long as they fulfill their responsibility to protect 
their citizens.7 If  states fail to honor this responsibility, the AU reserves itself  
“the right to intervene pursuant to a decision of  the Assembly in respect of  grave 
4 See Franke, A Pan-African Army: The Evolution of  an Idea and Its Eventual Realisation in the African Standby Force, 
in: African Security Review, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2006.
5 See Article 2, Paragraph 1, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of  the Peace and Security Council of  the African 
Union, 2002.
6 Articles II and III, Charter of  the Organization of  African Unity, 25 May 196, reprinted in International Legal 
Materials 2, no. 4, July 196, pp. 767–78.
7 The Responsibility to Protect, Report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
December 2001, Paragraphs 6.1–6.12.
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circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.8 The 
significance of  this shift in the non-interference norm cannot be understated: a 
pivotal OAU principle was that states would not interfere in the internal affairs of  
other African states. This core principle not only prevented the OAU from taking 
action in a number of  severe crises in Africa, but also extended to a continent-
wide silence on the abusive tendencies of  autocratic leaders. The simple accep-
tance that sovereignty is not completely inviolable represented a major change.
A second prominent feature of  the new peace and security architecture is its 
multi-layered and symbiotic approach to security cooperation. Likened by some 
to a “peace pyramid,” the continental security structure rests firmly on Africa’s 
existing regional security mechanisms, which act both as pillars of  and implemen-
tation agencies for continental security policy.9 This structural interdependence 
not only contrasts starkly with the OAU’s often uneasy relationship with the 
continent’s regional economic organizations (RECs), but also helps to focus the 
plethora of  African security initiatives onto one common objective. Moreover, 
the AU can profit from the regional organizations’ comparative advantage in 
military and security matters, their experience with peace operations and—in the 
case of  Western, Eastern and Southern Africa—their established frameworks and 
mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Congruently, 
the cooperative structure does not deny the regional organizations a significant 
stake and central role in all processes and respects their regional authority and 
responsibility. Under this system of  decentralized collective security, the primary 
responsibility for peace and security remains squarely with the regional organi-
zations while the AU serves as the clearinghouse and framework for all initia-
tives, thus filling the conceptual and institutional gap between the global level 
(the United Nations) and the regional level. The resultant symbiosis ensures the 
regional organizations’ ownership in the process of  establishing a continental 
security architecture and virtually eliminates the risk of  competition between the 
various levels of  inter-African security cooperation; and increases the stakes all 
actors have in the process and thereby reduces the chances of  failure.10
While some critics argue that this decentralized approach merely creates or rein-
forces additional layers of  bureaucracy and thus slows down responses to crises 
and conflicts, there is ample evidence that the symbiotic relationship between the 
8 The Constitutive Act of  the African Union, July 2002, Article 4 (Principles), Paragraph h.
9 For the concept of  “peace pyramid”, see Mark Malan, The OAU and African Sub-Regional Organisations—a Closer 
Look at the Peace Pyramid (Institute for Security Studies), Pretoria 1999.
10 See AU Document AU-RECs/EXP/2(II) Rev. , Draft Memorandum of  Understanding on Cooperation in the 
Area of  Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating 
Mechanisms of  the Regional Standby Brigades of  Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, 2 September 2007.
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continental and regional levels is already beginning to bear fruit. Over the past 
five years, the ambitious dream of  a comprehensive security architecture has been 
taking shape at a remarkable pace and the AU has become deeply involved in the 
continent’s manifold security problems by building on the experiences and relying 
on the resources of  regional organizations. In Burundi, for example, the African 
Union Mission (AMIB) stabilized the fragile situation and prepared the ground 
for a subsequent UN peacekeeping operation. In Darfur, the African Union Mis-
sion in Sudan (AMIS) has, despite severe financial and logistical difficulties, done 
remarkably well in alleviating widespread suffering and containing a conflict in 
which no one else was prepared to intervene. Similarly, the AU was the only or-
ganization ready to deploy to Somalia following Ethiopia’s invasion in December 
2006. In Togo, the AU prevented the undemocratic take-over of  power following 
the death of  President Gnassingbe Eyadema; and on the Comoros the African 
Union Military Observer Mission (AMISEC) successfully safeguarded a compli-
cated election and reconciliation process.
Current Capacity Building Initiatives
The international community has not missed these positive developments and 
has gradually increased its capacity building support to the AU and the conti-
nent’s regional organizations through the channels of  the UN, G8, EU as well as 
national efforts, most notably those of  the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Germany.
United Nations
The United Nations has a long history of  institutional capacity building in Africa. 
As early as 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali established the 
United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central 
Africa in order to support the Economic Community of  Central African States 
(ECCAS) in its incipient efforts to promote regional peace and stability.11 Since 
then, the UN has expanded its capacity building to other organizations such as 
the Economic Community of  West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU,12 
which, as a result of  the reports of  the Brahimi Commission (2000) and the High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), has increasingly emerged 
as the focal point for UN capacity building support.13 Given the emergent divi-
sion of  labor in which the AU or RECs provide the initial response to crises 
before the UN takes over (as happened in Sierra Leone, Burundi and Liberia) 
11 See UN Document A/RES/46/7 B, 6 December 1991.
12 See Victoria Holt, African Capacity Building for Peace Operations: UN Collaboration with the African Union and 
ECOWAS (Henry L. Stimson Center), Washington, DC, 2005.
13 Report of  the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility 
(United Nations), New York 2004, para 272c.
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as well as the anticipated growth of  so-called “hybrid” missions where multiple 
organizations try to synchronize their field activities (as is currently the case in 
Darfur), the UN has now deployed a permanent liaison team to the AU in order 
to coordinate support activities, assist with operational planning and management 
and strengthen headquarters capabilities.
G8
The G8’s involvement in capacity building in Africa began at the Genoa Summit 
in 2001, and has since grown steadily and culminated in this year’s Heiligendamm 
Summit, which declared Africa’s development one of  the group’s top priorities 
(the others being climate change and economic growth). To this purpose, the G8 
leaders pledged to increase their capacity building support in line with the 1992 
Paris Declaration, their own Africa Action Plan—agreed to in Kananaskis in 
2002—and the so-called Joint Plan adopted in 200. A fundamental aim of  the 
latter was to “mobilize technical and financial assistance so that, by 2010, Afri-
can partners are able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent 
conflict on the continent, and undertake peace support operations in accordance 
with the United Nations Charter.”14 Realizing that implementation of  the ambi-
tious Joint Plan was lacking, one problem being that the G8 has no bureaucracy 
or other machinery through which to implement its policies, and thus has to 
rely on coherent actions of  its member states, the G8 began to narrow its focus 
on particular areas of  the African peace and security architecture.15 These areas 
include the ASF, and specifically its civilian component, as well as capacity build-
ing for conflict prevention and stabilization, reconstruction, reconciliation and 
development in post-conflict situations.16
European Union
Like the G8, the European Union (EU) has been increasingly involved in Africa 
over the last couple of  years. Beginning in earnest with its Africa strategy of  2005 
(“The EU and Africa: towards a strategic partnership”), the EU has stressed the 
fundamental role of  institutional capacity building in its development initiatives. 
Based on the implementation policies outlined in its Concept for Strengthening 
African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of  Conflicts 
as well as various action plans, the EU has promoted long-term capacity build-
ing, including military and civilian crisis management support for the ASF. To this 
effect, it has earmarked €27 million out of  its €250 million African Peace Facil-
ity (APF) for capacity building purposes and began to fund personnel recruit-
14 Implementation Report by Africa Representatives to Leaders on the G8 Africa Action Plan, para. 12.
15 Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaji Bah, and Fanny Calder, The Implementation of  the Joint Africa / G8 Plan to Enhance Af-
rican Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations: Survey of  Current G8 and African Activities and Potential 
Areas for Further Collaboration (Chatham House), London 2005.
16 G8 Summit Declaration, Growth and Responsibility in Africa, 8 June 2007, Articles 9–45.
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ment, staff  costs, equipment, rent of  office space and duty travel, a series of  ASF 
workshops, the creation of  liaison offices of  RECs with the AU, as well as the 
development of  early warning capacities. In addition, the EU has recently Eu-
ropeanized the successful French training initiative Renforcement des capacités 
africaines au maintien de la paix (RECAMP) and established a separate delegation 
to the AU in order to increase coherence. The joint EU Africa strategy adopted 
at a joint AU-EU summit in Lisbon (December 2007) will further expand Eu-
rope’s role in institutional capacity building in Africa.
National Efforts
Over the last decade, various members of  the international community have begun 
to complement their multilateral capacity building support with more specific na-
tional efforts. The German Corporation for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), for ex-
ample, has emerged as the principal supporter of  the operationalization of  CEWS, 
having organized and paid for several workshops, contracted three external experts 
as early warning consultants for the AU, supported the development of  an authori-
tative CEWS Handbook and installed the necessary IT-components throughout 
Africa. The GTZ has also provided temporary office space for the AU’s Peace 
Support Operations Division (PSOD), until a permanent arrangement is found, 
and facilitated the formulation of  a Memorandum of  Understanding between the 
RECs and the AU. During her widely publicized speech at the AU in October 2007, 
Chancellor Angela Merkel promised further German capacity building initiatives.
The United States, for many reasons from the Global War on Terror to resource 
interests, is an even more active capacity builder than Germany. Besides its long-
existent programs like the Global Peace Operations Initiative, the African Con-
tingency Operations Training Assistance and the Enhanced International Peace-
keeping Capabilities Assistance,17 the US recently established a separate embassy 
to the AU and announced the creation of  a new African Command (AFRICOM), 
which will “provide a comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach to capacity 
building.”18 Other notable national initiatives include the United Kingdom’s Con-
flict Prevention Pool as well as China’s unconditional provision of  $100 million 
for an urgently needed expansion of  the AU Headquarters in Addis Abeba.
Key Challenges to Capacity Building in Africa
There are three key challenges to institutional capacity building in Africa today. 
First, the continent’s organizations crucially lack institutional human resource 
17 For a more detailed description of  US capacity building in Africa see Franke, Enabling a Continent to Help Itself: US 
Military Capacity Building and Africa‹s Emerging Security Architecture, in: Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, No. 1, 2007.
18 Otto Sieber, Africa Command: Forecast for the Future, in: Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, No. 1, 2007.
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capacity. Second, there still appears to be too little coordination within the donor 
community. Third, the insufficient coordination among African actors also re-
mains an area of  concern.
Institutional Human Resource Capacity
Identified as “the major problem both at the AU and within Africa’s regional 
bodies” by Alex Ramsbotham and Alhaji Bah over two years ago, the lack of  
institutional human resource capacity continues to cripple Africa’s institutional 
effectiveness.19 For instance, the AU PSC has a huge mandate, but still has no 
formal secretariat to support its work. Its Peace Support Operations Division 
tries to run several operations (AMIS, AMISOM and AMIB) and simultaneously 
coordinate the establishment of  the ASF and the CEWS while being as much as 
55 percent short of  its planned personnel strength. Operational pressures such as 
those to respond to the crises in Darfur and Somalia further exacerbate already 
weak headquarters capacity for strategic, long-term planning and development. 
Naturally, such shortcomings cause many difficulties for international capacity 
building efforts. The AU’s subsequent inability to determine clearly the specifics 
of  what support it wants and how that support should be delivered, for example, 
weakens its capacity to secure coherent donor assistance for identified priorities, 
and the lack of  financial audit and administrative staff  dealing with peace funds 
reduces its absorption capacity for aid.
Donor Coordination
Despite many promises to the contrary, there still appears to be insufficient donor 
coordination even where synergies seem natural. Effective coordination, however, 
is vital if  the multiplication of  donor partners in the capacity building process 
(including the comparatively recent arrival on the scene of  the G8, China and 
emerging powers such as India and Brazil) is not to create more impracticable ac-
counting demands and increase transaction costs for the AU and the RECs thus 
further undermining institutional capacities.
Coordination among African Actors
Lack of  coordination between the AU and the RECs also continues to impact on 
the effectiveness of  international capacity building. While the recent creation of  
REC liaison offices at the AU and the expected adoption of  a Memorandum of  
Understanding between the AU and the RECs at the next AU summit will go a 
long way towards formalizing the relationship between the continent’s various or-
ganizations, effective communication and collaboration between them is still far 
from assured. The presence of  at least six African institutions with serious secu-
19 Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaji Bah, and Fanny Calder, Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity: A Useful Role for 
the UK and the G8?, in: International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 2, 2005, p. 4.
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rity and development ambitions and often overlapping memberships will contin-
ue to create tensions.20 These are potentially further aggravated by donor-driven 
capacity building initiatives, which often tend to favor some regions and member 
states over others. In addition to the uneven political and economic development 
of  African states, the differing political and security agendas and visions as well 
as competition between states could contribute to the asymmetrical development 
of  regional organizations and undermine the rationalization and integration ef-
forts of  the AU as well as the consensus required to realize a common approach 
to security and development.
The Rationale for Expanding Institutional Capacity Building in Africa
Why should the international community expand its institutional capacity build-
ing effort? Is it not true that the existing institutional structures of  organizations 
like the UN, EU or even NATO are, at least for the foreseeable future, much 
better suited to deal effectively with Africa’s many perils? Also, does the fact that 
the UN lately had to take over several African-led missions (Liberia, Burundi, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Darfur) not suggest that ten years of  western capacity building 
programs in Africa have had, to date, a relatively moderate effect, and that the 
ability of  the continent’s organizations to take over responsibility for peace and 
security remains severely limited? While the above may be true, there are at least 
three good reasons for the international community to increase its capacity build-
ing support to the continent’s emerging institutional architecture. The first is the 
nature of  this architecture itself. Contrary to Africa’s previous attempts at coop-
eration, the multi-level structure of  the current architecture is highly inclusive and 
ensures that all states and regions can feel ownership in its initiatives. Instead of  
regarding the RECs as competitors in a zero-sum game as the OAU had done, 
the AU—applying the principles of  subsidiarity, burden-sharing and sub-con-
tracting—relies on them as essential building blocs and implementation agencies 
for its continental programs.21 This “organized complementarity” is best illus-
trated by the heavily regionalized character of  central AU projects like the ASF 
(based on five regionally administered standby brigades) or the CEWS (based on 
five regional early warning mechanisms). Besides the benefit of  welding together 
Africa’s states, the emerging peace and security architecture also epitomizes a 
much needed common objective which can finally channel the multiplicity of  
resources, initiatives and ambitions devoted to African capacity building into one 
20 For a more detailed discussion of  the proliferation of  regional organizations and the effect of  overlapping member-
ships, see Franke, Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent‹s Emerging Security Architecture, in: African 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2007.
21 Article 16 of  the PSC Protocol and the CADSP stress that the regional mechanisms will form the “building blocs” of  
the AU’s peace and security architecture; see also Articles c, j and k of  the AU Constitutive Act and Article p of  the 
2003 Amendment to the Constitutive Act.
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direction, or as Cedric de Coning put it in 2004: “The development of  an African 
peace and security system is a significant achievement because it provides Africa 
with a common policy framework for capacity building. This means that the 
various initiatives currently underway, and any new programs, can be directed to 
support this common objective, regardless of  whether such initiatives are taking 
place at the regional, sub-regional or national level.”22
The international community should expand its support to Africa’s emerging 
institutional architecture not only because the latter provides a unifying frame-
work for all the continent’s cooperative efforts, as well as a useful focal point for 
international assistance, but also because it, more than anything else, has come to 
symbolize Africa’s (self-declared) renaissance and process of  self-emancipation, 
which has a very real and valuable impact on African politics in general. Increased 
political institution-building and the establishment of  an administrative base for 
cooperative ventures in other fields, such as economics, are only a few of  the 
positive spillover effects of  a functional continental security architecture. Lastly, 
the international community should expand its efforts because, in light of  the 
UN’s current overstretch and its own apparent reluctance to get involved other-
wise, home-grown African initiatives represent the best chance for halting the 
violent conflicts and resultant humanitarian tragedies which continue to thwart 
development in large parts of  Africa.
Policy Recommendations
• Build AU institutional capacity—a pivotal priority to control and streamline 
the development of  the RECs in order to avoid unnecessary duplication 
of  effort and to ensure a common approach to the continent’s troubles. It 
needs to be credible and must overcome its deficiencies in communication, 
planning and management. The international community must not let the 
AU follow the OAU’s slip into institutional insignificance.
• Establish reliable financing mechanisms—the EU’s APF was a good start, 
but did not provide African organizations with sufficient planning security. 
As Africa’s institutions move away from ad hoc initiatives, so should the 
donor community.
• Enhance further donor coordination—the institutionalization of  regular 
liaison and partner group meetings is an important step towards identifying 
and using potential synergies and harmonizing long-term capacity building 
strategies.
22 Cedric de Coning, Towards a Common Southern African Peacekeeping System, in: Electronic Briefing Paper (Center 
for International Political Studies), No. 16, Pretoria 2004, p. 4.
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• Share more expertise with the AU, namely from the UN, the EU and 
NATO—areas for increased collaboration should include the development 
of  headquarters capacity, focusing on mission planning and support. They 
could also work on the coordinated use of  logistics sites, organizing staff  ex-
changes between headquarters, supporting hand-offs between African- and 
UN-led operations, sharing lessons learned and planning expertise, improv-
ing the use of  early warning and analytical information in Africa, harmoniz-
ing training and doctrinal materials as well as operational funding.
Conclusion
Security is an essential foundation for Africa’s development. However, the chal-
lenges to African peace and security defy easy solutions. Many conflicts are 
multifaceted and deeply entrenched such as those in the Mano River Union 
conflict system (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire), the Great Lakes 
(Democratic Republic of  the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda), the Horn of  
Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea) as well as Central Africa (Sudan, Chad, Central 
African Republic) and therefore likely to remain on the international agenda over 
the next decade or more. Coupled with the apparent unwillingness of  large parts 
of  the international community to respond meaningfully to these crises, this fact 
highlights the need for alternative approaches to conflict management in Africa. 
Though numerous problems persist for African organizations to spearhead such 
approaches, the last decade has seen several important developments. The pa-
rameters have clearly shifted in the direction of  greater visibility and a heightened 
political will to act and the various organizations have slowly forged ahead with 
the process of  establishing a viable security architecture. Administrative, financial, 
institutional and operational structures have been established to serve as bench-
marks and guidelines for future missions and several international initiatives have 
begun to remedy the significant institutional deficiencies of  African organiza-
tions, which, given appropriate resources, could certainly help to ease the United 
Nations’ heavy burden without infringing upon the latter’s authority. Expanding 
institutional capacity building surely is no panacea to Africa’s manifold perils, 
but the notion is not without its merits, due to the decreasing willingness of  the 
international community to accept responsibility for peace and security on the 
continent and the increasing African ability to take on such a task.
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From National Security to Human Security—Less of the 
Same in Congo?
Zoë Marriage
With the end of  the Cold War came shifts in the way security was perceived and 
pursued. The failing favor of  the nation state provided space for the concept of  
human security and with it a plethora of  associated security actors. Human secu-
rity has particular resonance in Congo as millions of  people have died, and the 
majority of  deaths have not resulted directly from military violence. However, at 
the level of  policy and practice, the contribution of  human security is question-
able: it has not inspired effective protection of  the population. In addition, the 
relationship between human security and national security, originally theorized in 
terms of  exclusive sovereignty, has proved to be more complex.
What is Human Security?
The security debate was revived in the 1980s and gathered pace through the 
1990s as the paradigm of  human security emerged and was debated. A corre-
sponding policy discourse engaged major donors, and this overlaid the notion of  
national security with concepts of  human, environmental, economic and interna-
tional security.1 Academic and practitioner discussions have moved the concept 
of  security away from one defined by national interest, pursued through the 
use of  force and being dominated by northern and masculine perspectives. The 
concept of  human security takes human populations as the referent objects of  
security.
There is little agreement on how human security is defined—and what is exclud-
ed,2 but a seminal and referential piece of  work is the 1994 Human Development 
Report,3 which identified the component parts of  human security as being per-
sonal, economic, health, political, food, community and environmental security. 
1 Peter Dombrowski (ed.), Guns and butter: the political economy of  international security, Boulder, CO, 2005; Human 
Security, in: St Antony’s International Review, No. 2/2005; Roland Dannreuther, International Security. The Contem-
porary Agenda, Cambridge [et al.] 2007; Karen Fierke, Critical Approaches to International Security, Cambridge and 
Malden, 2007; Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold 
War Era, London 1991.
2 Roland Paris, Human Security : Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, in: International Security, Fall 2001, pp. 87–102; Gary 
King and Christopher J. L. Murray, Rethinking Human Security, in: Political Science Quarterly, Nr. 4, 2001/2002, pp. 
585–610; Jakkie Cilliers, Human Security in Africa. A conceptual framework for review, African Human Security Initia-
tive, <http://www.africanreview.org/docs/humsecjun04.pdf>, Nairobi 2004 (16/10/2007).
 New dimensions of  human security, in: Human Development Report 1994 United Nations Development Programme, 
pp. 22–46, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1994_en.pdf> (17/12/2007).
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Others argue that human security and national security complement each other;4 
but the fact that a long liberal tradition has sought ways of  ameliorating the rela-
tionship between the state and the population is not in question, but rather what 
happens when national security and human security collide?
The political impact of  the human security notion was to signal some interna-
tional agreement that the state was not permitted to abuse its citizens—the rights 
of  human populations could trump sovereignty claims and large-scale abuse 
would attract international disapprobation and intervention.5 Human security 
brings with it some implied criticism of  the state and with it an interventionist 
agenda: concretely—the state is not doing its job in protecting civilians and may 
be threatening them, and theoretically—international war is not the major threat 
and major threats cannot be dealt with by states. By asserting the sovereignty of  
populations, the challenge was issued: two things cannot be sovereign, and if  the 
population is sovereign, the state must cede.
Human Security and Politics in Congo
The end of  the Cold War was significant in the Great Lakes region of  Africa 
because support from the USA and Europe was suddenly withdrawn. Northern 
states’ declining need for buffers or proxies was accompanied by a declining 
respect for national sovereignty and for clients such as Mobutu Sese Seko. An era 
had ended: there was no more foreign patronage—in financial or military assets—
and no more pretence at internal state-led development.
The move towards a human security framework appears to have potential for 
protecting the population from violently neglectful and abusive leaders. The con-
cept diversified the way that security is conceptualized, shifting the focus from in-
ternational war to a more varied explanation of  why people are dying. In doing so 
it problematized destitution in such a way as to identify areas for intervention and 
licensed a number of  actors protecting or promoting security. Across Africa there 
were increasingly interventionist aid packages that addressed themselves, amongst 
other things, to demobilization, security sector reform and peace negotiations.6
4 Freedom from Fear. Canada’s Foreign Policy for Human Security, Department of  Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade, Ottawa, <http://pubx.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/00_Global/Pubs_Cat2.nsf/0/561589ff8dfda285256bc70065b9f/
$FILE/Freedom_from_Fear-e.pdf> (16/10/2007); Stuart MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human security and 
the UN: a critical history, Bloomington, IN, 2006.
5 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, New York 1992, 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html> (17/12/2007).
6 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars. The merging of  development and security, London and New 
York, 2001.
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In the context of  Congo, the impact of  the shift in thinking and policy-making 
can be explored with reference to two sets of  documents that have been funda-
mental in defining the interpretation given to the conflict; neither document men-
tions human security explicitly, but both address the effects of  the war and have 
emerged from the ranks of  the new security actors—NGOs and the operational 
arms of  the UN. The first is a series of  mortality surveys published by the Inter-
national Rescue Committee7 and the second is the UN Panel of  Experts Report.8 
Both have been updated and re-released in subsequent years.
The IRC mortality survey is widely cited and makes two notable contributions. 
One concerns the number of  casualties—starting at 1.7 million in 2000 and rising 
by around a million a year through the war. Though heavily caveated with regard 
to access and methodology, this revelation established the second Congo war as 
the armed conflict involving the highest number of  casualties since World War II. 
The second contributing factor was that the majority of  the deaths were not the 
direct result of  military violence, although areas of  high levels of  direct violence 
also saw the highest levels of  fatalities due to disease. The population was be-
ing killed by the destitution that war occasioned. The focus on the safety of  the 
population, the variety of  vulnerabilities faced and the attention drawn to the lack 
7 International Rescue Committee, Mortality Study, Eastern Democratic Republic of  Congo 2000, 2002, 200, Bukavu 
(DR Kongo), <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/mortalitydrc.pdf> (16/10/2007).
8 Report of  the UN expert Panel on the Illegal exploitation of  natural resources and other forms of  wealth of  the 
Democratic Republic of  the Congo, S/2001/57.
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of  development—the destruction of  infrastructure, for example—all correspond 
to the concept of  human security.
The UN Panel of  Experts Report was the document that brought international 
and official recognition to the widespread and unregulated exploitation of  re-
sources in eastern Congo. This document is also inspired by post-Cold War 
thinking on security: the invasion and occupation of  two thirds of  the country is 
not the primary issue identified by the report. Instead, what is presented is pillage, 
an economic venture described as “illegal”, with the “violation of  sovereignty” 
contributing to its illegality. The violation of  sovereignty is defined in terms of  
“extraction, production, commercialization and exports” (p. 3)—not occupation. 
The culprits were individuals and companies, including some military person-
nel, but not the states of  Rwanda or Uganda. The report states that “fighting 
erupted” in 1998, not that Congo was invaded, and the economic agents were 
named and apparently shamed in an appendix. The 2001 report listed a “sample” 
of  the companies importing minerals from Congo via Rwanda. The 2002 report 
presented 85 companies considered to have violated the OECD guidelines for 
multinational enterprises.
These two sets of  documents have been influential in determining the kinds of  
intervention made in Congo. Both exemplify mainstream policy discourse on se-
curity and in their presentation of  events, reinforce the interpretation of  Congo 
as a country in need of  humanitarian intervention (and ultimately development) 
and conformity to the market. They present a version of  events that contrib-
utes to and is strengthened by the human security framework. Both documents 
were ‘shocking’ in the magnitude of  what they described and as such have been 
debated at length with regard to their accuracy, reliability and purpose. Their 
significance, however, lies not in the details they include, but rather in the politi-
cal machinery they overlook. The IRC mortality survey and the UN Panel of  
Experts Report combined to present the conflict as widespread human suffering 
and economic pillage, not as violent politics, invasion and globalized war.
What is Left Out?
The documents achieved certain goals: the IRC mortality surveys have been 
widely cited in academic and practitioner debate and by the press as a measure of  
suffering, and aid allocations to Congo have increased steeply over the last seven 
years. Similarly, the pillage of  Congo has been accepted as a fact in international 
relations and policy circles, and some steps have been taken accordingly, including 
the physical withdrawal from the country of  the Rwandan and Ugandan armies. 
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What is not addressed, though, are the processes by which people are made and 
kept vulnerable and the political conditions that enable the extraction and ex-
ploitation of  resources. As a result, foreign aid has not transformed life chances 
and the absence of  troops has not led the trade in minerals to be regulated, less 
harnessed still for the development of  Congo.
Nor did either report fulfill certain stated aims. The IRC survey aspired to “guide 
health programs” and presents the hope that “those who have influence over the 
warring parties and over the processes which may bring peace will add a sense 
of  urgency to resolving the conflict” (p. 2). The UN report presented a set of  
recommendations—“tough measures”—including sanctions, preventive measures, 
reparations, reconstruction, regulation and security (p. 2). It is not obvious from 
either document how these aims would be achieved. As a quantitative, informa-
tion-gathering exercise, the IRC is perhaps deliberately politically vague. The 
UN report involves an analysis that delineates events from the exploitation of  
resources to the continuation of  conflict, rather than the other way around. This 
analysis accords with mainstream liberal thinking at the time,9 and proposes little 
in practical terms: for as long as there are resources, war is inevitable.
National security has always been about contract and compromise—between 
states to respect the sovereignty of  others, and the Leviathan bargain for people 
to surrender some of  their freedom in return for some protection. Previous to 
the end of  the Cold War, all parties had strong—if  not always compelling—in-
centives to respect the security machinery. However, human security is presented 
in terms of  a number of  elements that reinforce each other for mutual gain, 
which can be achieved through increased humanitarian assistance and voluntary 
corporate responsibility.
The combination of  a broad—practically limitless—human security category and 
an evasion of  any discussion on contracts or compromises are prone to critique. 
With no theoretical or empirical basis, human security has shifted security think-
ing away from a focus on territorial integrity and proposes the promotion of  a 
new brand of  security, not through arms but through sustainable development. 
At best this legitimizes benevolent actors to intervene to protect vulnerable 
populations, but there is no agreed responsibility or incentive, and no sanctions 
for interventions that do not achieve their goals or are not undertaken in the first 
place. The similarities to the frailties of  humanitarianism are evident.10
9 Paul Collier et al., Greed and grievance in civil war?, Washington, DC, 2000. 
10 Zoë Marriage, Not breaking the rules, not playing the game : international assistance to countries at war, London 2006.
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Congo and the Concept of Human Security
In Congo, the outcomes have been severe. The move away from the focus on 
national security contributed to the fall of  Mobutu, which feted a host of  non-
state actors and paved the way for predatory leaders of  foreign countries to lead 
campaigns in Congo. The rebellion led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and the invasion 
by the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) a year later are two of  the most 
extraordinary challenges to national sovereignty that have occurred in recent 
years, and yet neither attracted significant condemnation or intervention. The 
invasion by Rwanda is described as a “counterrevolution” in the IRC survey. The 
UN report refers to “territories conquered by the armies of  Burundi, Rwanda 
and Uganda,” but expresses little disquiet about the nature of  this conquest. The 
situation for the majority of  the population at the end of  the decade was incom-
parably worse than it had been at the beginning of  the decade: the abusive leader 
had been removed, but the security of  the population had deteriorated.
The second shift, from security through military weight to security through 
sustainable development, also failed to ameliorate people’s security. The decom-
missioning of  personnel and weapons from national armies in many countries 
around the world contributed to the rise in private military firms and second-
hand arms markets. These phenomena impacted negatively on security in Congo: 
the proliferation of  thousands of  weapons in the area has enabled groups to 
arm, and demobilized soldiers have found mercenary activity lucrative. In addi-
tion, Rwanda and Uganda instituted huge non-state networks in Congo to sup-
port their own states while lauding sustainable development at home. Sustainable 
development—both through government policy or through external interven-
tion—has been absent and has not enhanced any aspects of  life for the popula-
tion of  Congo.
The result in practical terms is that the rhetorical championing of  the human 
population over the interest of  the state has informed interventions that have 
further undermined the Congolese. This is significant because human security has 
become something of  an organizing principle for aid and plays a role in legitimiz-
ing other forms of  intervention as well. Parallels can be seen in Iraq and Afghani-
stan where interventions made purportedly on behalf  of  human populations, or 
sections of  them, have left those populations less secure than they were before.
There is little to suggest, though, that these events are politically naive. Human 
security frames the political space, not by defining what happens, but rather what 
is politically visible. The pursuit of  power has not been curtailed by the discus-
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sion on human security, and much of  the military activity in Congo can be ana-
lyzed in classic terms. Human security offers another perspective: the presenta-
tion of  suffering and pillage overlooks the support given by the UK government, 
among others, to Rwanda and Uganda. At a sub-national level, it does not exam-
ine the processes by which power is forged during a conflict and what patterns of  
protection and control are established. Devoid of  these analyses the documents 
examined become static—moments recorded in history. They do not investigate 
causes or processes; they say how things used to be.
Because the concept of  human security is lacking in context, no serious attention 
is paid to its relationship with national security. The IRC survey notes that “war 
means disease” as areas of  insecurity saw high mortality rates from disease, but 
the observation is not pressed further. In Congo, while human security was being 
developed in policy discourse as a concept to champion the security of  popula-
tions over the interests of  leaders, the events that contributed most forcefully 
to the insecurity of  the population was the effectual destruction of  the state, by 
building-up and then removing Mobutu, and the sponsorship of  foreign invasion.
Furthermore, human security can be seen to patronize areas not deemed worthy 
of  real security, or those that pose no threat. (This hypothesis is tested by the 
alterations that have taken place since the War on Terror: the peace process has 
been promoted with renewed vigor, but the numerous setbacks and flaws sug-
gest that Congo still does not pose a serious threat). The paradigm of  security 
through sustainable development is not a military blueprint in northern countries. 
To pursue this reasoning, northern countries that have in some sense “achieved” 
development would no longer require military capability. The reverse is observ-
able, whereby human security is a paradigm applied to countries in which human 
life is threatened daily, whilst northern countries employ a range of  military and 
diplomatic tools to defend themselves from the threats posed by migration, non-
compliant markets and terror.
Policy Implications
Considering the problematic conceptualization and contradictions with actual 
implementation, this overview of  human security and Congo gives rise to three 
specific policy-related conclusions:
1. The concept of  human security nestles easily within the mainstream dis-
course of  the liberal peace and as such problematizes Congo’s situation in 
such a way that responses can be made and carried out successfully, accord-
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ing to delineated criteria. Foreign aid has increased, and considerable interna-
tional attention has been given to the extraction of  mineral wealth from the 
east of  the country and the withdrawal of  Rwanda and Uganda, including 
a demobilization program with a designated wing for the return of  foreign 
troops.11
2. The human security approach has not—empirically—improved the situation 
in Congo. Mortality rates continue at a disastrous level (despite the fact that 
most of  the fighting has ceased), extractive industries have not been re-ori-
ented to the benefit of  the Congolese population; the structures of  impov-
erishment, differentiation and violent power remain in place. Massive inter-
national investment, including funding UN troops has yet to prove its worth; 
the plan has not become unstuck entirely, but has been consistently violated. 
Human security did not give a robust means for analysis of  the security situ-
ation in Congo or an action agenda.
3. Security is not “out there” to be discovered. There are dialectic processes by 
which the conceptualization of  security influences what is perceived and pri-
oritized and what response is given. How security is conceptualized in north-
ern policy discourse is significant not only in recording events, but in shap-
ing them. Misperceptions and scattergun responses may aggravate forms 
of  violence. The security of  the population is not defined solely or even 
largely by the Congolese—and least of  all by the civilians. There is a web of  
political interests competing and impacting on the population. Focusing on 
the people’s suffering and championing their rights intimates a discourse of  
empowerment, but no means by which to operationalize it.
To conclude, while conventional thinking on security focuses predominantly on 
national interest, and is inadequate for examining the decentralized violence of  
Congo and the multiple forms of  vulnerability that people face, the human se-
curity concept has not provided a useful analytical tool. In addition, the political 
shift inherent in theorizing is dangerous and the lack of  respect for the nation-
state has allowed for circumscribed achievements—in terms of  removing leaders 
or increasing aid—, but has contributed to compromising further the security 
situation for people, most notably in Congo.
11 Marriage, Flip-flop Rebel Dollar Soldier, Demobilisation in the Democratic Republic of  Congo, in: Conflict, Security 
and Development, Vol. 7, No. 2/2007.
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Securitization against Democratization: War on Terrorism, 
Authoritarian Liberalism, and Neo-Liberalism in  
Post-9/11 Southeast Asia
Bonn Juego
Introduction
The securitization of  social life is becoming palpably evident in Southeast Asia. 
The events of  9/11 have ramifications for security-development dynamics of  
the region. Since then, the idea of  “security” seems to have become a master 
narrative, a dominant discourse—if  not a political-economic imaginary—that 
informs and shapes strategies on all scales from the individual to the firm to the 
wider economy, and on all territorial scales from the smallest community through 
the state to the regional and the global levels. The basic idea is being articulated 
in many organizational and institutional sites (from firm security to state 
security), on many scales from national to regional and global (national security, 
regional security, global security), and in many functional systems (health security, 
educational security, environmental security, internet security and business 
security etc.). It has been translated into many visions and strategies, such as the 
various human security legislations, national security frameworks, and regional 
security community projects. The imperatives of  security have thus penetrated 
just about every aspect of  human life.
Security and development policy-makers stand again at a historic crossroads in 
dealing with post-9/11 Southeast Asia, a region of  strategic importance in the 
Cold War. Post-9/11 has ushered in yet another political-economic contradiction 
in the region, being perceived as a global security threat in the contemporary “war 
on terror” and a promising dynamic economic region in the globalizing world. 
Against the background of  intensifying globalization, addressing the geopolitics 
of  security and the political economy of  development in Southeast Asia is 
bewilderingly complex. This complex security-development challenge in the 
region thus requires comprehensive policy responses firmly grounded on history, 
geography, culture, and political economy.
This paper argues that 9/11 has accelerated the Americanization of  the security-
development architecture in Southeast Asia, as shown in the increasing institu-
tionalization of  principles and practices that are easily ascribed to US hegemony. 
In particular, the Americanization of  security-development has paved the way 
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either to the strengthening or resurgence of  the hegemony, both in policy and 
discourse, of:
a. “Global war on terrorism” over historically sensitive conflict resolution 
mechanisms;
b. “authoritarian liberalism” over democratization; and
c. neo-liberalism over developmental statism.
Each of  these phenomena is inherently unstable and conflict-ridden. Hence, the 
securitization of  social life in the region is not resulting in the reproduction of  a 
security-development agenda patterned after the US, but in the reproduction of  
social antagonisms that spring from the very contradictions of  the securitization 
project itself. The paper concludes with a proposal for a “democratic security-
development policy” built from the bottom-up, in which security and 
development are both seen as “political” and “economic” ideals in organic 
synergy.
Global War on Terror over Local Historical Specificities
The US-launched global war on terror is a fierce and global response to the 9/11 
attacks. The campaign intensified in Southeast Asia as the Bush administration 
tagged the region the “second front” in the war against terror for being the 
hide-out of  alleged al-Qaeda operatives and the training camp to radical Islamist 
groups (such as Jemaah Islamiah, Abu Sayyaf, and the Kumpulan Mujahideen 
Malaysia), and hence one of  the weakest links in the quest for global stability. 
After putting the Taliban to rout, security policy-makers, especially those from 
the US, have since then regarded Southeast Asia as the second front indeed on 
the war on terrorism, with the US deploying more than 500 troops supposedly to 
assist in hostage rescue and counterinsurgency operations in southern Philippines 
in January 2002. This approach of  looking at Southeast Asia through the lenses 
of  the US-led “Coalition of  the Willing” wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the 
global war on terror will, however, result in erroneous conclusions and hence 
wrong policies. So long as security policy-makers become overly fixated on the 
global war on terror, they will never grasp the complex reality of  various conflicts 
in the region in order to put an end to the roots of  violence. There is need to 
critically situate conflicts in the region in their varying geographical and historical 
contexts.
Southeast Asia is a region of  conflicts. Most major conflicts from and among 
identities are homegrown and fought over long before 9/11. These racial, 
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religious, and ethnic conflicts are not at all epiphenomenal; these are complex 
conflicts that are related to—but cannot be simply reduced to being by-products 
or secondary symptoms of—poverty, inequality, and uneven development. There 
are historical reasons why issues of  race, religion, nationalism, and ethnicity have 
so much purchase on the lives of  many peoples in Southeast Asia. But, at the 
same time, there are also material reasons why these conflicts are articulated in an 
increasingly unequal capitalist world. While these conflicts may predate 9/11, the 
latter has given a much more conflictual, or even a new, terrain of  struggles in the 
region.
In this multi-cultural region, racial, religious, ethnic and national identities are still 
at the center of  many conflicts. Burma, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines have their respective enduring internal conflicts among 
identities (e. g. the religious conflicts in Poso in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, 
and the ethnic conflicts in West Kalimantan, southern Thailand, and southern 
Philippines). There exist politicized and actively struggling organized identities 
based on race, religion, ethnicity, and nation. The conflicts in Maluku and Poso 
islands in the Indonesian archipelago (1999–200), which were believed to be 
instigated by military and paramilitary forces, resulted in the killing of  thousands 
of  people and the destruction of  ethnic and religious harmony in the region. 
These conflicts exemplify the local intensity of  homegrown and largely religious, 
Muslim-Christian, conflicts that are by no means upshots of  9/11.
Against the background of  economic globalization, the struggle of  identities 
is not only conspicuous in the cultural arena, but also in the materiality of  the 
political economy. Identity conflicts in the region—such as the Muslim rebel 
groups in the Philippines and Indonesia—are becoming intractable due to the 
fact that their struggles are based on demands both for recognition and for 
redistribution. The resistance of  oppressed identities is twofold: against their 
respective states and against increasing material inequality.1
The resurgence of  military-oriented 9/11 strategies is gradually unfolding. This 
hardcore stance is inimical to peace and stability in the region, not only because 
it equates rebellion, be it pre- or post-9/11, with terrorism, but it also fails to 
recognize the legitimate aspirations and demands of  struggling identities and 
1 For a discussion on the relationship between state and ethnicity in Southeast Asia, see David Brown, The state and 
ethnic politics in Southeast Asia, London 1994; and for a discussion on the coexistence of  the struggle for recognition 
and the struggle for redistribution in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, see A. B. Shamsul, 
Globalization and democratic developments in Southeast Asia: articulation and social responses, in: Catarina Kinnvall 
and Kristina Jonsson (eds.), Globalization and Democratization in Asia: The construction of  identity, London 2002; 
and Temario C. Rivera, Assessing Democratic Evolution in Southeast Asia: Philippines (Institute of  Southeast Asian 
Studies), Singapore 2002.
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oppositions. For instance, in the case of  the Bangsamoro problem in southern 
Philippines, 9/11-oriented policy-makers and strategists have been outright in 
linking the rebel Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) with the terrorist Jemaah 
Islamiah at the expense of  prejudicing the process of  ongoing peace negotiations 
between the MILF and the Philippine government. The MILF, which has been 
pursuing armed struggle for more than half  a century now, has been fighting 
for a wide variety of  social, cultural, economic and political issues and concerns 
that include: a) ancestral domain; b) displaced and landless Bangsamoro; c) 
destruction of  properties and war victims; d) human rights issues; e) social 
and cultural discrimination; f) corruption of  the mind and the moral fiber; g) 
economic inequities and widespread poverty; h) exploitation of  natural resources; 
and i) agrarian reform.2 The accusations that MILF has links with terrorist 
organizations and has been involved in deliberate attacks on civilians to spread 
fear and terror are matters to be investigated by an independent, impartial 
organization that is free of  9/11 bias without distracting substantive issues of  the 
Bangsamoro problem. Post-9/11 security policies seem to have given primacy to 
military actions over peace negotiations in dealing with the legitimate outcries of  
rebellion.
A number of  key themes can be identified in the complex reality of  enduring 
conflicts in Southeast Asia. First, existing racial, religious, ethnic, and national 
identity struggles in the region are anything but epiphenomenal. Second, there 
are deep historical reasons these struggles mean so much to their lives. Third, 
these struggles have been more or less closely bounded with the evolution of  
global capitalism and the increasing material inequality in the world. And, finally, 
it is therefore necessary that security-development policies today must take 
issues of  political identities seriously, firmly grounding them on historical and 
materialist analysis. In other words, there is need for historically specific security 
policy and a socially embedded development policy.
Authoritarian Liberalism Installed, Democratization Stalled
The process of  securitization in Southeast Asia has overshadowed the relatively 
important post-Cold War debates on “democratization”, particularly concerning 
the synergetic relationship between democracy and development. The idea of  
security has now become inflected in neo-liberal (Philippines), neo-corporatist 
(Singapore), and neo-statist (Malaysia) ways, as well as in authoritarian terms. 
This suggests that security, as an idea, is amenable to strategic alliances and 
2 See Agenda, Technical Committee on Agenda Setting, in: MILF, 25 February 1997; and Soliman Santos, Dynamics and 
Directions of  the Peace Negotiations Between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 24 
September 2004.
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institutionalized compromises among disparate interests, and even among 
conflicting orientations, in different political regimes.
An emergent political-economic regime referred to as “authoritarian liberalism” 
(i. e. a mix of  strong state and free economy, or a neo-liberal economy in an 
authoritarian polity) is being institutionalized in Southeast Asia, not only during 
the immediate aftermath of  the Cold War, but also until the contemporary 
epoch of  post-9/11 neo-liberal globalization. This institutional fit between 
authoritarian polity and neo-liberal economy is being increasingly strengthened, 
as well as justified, amidst the structural requirements of  the post-9/11 
security environment. Far from stymieing the pursuit of  a capitalist market-led 
development strategy in a framework of  authoritarianism, the imperatives of  
the war on terror seem to have provided a deeper logic than ever to underpin its 
perpetuation for the preservation of  elite rule and capitalism in Southeast Asia.
Against the background of  the institutional imperatives of  the war on terror, 
(semi-)authoritarian, strong states have become strategic sites of  opposing 
terrorism. Malaysia’s Internal Security Act (ISA) and Singapore’s surveillance 
measures have once again found badly needed justification amidst growing 
domestic and international criticisms against these repressive security policies 
used to stifle political dissent. The declining popularity of  Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo’s administration has eventually enacted the Philippine Human Security 
Act of  2007 or the anti-terror law that had long been under public scrutiny and 
strong opposition. Initiated under former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, 
Thailand has implemented a series of  repressive laws and decrees peddled as 
deterrent to terrorism but in guise of  strengthening domestic security agencies 
after the slaughter of  over a hundred Malay Muslims in its southern province 
in April 2004. And in Indonesia, once one of  the strongest military regimes in 
the past decades under Suharto, the prospect for the resurgence of  military and 
security powers has come to life, especially as a result of  the Bali and Jakarta 
bombings in 2002 and 2004, respectively. The war on terror project has thus 
provided “exceptional” powers to Southeast Asian governments, and their 
discretionary powers of  detention and surveillance expanded, which are being 
used as legal license for abuse of  power to suppress dissent and opposition.
Post-9/11 security under conditions of  authoritarianism provides institutional 
justification for a state’s exercise of  exceptional executive power in the name of  
public order against terrorism, allowing for the suspension of  civil and political 
rights—even if  these rights are protected in the constitution—and activating 
the use of  coercive force (police and military) during times of  perceived “state 
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emergency”. This “regime of  exception” provides far-reaching powers to the 
state, not only by suspending normal political and legal processes, but also by 
enabling the reorganization and centralization of  its (coercive) apparatus of  
power. This regime of  exception has become an all too familiar situation in 
recent Southeast Asian politics, increasingly becoming the norm, rather than 
being supposedly temporary and effective only in times of  national emergency. 
This then implies the hostility of  Southeast Asian regimes of  exception to 
political pluralism, and hence to democracy. Politics in the spirit of  political 
pluralism is easily dismissed either as disruptive to the presumed political order or 
simply as terrorism.
Contrary to the mainstream globalist pronouncements that globalization will 
bring about a world of  liberal democracies, post-9/11 Southeast Asia is by far a 
region of  authoritarianisms—a security complex of  authoritarianisms. Regional 
stability seems to come from a “peaceful coexistence among authoritarianisms”, 
rather than among democracies, following the policy of  non-interference, which 
every government in the region normatively proclaims. The region is progressing 
towards the resurgence, or deepening of, a variation of  authoritarianisms: (semi-) 
authoritarian regimes in Malaysia and Singapore; the military governments 
in Myanmar and Thailand; the monarchy in Brunei; one-party rule in Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam; a military general leadership in Indonesia; and an 
administration predisposed to authoritarianism and the militarization of  the 
cities and countryside in the Philippines. Time and again, numerous researches 
conducted to guide policies for protecting human rights have identified the 
conditions under which governments and people are most likely to commit 
large-scale murder, torture, and arbitrary imprisonment. They conclude that 
authoritarianism, alongside war and poverty, can lead to large-scale human rights 
violations.3
The toppling of  two military regimes—Ferdinand Marcos’ in the Philippines in 
1986 and Suharto’s in Indonesia in 1998—were regarded as democratic moments, 
signaling the process of  democratization in the broader region. This comes at a 
time when the dominant discourse from mainstream scholars and policy-makers 
adhering to either the modernization theory or the transitions perspective 
prophesies that economic liberalization encourages the development of  liberal 
and democratic modes of  governance. Empirically, Southeast Asia appears to 
 See Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate, Human Rights and Repression to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global 
Analysis, in: American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, 1994, pp. 85–900; Steven C. Poe, C. Neal Tate and Linda 
Camp Keith, Repression of  the Human Rights to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Crossnational Study Covering 
the Years 1976–199, in: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 4, 1999, pp. 291–15; and Kathryn Sikkink, A Human 
Rights Approach to Sept. 11, in: Social Science Research Council, New York 2002, <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/ 
essays/sikkink_text_only.htm>.
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demonstrate a quite different prospectus from this dominant discourse. In fact, 
pace modernization theory and transition perspectives, globalization may mean 
the end of  liberal democracy rather than its triumphant ascendancy. Historically, 
if  there is any cogent lesson that the past two decades have shown about 
the relationship between democracy and political-economic regime, it is that 
capitalism can thrive and survive even without democracy. Southeast Asian elites 
do not necessarily become forces for political liberalism and democracy; they can 
be downright illiberal and anti-democratic so long as it serves their interests.
What the ongoing campaign against terrorism in the case of  Southeast Asia 
signifies is that “security” can thrive, and can be promoted, even without 
democracy. The war on terror project has thus stalled the process of  
democratization in the region, paving the way for a protracted institutionalization 
of  authoritarianism. And herein lies a serious security challenge in Southeast Asia. 
The war on terror carried out under authoritarian auspices is not reproducing 
regional security as its most ardent proponents suggest. Above all it is generating 
the reproduction of  social antagonisms that spring from the very logic of  the 
repressive practices of  authoritarianism itself.
Bonn Juego advocates democracy promotion in South-East Asia
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From Developmental Statism to Neo-Liberalism
Southeast Asia has purportedly followed a development paradigm referred to as 
“developmental statism” that made possible the “East Asian Miracle”, in which 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand are among the high-performing 
Asian economies (together with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong) 
that registered high growth with high equity during the period of  1965–1990. 
This Southeast Asian model of  development is characterized by state involve-
ment in the economy through a strong “industrial policy” that coordinates a 
whole set of  economic policies and institutions, as well as by a strong manufac-
turing sector that is synenergistically linked to agriculture and services.
The Washington Institutions consider this development strategy as “bad” eco-
nomics based on their neo-liberal ideology, which posits that markets are efficient 
and that government intervention in the economy distorts market efficiency. 
Instead, they prescribe the realization of  an open market economy through 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in the macroeconomic policies of  priva-
tization, liberalization, deregulation, and fiscal reforms. These SAPs have been 
imposed especially to the highly indebted countries of  Indonesia, Thailand, and 
the Philippines. September 11 and its aftermath offered an opportunity for the 
Washington Institutions and their neo-liberal proponents to restructure the politi-
cal and economic apparatuses of  the state to be more responsive to the demands 
of  the market forces than the multitude, and hence accelerating the financial 
and economic reforms initiated right after the 1997 Asian economic crisis. The 
Americanization of  development strategy in the context of  post-9/11 allows for 
active state involvement in the economy so long as states pursue “market friendly” 
policies without fear or favor.
The destructive attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center were ini-
tially thought of  as a crisis of  US geopolitical security and of  global capitalism. 
Post-9/11 political economy is, however, revealing that this supposed crisis is be-
coming functional to US geopolitical and economic interests. The terror attacks 
have led to the restructuring of  the US security and political-economic agenda in 
the context of  contemporary historical juncture. Importantly, 9/11 has resulted 
in a series of  internal reorganizations of  Southeast Asian states in line with the 
requirements of  a “securitized global competitiveness”, or of  neo-liberal global-
ization in the context of  post-9/11 security dynamics.
A little over a month after 9/11, the World Economic Forum organized the 
East Asia Economic Summit 2001 that came up with the conclusion on the the 
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need “to tackle the root causes of  terrorism and enduring poverty in developing 
countries”, and accordingly called for “a new development paradigm based on 
fair trade and equitable partnerships between developing countries and developed 
ones.”4 State leaders, business leaders, and technocrats who participated in the 
Summit recognized the existence of  uneven development in the world between 
rich and poor countries, realized the close connection between global political 
and economic security, proposed development as a security strategy, and affirmed 
their shared interests in counterterrorism. However, this common commitment 
and understanding for security-development in East and Southeast Asia has been 
imperiled because of  the apparent return of  the US and other developed coun-
tries to the political economy of  security along Cold War terms. But this time it is 
framed in the language of  a bifurcated worldview between “zones of  safety” and 
“zones of  danger.” The categorization of  Southeast Asia as “terrorist hot spot,” 
alongside the release of  numerous travel advisories for citizens of  rich countries, 
defines Southeast Asia as a zone of  danger. Notwithstanding the implied double 
standard of  the US and West, this categorization discourages the investments 
needed for economic growth and overall development in the developing region.
The post-9/11 security-development nexus in Southeast Asia suggests that se-
curity concerns have implications for the restructuring of  regional political and 
economic relations in the region. In particular the selective logic of  the capital-
ist market is guided by the coercive arm of  security. Regional supporters of  the 
US-led war on terror were promised preferential trade access to US market. For 
instance, when Thaksin’s Thailand implemented tough counterterrorism measures, 
the US called it a major “non-NATO ally”, and signed a bilateral trade agreement 
with Thailand.
The securitization of  neo-liberal globalization in Southeast Asia compels the 
restructuring of  institutions in ways that are much more responsive to capitalist 
market forces than to popular democratic ones. It also calls for change in human 
values, putting premium on private sector, private property, and their attendant 
values in the conduct of  social life. This is the context within which security is 
promoted at this time—one that works for the market and with the market. Gov-
ernment and social institutions are all mobilized to sustain this system of  private 
appropriation to provide a certain degree of  predictability for capital. To a large 
extent, they also manage market forces through policies of  privatization (the sale 
of  public assets to private investors) and liberalization (opening up of  restricted 
markets to competition). Equally important for the system is that market forces 
4 World Economic Forum, East Asia Economic Summit Report: Responses to Recession Regaining Stability and 
Growth in Asia, 2001, pp. 18–19.
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are institutionally managed through the reorientation of  regulation—in particular, 
a regulatory framework in a regime of  de-regulation. However, the central task 
of  this regulation under a neo-liberal regime is to secure the interest of  business, 
and not of  the broader citizenry. But again, the accountability of  the market—
whose conduct of  business implicates the rest of  the society—is not sanctioned. 
It therefore enforces the separation of  “the economic” from “the political” in 
capitalist discipline, as well as the paradox at the heart of  capitalist production: 
the exclusion of  the poor and workers from wealth, and yet their inclusion in 
the circuits of  its production. Furthermore, it implies that states, and hence the 
people of  Southeast Asia, will be the absorber of  risks as well as of  failures of  
market adventurism.
Particularistic and exclusivist identities are so often a response to something uni-
versal. The neo-liberal development paradigm, with its mathematics-like attempt 
for universal applicability as well as its all-embracing social implications, is essen-
tially conflictive for human relations. Accordingly, neo-liberalism in a framework 
of  authoritarianism is inherently unstable and conflict-ridden. Likewise, the at-
tempt to reproduce capitalism across Southeast Asia is tantamount to reproducing 
antagonisms from society to society in the region. A much bolder security-devel-
opment project that brings back Southeast Asia to the track of  democratization is, 
by all means, ambitious; but it is utterly necessary to resolve the contradictions of  
authoritarian liberalism.
Towards a Democratic Security-Development Policy
Mindful of  the historical dynamics of  the political economy of  conflicts in 
Southeast Asia, as well as the contemporary regimes of  authoritarian liberalism 
across the region, a democratic security-development policy built from the bot-
tom up is herein proposed. The starting point for the proposal is that security-de-
velopment policy is essentially a social endeavor that implicates the rest of  society. 
Any security-development policy must therefore be historically sensitive, socially 
embedded, and culturally specific. Hence, the only social ideal that can perfectly 
capture this proposal is democracy, especially if  by democracy we mean “democ-
racy as a social relation”, in which “the political”, “the economic”, “the cultural”, 
and all the other spheres of  social life are not separated from, or merely reflective 
of, one another, but rather organically connected.
In this sense, political democracy does not only mean the enjoyment of  liberal 
freedoms and equally weighted votes among enfranchised citizens, it also means 
the rule of  the demos and its original signification as “popular power.” Cultural 
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democracy is about being and not about having, in which every human being is 
respected for who one is and not for what one owns. Economic democracy is 
not simply about equitable distribution of  wealth, but democracy as the driving 
mechanism of  the economy. Democracy is therefore suggested both as a means 
and ends of  security-development for purposes of  developing peaceful security 
and securing real development for human beings. In a word, it is democratization, 
rather than securitization, that can best develop security and secure development 
in Southeast Asia.
In practical terms, a program for a democratic security-development policy does 
not offer extravagant claims for “what to-dos”, but modest reflections on “what 
not to do”, to guide policy for the time being in Southeast Asia:
i. Not to imperiously deny the cultural capacity of  the peoples of  Southeast 
Asia for economic, political, and cognitive development;
ii. Not to come up with security-development policies that are devoid of  con-
text, history, and culture; and
iii. Not to forget the salience of  state-level perspective in security-development 
analysis and policy because the state remains the point of  concentration of  
instability, and hence remains the most strategic site for containing it, and, at 
the same time, the only arena for acquiring peoples’ legitimacy.
The pressing need now is to have the political will at all levels of  governance—
from the workplace to the state to the regional and global levels—to regard 
democracy both as a security-development tool and goal. Each and every secu-
rity-development policy must therefore be oriented towards the deepening of  the 
institutions, processes, and visions of  democracy.
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The Aceh Conflict, the EU and the  
Security-Development Nexus in Asia
Saponti Baroowa
The Nature and Genesis of the Aceh Conflict
The Aceh conflict dates back to 1976 when a separatist movement, spearheaded 
by the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), consisting of  a 
few hundred rebels, engaged in a guerilla struggle against the Indonesian armed 
forces. This low-intensity resistance was easily quelled by the Indonesian army 
and the movement subsequently subsided within a few years of  its inception. 
Popular resentment in Aceh against the Indonesian state continued, however. 
Apart from a number of  historical factors, including questions of  identity, the 
highly-centralized and authoritarian Indonesian state system was largely respon-
sible for aggravating the sense of  alienation among the Acehnese. Moreover, bad 
socio-economic governance on the part of  Jakarta altered the traditional Aceh-
nese social order and also infringed on their economic freedoms, particularly with 
regard to their land rights. The Acehnese also increasingly felt that they were 
losing control over their rich natural resources which were exploited by Jakarta 
without any benefits trickling down to the local populace.
After its initial setbacks against the Indonesian army, GAM regrouped in 1989 
and resumed its armed struggle albeit in a subdued fashion in the wake of  the 
high-handed repressive measures undertaken by Jakarta. The low-intensity gue-
rilla warfare was to continue for the next 16 years accompanied by large scale 
human rights violations by the Indonesian armed forces resulting in thousands 
of  deaths among the Acehnese population coupled with immense losses to their 
properties and livelihoods, which in turn gradually accentuated the support for 
GAM’s separatist agenda. After the installation of  a civilian government in Ja-
karta in the late 1990s, followed by the gradual erosion of  the army’s influence on 
Indonesian power politics, and subsequent international attention on Aceh result-
ing from the devastation by the Asian Tsunami of  December 2004, an agreement 
to settle the issue was reached between GAM and the Indonesian Government in 
August 2005. The terms of  the Memorandum of  Understanding (MoU) signed 
in Helsinki by the two sides on 15 August 2005 included the governing of  Aceh, 
human rights, amnesty for former combatants and their reintegration into society, 
1 The author would like to thank Felix Heiduk for his comments on the earlier version of  this paper and the participants 
and organizers of  the 10th New Faces Conference for their valuable insights provided in Madrid.
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the establishment of  the Aceh Monitoring Mission, and dispute settlement.2 The 
implementation of  the provisions of  this MoU, however, required proper and 
effective monitoring by an impartial third party, and this is where the European 
Union (EU) stepped in as the external agency which would monitor the effective 
implementation of  a sustainable peace and development process.
The EU’s Strategy and Approach towards Asia and Asian Security
In the first report of  the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1997, 
the Council made it clear that “Asia continues to constitute key priority for the 
Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.”3 Previously, in 1994, the Euro-
pean Commission (EC) produced an overall approach to Asia (including Austral-
asia) in a document titled Towards a New Asia Strategy, and followed-up in 2001 
with a revised policy document titled Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework 
for Enhanced Partnerships. The latter signified a more robust EU approach by 
emphasizing the importance of  the security dimension as well in relations with 
Asia. The document subdivides Asia into four sub regions: South Asia, South 
East Asia, North East Asia and Australasia.4 Of  the six broad objectives spelled 
out by the document, from the security point of  view, mention may be made of  
the EU’s aim to: a) “contribute to peace and security in the region and globally, 
through a broadening of  our engagement with the region”; b) “contribute to the 
protection of  human rights and to the spreading of  democracy, good governance 
and the rule of  law”; and c) “to build global partnerships and alliances with Asian 
countries […] to strengthen our joint efforts on global environmental and securi-
ty issues.”5 A European Parliament (EP) Study in 1999 also called for more active 
“involvement of  the CFSP in ‘Asian’ security issues, for instance in the areas of  
confidence-building, proactive and preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.”6 
The significance of  real and potential conflict in some of  Asia’s prolonged flash 
points remains high for Europe. This is evident from “the indication, often heard 
in EP and in EU security circles that the 1992 Petersburg Declaration […] may 
well be worth emulating in connection with conflict resolution in Asia.”7
2 <http://www.cmi.fi/files/Aceh_MoU.pdf  >.
 Annual Report CFSP 1997, Council of  Ministers, point 15a.
4 European Commission, Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships, Brussels, 4.9.2001, 
COM(2001) 469 final, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asia/doc/com01_469_en.pdf>, p. .
5 Ibid., p. 15.
6 Georg Wiessala, More than Distant Neighbors: CFSP and Asian Countries, in: Martin Holland (ed.), Common Foreign 
and Security Policy: The first ten years, London / New York 2004, p. 96.
7 Ibid., p. 97.
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The EU’s Role in Post-Conflict Aceh: The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)
Although the AMM was to be the European Security and Defense Policy’s 
(ESDP) first foray into Asia, several EU Member States expressed their appre-
hension towards undertaking a mission in a region which was 10,000 miles away 
from home and thus did not seem to constitute a European priority. Others, 
however, felt that “a mission in Indonesia would match the vision of  those who 
regarded the Union as a global player, not limited to stabilizing its neighborhood 
but nurturing more ambitious goals.”8 The AMM was a EU-led ESDP mission 
but it was conducted together with five Association of  Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) member countries, namely Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand, and with contributions from Norway and Switzerland.
As part of  the MoU and outlined in the Council Joint Action of  9 September 
2005, the AMM mandate involved some demanding and sensitive tasks on the 
ground for the EU mission.9 The MoU established that a new Law on the au-
tonomous provincial governing of  Aceh be in force no later than 31 March 2006. 
Other provisions established a Human Rights Court for Aceh and a Commission 
for Truth and Reconciliation. Interim provisions also involved roadblocks, and 
therefore the AMM was not only to play a vital role in “building confidence and 
encouraging dialogue” between the two sides but also to “guarantee an enabling 
environment on the ground.”10 The AMM was empowered with the following 
mandate:
a) Monitoring the demobilization of  GAM
b) Monitoring and assisting with the decommissioning and destruction of  its 
weapons, ammunition and explosives
c) Monitoring the relocation of  non-organic military forces and non-organic 
police troops
d) Monitoring the reintegration of  active GAM members
e) Monitoring the human rights situation and providing assistance in this field 
in the context of  the tasks listed above
f) Monitoring the process of  legislation change
g) Ruling on disputed amnesty cases
h) Investigating and ruling on complaints and alleged violations of  the MoU
i) Establishing and maintaining liaison and good cooperation with the parties.
8 Pierre Antoine-Braud and Giovanni Grevi, The EU Mission in Aceh: implementing Peace, (EU Institute for Security 
Studies, Occasional Paper 61), Paris, December 2005, p. 22.
9 Council Joint Action 2005/64/CFSP, 9 September 2005, OJ L24/1.
10 Braud and Grevi, op. cit. (fn. 8), p. 27.
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On the ground, AMM activities and responsibilities extended beyond these initial 
provisions. The AMM was initially tasked to monitor decommissioning, but later 
took charge of  the entire process, largely due to the apprehension of  the GAM 
fighters to hand over their weapons to the Indonesian forces, thus demonstrating 
preference for a reliable and impartial third party.11
Despite some initial pre-launch institutional deadlocks and confusions as regards 
logistics and finances, the AMM went underway as planned. The Aceh conflict 
was not only a test case of  the security-development nexus in Asia in that the 
conflict owes its origins so much to the bad political and economic governance 
of  the central authority as to the regional quest for identity and socio-economic 
self-determination, but also in that the devastation brought about by the Asian 
Tsunami reinforced the development woes of  the region. Leadership of  the 
AMM therefore provided a real opportunity for the EU to address a potent situ-
ation of  the security-development nexus in the Asian continent. The EU soon 
found out that it was not only the main external organization monitoring peace, 
but also one of  the main providers of  humanitarian assistance and development 
aid. Aceh also became a test case where both Commission (Development Aid) 
and Council (ESDP Missions) instruments could be applied to address the larger 
issue of  the security-development nexus in regions outside Europe. Aceh proved 
how both sets of  instruments could be complementary and mutually reinforcing. 
The EU had to recognize the interplay between the reconstruction efforts and 
initiatives to put an end to the conflict in Aceh and therefore had to strike the 
right balance, for instance, “in the aid provided to the coastal population, most 
hit by the tsunami, and to the population of  the mainland, which suffered the 
most from the civil war. EU action must be clearly and perceivably directed at 
building the future of  the entire region, and not of  one particular area or social 
component.”12 The Aceh experience showed how the EU could combine instru-
ments towards not only securing immediate peace and development, but also 
towards developing and sustaining long-term security.
Aceh Implications and the Case of Northeast India
In situating the EU’s Aceh experience within some other security-development 
scenarios in Asia, mention may be made of  the separatist insurgency in India’s 
northeastern state of  Assam. India has been confronted with a decades-long pro-
tracted and intractable separatist insurgency led by the outlawed United Libera-
tion Front of  Assam (ULFA). Although the insurgent group today no longer en-
11 Ibid. (fn. 8), p. 28.
12 Ibid., pp. 29–0.
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joys the popularity and support that it once perhaps commanded among sections 
of  the population, the problems of  Assam and the other conflict-ridden states of  
the region, a prominent commentator on the region, Sanjib Baruah argues that 
the problems of  Assam and the other conflict-ridden states of  the region should 
not be addressed from a state-centric “insurgency problem” approach, and also 
questions how a democratic India could tolerate the “Northeast Indian excep-
tion.”13 The root causes of  the conflict have never been adequately addressed by 
policy-makers, and have resulted in a mere postponement of  a congenial solution 
and in the festering of  a low-intensity warfare-like situation.
Mainstream political and academic thinking however attributes the troubles of  
Assam and the Northeast to the region’s underdevelopment and poor integra-
tion in India. Some regional commentators argue that an inequitable distribution 
of  Assam’s rich petroleum resources have created a sense of  alienation. Baruah 
however contests mainstream and simplistic paradigms by stating that although 
the “Indian Government has pumped enormous resources into the development 
of  Northeast India in order to remove what it sees as the structural cause of  
insurgencies”, till “date they have not significantly altered the conditions that give 
rise to and sustain ethnic militancy.”14
Interestingly, Baruah tries to imagine the Northeast outside the narrative of  na-
tional development and wonders if  the framework of  the EU’s Committee of  the 
Regions could offer an alternative paradigm. He draws attention to the fact that 
regional identities that were once considered as threats by European nation-states 
are today flourishing within the EU, which pursues transnational politics of  rec-
ognition that managed to compensate for the marginalization of  those identities 
within nation-states, and have allowed certain regional interests enough influence 
in the EU’s decision-making. He says that these European regional identities “are 
not unlike the identities that animate the militias of  northeast India.”15 Develop-
ing this premise further he wonders if  Northeast India could also forge transna-
tional linkages with India’s eastern neighbors.
Since the 1990s, India has been engaged in the enhancement of  its relations with 
countries of  South-East Asia within the framework of  its “Look East Policy.” 
The Northeastern region of  the country shares its borders with Myanmar and 
is located in close proximity to South-East Asia. This location advantage opens 
up the possibility of  the development of  economic links between the Northeast 
13 See Sanjib Baruah, A Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of  Northeast India, New Delhi 2005.
14 Ibid., p. 25.
15 Ibid., p. 26.
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region of  India and the countries of  South-East Asia. In fact, in recent times, 
many mainstream policy makers have increasingly begun to see India’s Northeast 
as a gateway to South-East Asia and the geographic launch pad for its Look East 
Policy. Considering that the problems of  India’s Northeast, including Assam, 
continue to defy simple solutions, possible opportunities for the region to inter-
act economically and culturally with South-East Asia under the framework of  
India’s Look East Policy may offer an alternative paradigm to address the ills that 
ail this resource-rich, culturally diverse and strategically important part of  India.
Potential Parameters for EU Engagement in Asian Security
EU strategic discourse propounds that in conducting external relations it has suc-
cessfully maintained its civilian image as a responsible international actor firmly 
committed to the norms of  international stability informed by the principles of  
the United Nations (UN) Charter. Indeed, “UN-centrism in European security 
cooperation in Asia could offer an alternative Western identity for Europe in 
Asia and strengthen the EU’s image as a more independent security actor in the 
region.”16 Consequently, “Europe should seek constructive involvement in Asian 
preventive diplomacy and try to utilize its expertise in the field of  ‘soft security’, 
which uses civilian means instead of  military means.” In fact, ESDP’s experiences 
in conflict resolution and crisis management, together with its frequent use of  
civilian measures, can provide a comparative advantage for the EU to construc-
tively develop a culture of  security cooperation with Asia in the field of  crisis 
management. Moreover, rather than developing new structures, the EU’s main 
policy in Asia “should be related to the strengthening of  the development of  the 
existing security institutionalization in Asia.” To this end, the EU “should give 
sufficient priority to official Asian security dialogue forums such as the Asia-Eu-
rope Meeting (ASEM) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).”17
EU-ARF Relations
Although the ASEM process provides an important forum for dialogue and 
cooperation between the EU and East and South-East Asia, meaningful political 
and security dialogue within ASEM has been hard to come by, as many of  the 
topics for discussion are considered “out of  bounds” or “too sensitive.”18 Co-
operation on security issues is therefore found to be more feasible in the frame-
16 Timo Kivimaki and Jorgen Delman (ed.), The Security Situation in Asia: Changing Regional Security Structure?, Co-
penhagen 2005, p. xi.
17 Ibid., pp. iv-v. 
18 Patrick Koellner, Whither ASEM? : Lessons from APEC and the future of  transregional cooperation between Asia 
and Europe, in: Südostasien aktuell (Hamburg), Vol. 19 (September 2000), No. 5, pp. 425–44, or: <http://library.fes.
de/fulltext/bueros/seoul/0168.html>.
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work of  the EU’s relations with ASEAN and in the ARF where the EU enjoys a 
full seat and participates as an organization. However, in practice, the ARF has 
remained more of  a consultative forum and all security discussions “have focused 
hitherto primarily on threat perceptions and confidence-building measures rather 
than on concrete management of  regional security conflicts and conflict resolu-
tion mechanisms involving legal obligations and not just non-binding political 
declarations.”19
Since the early 1990s, the EU had expressed a strong desire in widening the secu-
rity agenda in its relations with ASEAN, and the non-compatible security cultures 
between the two organizations meant that “for most of  the 1990s the EU and 
ASEAN could not find any common ground on conflicting issues such as the lib-
eralization and democratization of  authoritarian regimes, human rights, sustain-
able development, and good governance.”20 Recently, however, there is a growing 
acceptance of  the importance of  non-traditional security on the ASEAN side as 
security culture has changed with an ongoing process of  harmonization of  Asian 
and European security cultures.21 As long as the ARF does not develop mecha-
19 Frank Umbach, EU-ASEAN Political and Security Dialogue at the Beginning of  the 21st Century: Prospects for 
Interregional Cooperation on International Terrorism, in: Panorama (KAS, Singapur), 1.1.2004, <http://www.dgap.
org/midcom-serveattachmentguid-f84fe76ca0c11dab612d7e9e95910b10b/EU-ASEAN-Panorama%2B2004.pdf>, 
p. 2.
20 Jorn Dosch, Changing Security Cultures in Europe and Southeast Asia, Asia-Europe Journal, Vol. 1, No. 4, December 
200, p. 494.
21 Ibid., p. 486.
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nisms for preventive diplomacy, the EU can insist on cooperation on soft security 
issues, and the experiences of  ESDP’s civilian instruments may prove beneficial. 
For the EU, Asia is the most challenging test case for building regional security 
arrangements.22 The EU maintains its ESDP missions open to participation by 
other regional and extra-regional states, but “to give meaning to ideas such as 
‘ownership’ and ‘open coalitions’, the EU needs to channel more resources and 
expertise to regional organizations in the developing world.”23
The EU and Human Security in Asia
It is also imperative for the EU to practically harmonize its instruments for crisis 
management and conflict prevention within the larger framework of  a human 
security approach, which envisages insecurity as emanating from not only un-
derdevelopment and violent conflict situations, but also from situations arising 
due to natural disasters, environmental crises and pandemics. In the Asian con-
text, countries in the region are increasingly beginning to realize the implications 
of  the human security dimension. Most South-East Asian nations have gener-
ally regarded economic development and prosperity as the cornerstone of  their 
national security and have therefore increasingly realized that it is imperative for 
them to cooperate on human security questions as well. Any major environmen-
tal or human security crisis in one country may well have trans-boundary impli-
cations and therefore endanger economic growth and security of  the region. In 
the context of  South Asia, effects of  climate change and natural disasters pose 
serious security challenges. For instance, climate change and the frequent inci-
dences of  tropical cyclones cause recurrent floods in Bangladesh displacing large 
populations. Many of  them are forced to cross over the porous border into the 
Northeast Indian state of  Assam causing tensions and socio-political upheavals 
which have at times turned violent. In addressing human security issues, the EU 
can condition its security and development strategies in far-flung Asian regions 
towards collaborating with regional and local actors in mitigating and preventing 
environmental crises and life-threatening epidemics.
The EU and Asia’s Emerging Global Actors: India and China
The incremental EU experience in civilian and humanitarian crisis management 
may prove beneficial in evolving common strategies with India and China when 
addressing regional humanitarian crises. Any direct EU involvement on the 
ground may also introduce a multilateral dimension to any regional humanitar-
22 Amitav Acharya, An Asian Perspective: Regional security arrangements in a multipolar world: the EU’s contribution, 
in: Martin Ortega (ed.), Global Views on the European Union (Chaillot Paper 72), Paris, November 2004, p. 9.
23 Ibid., p. 100.
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ian crisis management operation and help in ameliorating the fears and distrust 
among smaller nations, especially in the context of  South Asia. The emerging 
political relations between the EU and India have also shown greater signs of  
maturity with the two sides increasingly exhibiting a greater understanding of  
each other’s approach to difficult issues such as terrorism and human rights. The 
two sides have already expressed their desire to “establish an EU-India security 
dialogue on global and regional security issues, disarmament, and non-prolifera-
tion.”24 The current political dialogue under the broad framework of  the emerg-
ing India-EU Strategic Partnership may offer future possibilities to both India 
and the EU to develop strategies for potential cooperation in the field of  crisis 
management.25
Despite their long-standing bilateral disputes, the emergence of  effective confi-
dence-building measures between China and India are also perceptible. China has 
increasingly begun to view India less as a rival and more as a potentially strong 
economic trade partner. Although both countries may be seen to be continually 
trying to exert individual influence among smaller nations in regions along their 
peripheries, the real potential for India-China collaboration lies not so much in 
the resolution of  violent conflicts, but rather in addressing human security issues 
such as environmental degradation, natural disasters, epidemics, drugs and migra-
tion. The EU, along with the ASEAN, India and China, can potentially forge a 
symbiotic partnership in addressing such questions related to the security-devel-
opment nexus in Asia.
Policy Imperatives and Recommendations
The roots of  instability may be complex and may not be merely economic or 
over the control of  resources. Some may go back many centuries and can be 
deeply rooted in differences of  culture, ethnicity, religion, and language. Mere 
economic instruments and top-down approaches may only put many of  the unre-
solved animosities into deep freeze where they could fester and attain greater and 
unmanageable proportions. Therefore, institutional capacity-building from below 
which takes into account local realities and recognizes regional uniqueness and 
respective development processes should be encouraged.
24 European Council Brussels, 7 September 2005, Political Declaration on India-EU Strategic Partnership, in: EU Secu-
rity and Defence: Core Documents 2005, Vol. VI (Chaillot Paper 87), Paris, March 2006, p. 248. 
25 For an analysis of  the EU-India Strategic Partnership, see Saponti Baroowa, The Emerging Strategic Partnership 
between India and the European Union: A Critical Appraisal, in: European Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 6, Oxford 2007, 
pp. 72–749.
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Greater integration into the national mainstream of  troubled regions may not be 
enough and could maintain political and economic alienation. Instead, opportuni-
ties should be identified whereby regions may be integrated not only in a national 
project but also in a larger regional and trans-national system. This would not be 
antithetical to national interests or sovereignty, as some in governing establish-
ments would like to believe, but would lead to a kind of  placebo effect in the 
short-term and sustainable development and security in the long-term.
EU approaches towards security sector reform (SSR) cannot be applied in a 
uniform pattern in all Asian conflict scenarios: local realities and the fundamen-
tal elements which make one conflict situation distinct from another have to be 
taken into consideration. Enforcing the EU’s SSR initiatives in a Failed State in 
Africa is certainly different from enforcing initiatives promoting SSR in troubled 
areas in countries such as India, which is already a highly developed functional 
democracy with long entrenched formal institutions of  governance and policy. 
What is therefore required is a greater sharing of  experiences and expertise, thus 
leading to effective partnerships towards finding viable solutions.
An alternative solution would be to address the root causes of  instability and pro-
mote development by engaging regional partners and integrating troubled regions 
in mutually benefiting economic trade systems. As far as the EU is concerned, a 
Commission driven development agenda approach could be adopted in troubled 
areas, such as Northeast India, whereby collaborative development initiatives 
could be evolved with India towards ameliorating the development dilemmas 
afflicting the region by reducing the existing inequities and mitigating the adverse 
effects of  natural disasters, such as the recurrent floods in Assam. Therefore, in 
regions like India’s Northeast, EC instruments, as part of  the EU Development 
Policy, may prove more effective than the Council’s ESDP capacities, which could 
be more applicable in situations where there is an overall breakdown of  gover-
nance in the parent country and in the face of  an international crises where there 
is a growing international consensus for involvement and intervention.
Conclusion
The EU lacks a coherent policy towards Asia. The AMM resulted mainly from 
the fact that the two main external actors in the region, namely the United States 
and Australia, both discredited themselves with their involvements in Iraq and 
East Timor respectively. Many EU Member States were also reluctant to sup-
port the AMM, in a region far away from the EU and with no tangible European 
interests. Aceh may therefore be viewed as an exception and a contingency, but 
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such contingencies also provide a real opportunity for the EU to devise a more 
comprehensive and durable approach. If  the Union is to ultimately emerge as a 
responsible global actor, the Aceh experience can very well provide a direction 
which could inform future EU strategies when addressing the security-develop-
ment nexus in Asia and other parts of  the world. To bring its development and 
security policies in line with its existing development assistance programs in un-
derdeveloped but more stable regions, the EU could allocate greater resources to 
current and potential conflict-prone regions. Such an approach would introduce 
the much-needed development dimension to the prevalent security-related efforts 
in regional conflict mitigation. The EU should therefore combine its develop-
Felix Heiduk from Germany talks about his field work experience 
in post-Tsunami Aceh
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ment resources and security instruments towards a more long-term global crisis 
response and development approach, rather than resorting to reactive ad-hoc 
arrangements in select situations.
Michael Polyak served as press officer at the US embassy in 
Baghdad
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The Security-Development Nexus in Iraq
Michael Polyak
In 200, US-led Coalition Forces invaded Iraq with two goals: ending the regime 
of  Saddam Hussein, which it perceived as a grave and gathering danger, and 
fostering a stable democracy in its place. The Coalition Forces achieved the first 
objective successfully; the second goal has been more elusive. In Iraq, a violent 
insurgency, malicious foreign interference and sectarian warfare have made pro-
viding security a daunting challenge. Meanwhile, internal rivalries have led to po-
litical gridlock and a weak, albeit democratically elected, central government. In 
turn, the lack of  security and political cohesion has made Iraqi reconstruction an 
arduous task, greatly stunting the country’s potential for economic development. 
The international community can best promote success in Iraq by brokering 
domestic political reconciliation, while conducting innovative security operations 
and building capacity for the Iraqi government. Through Iraqi capacity develop-
ment, the international community can support Iraq with political consultation 
and material assistance. Since security and development are inter-dependent, they 
must develop in a simultaneous, stair-step like fashion.
Challenges in Iraq
Iraq will not succeed unless it overcomes the multiple security challenges eroding 
the country’s cohesion. A failed Iraq would affect the entire Middle East, and the 
disaster could result in a regional war that would significantly harm the world’s 
strategic and economic foundations. The international community therefore has a 
high stake in Iraq, and until the Iraqi Security Forces are fully capable of  handling 
domestic security operations, assistance from abroad is essential.
While it is common to hear of  strategic threats from an “Iraqi insurgency,” in 
actuality, several conflicts are occurring simultaneously, reinforcing each other. In 
the wake of  Saddam Hussein’s demise, numerous sub-national groups developed 
into armed gangs. In central and southern Iraq, as well as in Baghdad, Shi’ite mi-
litias such as the Jeish al-Mahdi and the Badr Brigades grew, ostensibly with the 
purpose of  providing security for their local communities against Sunni militants, 
al-Qaeda and ex-Ba’athists. Unfortunately, instead of  strictly providing local se-
curity, these militias frequently used their power to settle personal scores, commit 
sectarian murders and enforce sectarian cleansing throughout Iraqi cities.
Michael Polyak
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In other parts of  Iraq, disaffected ex-rank and file members of  the Ba’ath party 
formed “resistance” groups, with the initial aim of  fighting the Coalition Forces. 
Examples of  such groups include the Islamic Army of  Iraq and the 1920 Revo-
lution Brigade. These groups primarily based themselves in central and western 
Iraq, where they gained infamy through attacks on Coalition Forces and Iraqi 
civilians.
Subsequently, al-Qaeda was quick to establish a presence in Iraq, known as al-Qa-
eda in Iraq. Largely based in the Anbar and Diyala provinces, it recruited indi-
viduals from inside and outside of  Iraq, often working in concert with domestic 
Iraqi insurgent groups to carry out attacks on Coalition Forces. While a common 
enemy brought these groups together, beneath the surface, deep divisions existed. 
Many Iraqi insurgent groups existed under a banner of  Sunni nationalism and 
the insurgency was a means to reclaim what they considered their historical rule 
over the country. Al-Qaeda’s plan, however, was to undermine overall confidence 
in the Iraqi government and Coalition Forces, and to drive the country into a 
sectarian-based civil war, eventually leading to the Coalition’s withdrawal and a 
failed state. Al-Qaeda hoped that such a state would provide a base of  operations 
to carry out attacks throughout the region, in order to pursue its vision of  es-
tablishing a regional caliphate. In an attempt to ignite a civil war, al-Qaeda killed 
large numbers of  innocent Sunnis and Shi’ites, while attacking persons and places 
of  religious significance. Unfortunately, the strategy was partially successful, as 
sectarian warfare erupted between Iraq’s factions.
Economically, Iraq’s progress has stalled out due to decrepit pre-war infrastruc-
ture, attacks on reconstruction sites, widespread corruption, and an inability for 
the Iraqi government to properly budget and spend dedicated reconstruction 
funds. A combination of  these tragic factors has undermined the country’s ability 
to generate strategic, political and economic progress.
Responses
In response to these challenges, the Coalition Forces have been training and 
working alongside the Iraqi Security Forces in order to combat foreign terror-
ists, prevent sectarian warfare, and convince domestic insurgent groups to pur-
sue their agendas through the political process. Towards these ends, strategies, 
such as “Clear, Hold and Build”, have been effective. Initially, when conducting 
security operations in Iraq, the Coalition Forces would clear a city of  insurgent 
influence and move on to other cities. As a result, the insurgents would melt away 
upon hearing news of  an approaching military force—only to return once the 
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Coalition Forces had departed. This created a “whack-a-mole” type of  scenario, 
which prevented lasting progress in Iraq’s cities. More importantly, because many 
tribal sheikhs and mayors felt unable to count on sustained military support, they 
allowed insurgents to take root in their towns.
In response, the Coalition Forces implemented the “Clear, Hold, and Build” 
strategy whereby the military would clear a city of  insurgents, and rather than 
moving along, troops stayed put—pursuing suspected insurgents, helping to 
rebuild critical infrastructure, and working with the city’s elected officials to build 
effective governance and security capabilities. In cities like Tal Afar in northern 
Iraq, this was successful. The strategy, however, was not sustainable as it required 
many troops, and most of  the Coalition Forces were stretched thin and dedicated 
to other tasks. Meanwhile, sectarian warfare raged in other provinces and security 
in Baghdad was minimal.
In January 2007, President Bush, as part of  a “New Way Forward,” sought to ad-
dress these challenges by deploying 21,500 additional US troops to Iraq,1 primar-
ily to stabilize Baghdad, along with an additional 4,000 Marines to secure the An-
bar province.2 The military also adjusted its tactics to address the conflicts on the 
ground: rather than operating exclusively from Forward Operating Bases, some 
Coalition Forces positioned themselves on sectarian fault lines in mixed Sunni 
and Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad, to provide a buffer zone in areas prone to 
attack. Since its inception, the troop level increase, or “surge,” has significantly 
reduced violence in Iraq. Not only have attacks decreased in Baghdad, but Anbar 
province—once a notorious insurgent stronghold—has become far safer.3
The turnaround in security in Baghdad and Anbar can be largely attributed to the 
Anbar Uprising and Concerned Citizen Group programs. The Anbar Uprising 
represents a strategic re-alliance of  Sunni tribal sheikhs and ex-insurgent groups 
away from al-Qaeda and towards the Coalition Forces. In 2005/06, Iraqi insur-
gents and sheikhs from Sunni regions became increasingly frustrated with al-Qa-
eda’s attacks on innocent Iraqis—often their brethren—and came to understand 
the grave threat they would face if  Coalition Forces were to leave. Additionally, 
some sheikhs viewed the US troop surge as a tangible, lasting commitment to 
Anbar’s security, reassurance that they would not be abandoned after choosing 
to turn against al-Qaeda. As the troop surge progressed, former insurgents and 
Sunni sheikhs became more comfortable with the idea of  aligning with Coalition 
1 Tracking Variables of  Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, in: Brooking Institution, Iraq Index: <http://
www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf>.
2 President’s Radio Address, in: White House Radio, 15 September 2007.
 Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, in: Department of  Defense Report to Congress, September 2007, p. 24.
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Forces against al-Qaeda. Furthermore, many sheikhs saw this as a chance to gain 
political influence in Iraq.4
Similarly, in the restive Dialya province, thousands of  volunteers have joined 
performance-based Concerned Citizen Groups, which work with Iraqi and 
Coalition Forces to identify security threats.5 The Coalition Forces have agreed 
to pay nominal fees to these individuals to help provide localized protection for 
their communities. In practice, this system has drastically improved security in 
Sunni and mixed provinces, and has provided an effective buffer between the 
largely Shi’ite Iraqi Security Forces and the populations of  Sunni cities. Indeed, 
by October 2007, al-Qaeda violence had dropped drastically since the beginning 
of  the year. In late October 2007, Major General Richard Sherlock, Director of  
Operational Planning for the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, reported that “in and around 
Baghdad, terrorist operations are down by 59 percent; operations targeting Iraqi 
security forces are down over 60 percent; car bombs are down by 65 percent; 
fatalities due to car bombs have decreased by 81 percent; casualties due to enemy 
attacks are down by 77 percent; and the violence during this last Ramadan period 
was the lowest in three years.”6
Security Policy Recommendations
While the strategy of  incorporating the Sunni “uprising” has been effective, some 
have criticized Coalition Forces for working with former insurgents. Critics argue 
that after al-Qaeda is forced out of  Iraq, the insurgents will only turn against 
Coalition Forces once again. Even if  that scenario transpires, however, it still 
removes al-Qaeda from the battle space—along with its attempts to stoke sectar-
ian warfare. Moreover, given the limited resources of  the Iraqi Security Forces 
and the strong sectarian tensions in Iraq, this option—while risky—seems to be 
an effective way of  reducing communal violence while giving interested Iraqi 
citizens a stake in maintaining local security.
In order for this strategy to work, Iraq’s leaders must take advantage of  the rela-
tive lull in violence to create conditions that will make ex-insurgents less likely to 
return to violence if  militant leaders later declare a call to arms. For this strategy 
to be consistent with national unity, the Coalition Forces must ensure that the 
volunteer forces meet several criteria. At a minimum, the volunteer forces must 
be accountable to—and supervised by—the Coalition Forces to ensure that they 
4 Hamza Hendawi, Brittle bond: Iraqi sheik joins US fight, in: Associated Press, 12 October 2007.
5 Fred W. Baker III, Grass-roots Security Efforts Help Drive Out Insurgents, in: American Forces Press Service, 16 
October 2007.
6 Maj. Gen. Richard Sherlock, DoD Regular Briefing, 24 October 2007.
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act appropriately and do not form militias. These groups must strictly adhere to 
the Iraqi Security Forces’ rules of  engagement, and should eventually be ab-
sorbed into the security forces. Most importantly, this strategy must not only have 
the approval of  the Iraqi government, but the government must ultimately own 
the strategy, building relationships of  trust with the volunteer forces. This final 
point is critical to mitigate the risk of  volunteer forces fighting against the Iraqi 
government after the Coalition Forces’ withdrawal. As the volunteer forces con-
tinue to isolate al-Qaeda, identify attackers and weapons caches, the nationwide 
level of  violence will continue to fall. Such progress will be felt in both Sunni and 
Shi’ite regions of  the country, lending credence to the value of  this strategy.
In spite of  recent progress, terrorist attacks continue and Iraq remains far from 
stable. In order to achieve lasting national security, the Coalition Forces and 
Iraqi Security Forces must continue to implement adaptive tactical measures as 
the strategic picture changes. For instance, given the Coalition Forces’ success 
in driving a wedge between many of  Iraq’s Sunni insurgents and al-Qaeda, it is 
worth considering whether a similar policy could isolate frustrated populations 
from militias and Iranian-backed death squads in the Shi’ite regions of  Iraq. By 
dedicating comprehensive, consistent support to Shi’ite leaders tired of  mali-
cious interference in their lands, the Coalition Forces could begin to undermine 
the base of  operations for militias and Iranian influence. Granted, the nature of  
destabilizing activities differs greatly in Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’ite regions, as do the 
hierarchies of  leadership in the insurgent organizations. While the two scenarios 
are not completely analogous, it is possible that an overall desire for change could 
prompt a similar re-alliance in Iraq’s Shi’ite regions.
In an idealized scenario, through al-Qaeda’s dwindling support in Iraq, coupled 
with the isolation of  death squads, two of  the greatest perpetrators of  sectarian 
violence would be muted. The subsequent drop in sectarian killings would take 
the wind from the sails of  insurgents who justify attacks based on other sectar-
ian violence. Furthermore, a reduction in sectarian conflict would provide a more 
suitable climate for political and sectarian rapprochement, which could ideally 
culminate in a lasting peace agreement. Such an agreement would create greater 
stability, instilling confidence in international donors contemplating sending 
financial, personnel or material assistance to Iraq.
In the security realm, the international community could play a greater role. Col-
lective security organizations can contribute to the efforts of  the Coalition and 
Iraqi Security Forces and greatly support the critical fight for Iraq’s future. Al-
though NATO currently has a major role in Afghanistan and a minor role in Iraq, 
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improved conditions in Afghanistan or a greater overall NATO commitment 
would allow the organization to augment its presence in Iraq and demonstrate its 
primacy in addressing modern security challenges. Alternatively, were the UN or 
the Arab League to establish a presence of  troops for support and peacekeep-
ing missions, this would help balance out the overwhelming US presence, while 
demonstrating a tangible commitment to a secure Iraq.
Fundamentally, security policy in Iraq must protect the population from terrorist 
attacks. This creates space for economic development and political reconciliation 
throughout the country. Indeed, in some provinces, including much of  Anbar, 
this has been successful. Any effective security initiative in Iraq must protect the 
populace while isolating foreign and domestic threats.
Finally, despite Iran’s rhetorical support for a stable, democratic Iraq, there is 
continuing evidence of  Iranian involvement in providing training and material 
support to militias that carry out attacks on Iraqi civilians and Coalition Forces.7 
These actions are violating Iraq’s sovereignty and straining the cohesion of  the 
Middle East. In an attempt to reach a diplomatic solution, the United States and 
the international community have engaged with Iran in several different forums; 
however, evidence suggests that Iran has maintained its destabilizing activities 
in Iraq.8 To counter this, the Coalition Forces must bring to light more evidence 
of  Iran’s involvement in Iraq, and the international community must place more 
pressure on Iran to cease its activities. Ultimately, however, the greatest check on 
Iran’s regionally hegemonic aspirations will be a stable, democratic Iraq. There-
fore, it is in the interest of  the international community to assist Iraq, as this 
provides a corollary benefit of  reigning in Iran’s regional ambitions.
Political and Economic Assistance Recommendations
In Iraq, military operations alone will not create success. A secure environ-
ment is essential for progress, but even then, it is not preordained that political 
and economic development will follow. In the political realm, sectarianism and 
corruption are presenting major obstacles to reform. In negotiating many key 
landmarks for political progress in Iraq, officials frequently advocate policies that 
greatly benefit his or her religious or ethnic sect, at the expense of  national unity. 
This has caused gridlock on key reform processes, such as deciding the status of  
Kirkuk, allocating oil revenues, and determining the relationship between Bagh-
dad and Iraq’s provincial governments. The tendency for politicians to negotiate 
7 David Mays, More Evidence Shows Iran Directly Supports Iraq Insurgents, in: American Forces Press Service,  Octo-
ber 2007.
8 Kenneth Katzman, Iran’s Influence in Iraq, CRS Report to Congress, 9 August 2007.
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policies based on sectarian interests stems from an overall lack of  confidence 
in Iraq’s future. The politicians, fearing the collapse or partitioning of  Iraq, are 
hedging their bets by investing in regional, sectarian structures of  governance. To 
move beyond this state of  affairs, all of  Iraq’s sectarian groups need to feel that 
they have an equitable, lasting stake in the central government.
Capacity Development Programs for the Central Government
In this regard, capacity development programs for the central government should 
focus on managing and sharing national resources, securing borders, resisting 
influence from neighbor-
ing countries, and devising 
strategies to hold together 
the country’s sectarian 
blocs after the eventual 
withdrawal of  Coalition 
Forces. Another critical 
topic is determining the 
strength of  the relationship 
between Iraq’s central and 
provincial governments. 
Given Iraq’s great diversity, 
the central government will 
only succeed if  it upholds 
cooperative relationships 
with all of  Iraq’s provinces, 
which requires granting 
substantive authority to the 
provincial governments. At 
the same time, a relatively 
strong central government 
will be necessary to uphold 
national interests, ensure 
domestic security, collect 
taxes and prevent sectarian 
strife or separatist tenden-
cies. Thus, striking the 
correct power balance be-
tween national and provincial governments will prove critical to Iraq’s long-term 
stability. While Iraqis must make these decisions, the international community 
Kamal Amakrane, who works in the Department of Political Affairs 
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can provide consultation, while creating conditions that allow secure, equitable, 
democratic negotiations to occur.
Programs for the Provincial Governments
Iraq’s provincial governments require similar political assistance. Some leaders 
in the Sunni regions, benefiting from the “uprising,” have seen improvements in 
security, families returning to their homes and city life stabilizing. This stability 
could be leveraged by developing sound, responsive governance structures and 
by encouraging local economic development. In support of  this, international do-
nors could enhance economic growth by rebuilding critical infrastructure, initiat-
ing micro-credit schemes for small businesses, and by fostering economic strati-
fication by diversifying Iraqi exports. Such products and services might include 
agriculture, minerals or secure transport corridors. By developing new markets, 
these regions would experience direct financial growth and the country’s econ-
omy would begin to reduce its monolithic dependence on oil revenues. Eventu-
ally, Iraqi provincial leaders could point to lasting regional stability to encourage 
foreign investment. Some institutions, such as the U. S. Commercial Services, have 
already implemented programs in conjunction with local businesses to encourage 
investment in Anbar province. While past attempts of  this nature have had lim-
ited success, the environment is becoming increasingly ripe for similar initiatives.
By capitalizing on secure regions of  Iraq through economic development pro-
grams, the country would acquire more bastions of  security and trade in Arab 
regions that allow for the same economic opportunities as in the country’s Kurd-
ish region. As more Arab provinces experienced security and development gains, 
capital would flow to these regions, giving residents a greater stake in ensuring 
that their lands remained secure. Subsequently, the military could then free up 
resources from these regions to focus on other threats, and lay the groundwork 
for economic development in other provinces. Improved conditions in Iraq’s 
provinces would also create space for genuine political dialogue—allowing 
provincial leaders to formulate initiatives that improve the lives of  their constitu-
ents, and strategies to be the most effective when negotiating with the national 
government.
Foreign Assistance
Assistance from abroad would best take the form of  capacity development 
programs. Such consultation must continue to focus on enforcing the rule of  
law, protecting rights of  women and minorities, and it must provide technical 
assistance on subjects like monitoring corruption and allocating budgets and re-
sources. Indeed, several organizations already exist to help the Iraqi government 
build capacity and develop good governance practices. Examples include the US 
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Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Republican 
Institute, the National Democratic Institute, the US Embassy’s Provincial Recon-
struction Teams (PRTs) and Regional Embassy Offices. Interested donor coun-
tries would be of  great service by contributing to these existing development 
operations, or by starting new initiatives to meet unmet needs.
Finally, international supporters must insist upon augmented and accelerated de-
Ba’athification reform. After the downfall of  the Ba’ath party, many party mem-
bers fled or were released of  their services, leading to widespread resentment and 
unemployment from this group. In Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Ba’ath party member-
ship was a requirement for holding a professional, academic, or military position. 
A vast number of  low ranked Ba’athists were not involved in the regime’s egre-
gious crimes, but enlisted solely as a means of  getting ahead in life. As such, there 
is a need to invite these individuals to return to public service. Currently, the pro-
cess of  de-Ba’athification reform has been too slow and ambiguous, and many 
consider it marred by sectarianism. Successful de-Ba’athification reform can help 
alleviate unemployment and disenfranchisement, and it represents a critical step 
in overcoming sectarian discord. In order to ensure that equitable debate and 
proper de-Ba’athification reform occur, the Iraqi government must entrust this 
process to a religiously and ethnically diverse group of  officials, while demanding 
transparency and oversight on its decisions.
Conclusion
The processes of  strategic, political and economic development in Iraq must hap-
pen simultaneously, in a stair-step process. Securing a city or province provides an 
environment for political dialogue, which can produce a stable, legally transparent 
framework for conducting business and economic development. Encouraging in-
clusive, grass roots business practices creates jobs and gives residents an incentive 
to keep their regions safe, which would free up national resources to replicate the 
process elsewhere. Iraq will continue to require international economic, political 
and military support. Iraq’s neighbors and the broader international community 
have much to gain from Iraq’s success and much to lose from its failure. In order 
to properly assist the Iraqi government, donor countries must make clear to Iraqi 
politicians the disadvantages of  defection and the rewards of  cooperation.
At both state and local levels, elected officials engaging in corrupt behavior or 
shirking their duties should be encouraged to reform by the international com-
munity, and should not be supported until they do so. Foreign donors should 
therefore augment support to Iraqi leaders that put aid resources to good use, as 
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this will eventually lead to the development of  more bastions of  stability. Finally, 
donor countries must link material support with programs that prevent the Iraqi 
government from becoming dependent on foreign aid. In the security realm, 
this means continuing to train the Iraqi Security Forces; economically, it means 
developing sustainable business practices; and politically, it requires governance 
consultation. While no initiative is perfect, this broad overview provides a general 
framework, which holds better chances for success in the land of  two rivers.
Pablo Barrera Cruz, here with Michael Polyak, currently works as 
Middle East Representative for a Spanish NGO in Lebanon
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Turkey’s Emerging Role in the Middle East
Özge Genç
Turkey has become more assertive in the Middle East. Underlining the obstacles 
and opportunities leading to Turkey’s foreign and security policy towards the 
region, an overview of  the more traditional dynamics of  Turkish foreign policy is 
useful and complementary to an analysis of  the dynamics of  change from a hard 
security approach towards a more comprehensive foreign policy. Elaborating on 
the prospects for a comprehensive policy, development strategies need to be in-
tegrated into foreign and security policy-making. Though this need is particularly 
relevant for Turkey’s approach and relations with adjacent conflict zones in Iraq, 
Syria-Lebanon and Palestine-Israel, there are some promising cases worth high-
lighting in which a great deal of  coordination and cooperation has been achieved 
between Turkey and countries of  the Middle East.
Traditional Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy
Since the foundation of  the Republic of  Turkey in 192, the ruling elite, in keep-
ing with the legacy of  Kemal Ataturk, tended to identify more with the West than 
with the Middle East and the Islamic world.1 By identifying Islam and the Islamic 
state as the main cause of  backwardness, secularism became the constitutive part 
of  the Turkish state discourse. The politics of  “Westernization” also prompted 
the gradual erosion of  the role of  Islam in politics and public administration. Yet, 
breaking with the Ottoman past reinforced the formation of  state identity based 
on Turkishness. The formation of  the Turkish state and national ideology was a 
transformation of  “a non-western, de-central, a-national and non-secular social 
formation (the Ottoman Empire) into a western, central, national and secular one 
(the Turkish Republic).”2
In Turkey, national identity formation and conflicting identities shaped prefer-
ences in foreign policy decision-making, and led to different foreign policy goals 
at times. Therefore, the components of  Turkish identity, narratives and symbols 
of  belonging, threat perceptions and insecurities have all had repercussions on 
Turkey’s behavior toward its most immediate Middle Eastern neighbors. Accord-
ing to Philip Robins, the role of  state ideology was significant in Turkey’s politi-
cal marginalization, which established the differences between the Turks and the 
1 Sabri Sayari, Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s, in: Journal of  Palestine Studies, Vol. 26, No. , Spring 1997, p. 
51.
2 Mesut Yeğen, The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse, in: Journal of  Contemporary History, Vol. 4, No. , 
1999, p. 559.
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peoples of  neighboring states.3 The Turkish state elite’s perception of  the Turks 
as “distinct people” led to a “frigid isolationism” in foreign policy; Turkey be-
came a “peripheral”, “awkward” and “uneasy” actor in the Middle East.4 Often-
times, the Middle East has been conceptualized as a region full of  threats and 
dangers aiming at the integrity of  the Turkish state, for instance by supporting 
Kurdish insurgency and radical Islamists. Moreover, as Turkey was born out of  
several conflicts with Greece and tribal ethnic Kurdish uprisings, the overriding 
concern about security has not only been synonymous with the state-building 
project, but has also dictated foreign policy. Since the dismemberment of  the 
Ottoman Empire, fear of  losing more territory and the fear of  abandonment has 
become a major aspect of  Turkish security culture; these fears still continue to 
influence some of  the elite and public opinion.5
Another important factor in the production of  insecurities and threats has been 
the role of  the Turkish military in the evolution of  a national security culture.6 
In Turkey, the military has played an overly influential role in defining and acting 
against external and internal threats, by not only using its military power, but also 
influencing the domestic policy-making apparatus. The Turkish military has long 
portrayed itself  as the protector of  Turkey’s secular state. In this “guardian” role, 
it has ousted four democratically elected governments in less than 50 years. The 
military is struggling not only to preserve its privileged position within Turkey’s 
political system, but also the “security first” logic of  the state. According to many 
in Turkey, the rationale of  security is used to justify a large and strong army, a big 
defense budget, the practices of  gendarmerie, intelligence and armed forces, and 
other measures which erode freedoms and enable press censorship and closing 
down political parties.7 In fact, the Turkish public is fairly supportive of  using 
military strength in ensuring peace, and eliminating terrorist organizations in 
fighting terrorism.8 The military usually supports a hard security approach fo-
cused on preventing any disruption of  the integrity of  the Turkish state and its 
borders. For instance, they have recently been insisting on the need to raid the 
northern Iraq hideouts of  anti-government Kurdish rebels of  the PKK.
However, parallel to Turkey’s EU accession process many reforms have been un-
dertaken to diminish the role of  the military in the political system. The military’s 
 Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, New York, NY, 1991, p. 10.
4 Ibid., p. 155.
5 Ali Karaosmanoğlu, The Evolution of  the National Security Culture, in: Journal of  International Affairs, Vol. 54, 
No. 1, Fall 2000, p. 201.
6 Ibid.
7 Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, London, 200, p. 161. 
8 See The German Marshall Fund of  the United States and Compagnia di San Paolo, Transatlantic Trends Key Findings 
2007, <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/doc/Transatlantic%20Trends_all_0920.pdf>.
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privileged position within the political system is being challenged by a rising 
sector within the middle class, which is conservative and Muslim, and helped the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) come to power in the 2002 parliamentary 
elections. Thus, along with foreign policy initiatives implemented by the Is-
lamic-rooted AKP and Turkey’s bid to secure European Union membership, the 
meaning of  (in)security is being transformed and Turkey is achieving significant 
progress in its relations with neighboring Middle Eastern countries.
Considering recent developments in Turkish foreign and security policy towards 
the Middle East the impact of  Turkey’s bid for EU membership is very signifi-
cant. Although the EU does not have a coherent foreign policy approach or 
clear foreign policy benchmarks, Turkey’s latest efforts can be claimed to be in 
line with the EU policies. Turkey’s direct and indirect contributions to the objec-
tives of  the European Neighborhood Policy include its role in the Middle East 
Peace Process, its relations with Syria, its participation in UNIFIL, its efforts to 
persuade the Sunnis in Iraq to cooperate, its efforts to rebuild Afghanistan and 
attempts to talk Iran into abiding by international demands. Turkey’s support in 
these areas was recorded as positive developments in the 2006 Progress Report.9
The AKP’s foreign policy seems to represent a new political and cultural trend in 
Turkey and it is based on “Turkey’s reconciliation with its geographical vicinity.”10 
Having “revived long-dormant ties with the Muslim world,”11 this vision collides 
with the concept of  national security, historical grievances and the so-called poli-
tics of  strategic positioning, which resulted in intense diplomacy with regional 
countries, as well as efforts to strengthen mutual dialogue by addressing contro-
versial issues. The positive atmosphere created with Middle Eastern neighbors, 
who have had overlapping identity-building processes, opposed each other and 
have grown alien to one another over time, seems to have considerably increased 
trust towards Turkey.12 Accordingly, good relations with Middle Eastern countries, 
especially with Syria, Lebanon and Iran, face-to-face contact, regional coopera-
tion and summits, especially with regard to Iraq and the Israel-Palestine conflict, 
have marked developments in the last few years, which have benefited all sides 
drastically due to flourishing diplomatic relations and increased trade. Despite 
positive achievements it is still too early to assess the outcome of  steps aimed at 
resolving regional conflicts such as Israel-Palestine and Iraq.
9 Commission of  the European Communities, Commission Staff  Working Document, Tur-
key 2007 Progress Report, SEC(2007) 146, Brussels, 6 November 2007, <http://ec.europa.
eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf>.
10 Interview with Ali Sarikaya, Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, 19 June 2004.
11 Turkey’s Foreign Policy: An Eminence Grise, in: Economist, 17 November 2007, p. 8.
12 See Özge Genç, Turkey EU and the Middle East, in: TESEV Foreign Policy Bulletin, No. 4, April 2007, pp. 1–14.
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Bilateral ties with Syria have improved since the late 1990s, particularly after the 
Adana Process, which ended the October 1998 crisis between Turkey and Syria 
when the two states came to the brink of  war, due to Syria’s support for PKK 
by hosting its leader Abdullah Öcalan. In 2004, Bashar al-Assad’s official visit to 
Turkey – the first for a Syrian President – invigorated the desire to increase eco-
nomic, political and social cooperation and relatively reduced the level of  insecu-
rity felt by both states. Since then, owing largely to face-to-face contacts between 
Syrian and Turkish officials and working together at regional summits, Turkey 
and Syria have become close “partners” rather than “distant neighbors.”13 Recent 
figures show that “in the last two years the Syrian authorities have approved more 
than 0 Turkish investment projects in the country with a total value of  over 150 
million Dollar; and bilateral trade is expected to be around 1.5 billion Dollar in 
2007, more than triple the figure when the AKP came to power.”14
A significant step for Turkey’s engagement in the conflict in Lebanon was taken 
during September 2006 after the July 2006 War between Israel and Lebanon, 
when the Turkish parliament approved the deployment of  Turkish peacekeeping 
troops between Israel and Hezbollah in the reinforced United Nations Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) operations in South Lebanon. Despite strong do-
mestic opposition, the government ensured that Turkey’s involvement in this mis-
sion would bolster Turkey’s role in the Middle East as a constructive player and 
thus passed the resolution in the parliament. Turkish troops in UNIFIL II are 
now composed of  a Turkish engineering unit, which helps to rebuild damaged 
bridges and roads, and a frigate from the Turkish Naval Forces patrolling off  
the Lebanese coast.15 Recently, following the conflict between Fatah al-Islam and 
the Lebanese Army in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in Northern 
Lebanon, which led to the displacement of  over 30,000 refugees and the damage 
and destruction of  much of  the camp infrastructure, Turkey donated an assis-
tance package of  around 1.1 million Dollar through the Emergency Management 
Agency.16
Turkey’s engagement in Iraq is a more complicated story. Since the beginning of  
the US-led invasion of  Iraq in 2003, Turkey has conducted active diplomacy con-
cerning the reconstruction of  a new regime in Iraq and the situation in its Kurd-
ish parts. Turkey’s diplomatic efforts for the current situation in Iraq have fo-
13 See Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations, 
in: Security Dialogue, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2006, pp. 229–248.
14 Gareth Jenkins, Assad Visit Signals Deepening Rapprochement Between Turkey and Syria, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 
17 October 2007, <http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=272511>.
15 Journal of  Turkish Weekly (Ankara), <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=40268>, 19 October 2006.
16 ReliefWeb, <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/LSGZ-788GXM?OpenDocument>, 22 October 2007.
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cused on preserving the territorial integrity and unity of  Iraq so that no separate 
Kurdish state is formed in northern Iraq. The overriding concern with northern 
Iraq led to two different and often contradictory attitudes by Turkish policy-mak-
ers towards the region, which has had its repercussions in Turkey’s Iraqi policy 
until today. Thus, in October 2007, the Turkish parliament passed a resolution for 
a possible cross-border operation into Iraq, which would involve a military raid 
into northern Iraq to crush the PKK forces. Subsequently, in November 2007, 
Turkey hosted the Extended Iraqi Neighbors Conference in Istanbul as a contin-
uation of  its previous attempts at regional diplomacy and summits for the Iraqi 
cause, which often aimed at bringing different local Iraqi and regional groups 
together to ensure their support for Iraq’s political, social and economic recon-
struction. However, this time the conference had a reiterated focus on coopera-
tion against ending the PKK’s presence in Iraq. The recent conference made it 
evident that the central government in Baghdad is closer to the Turkish position 
than ever before and is not willing to sacrifice its economic and cultural relations 
with Turkey.17 As described by Bulent Aras, Turkey portrays two different images 
in relation to Iraq: “One is Turkey getting ready for an incursion, ready to con-
front with Iraqi forces or even American forces in the region. The other is the 
Turkey that is providing 70 percent of  the logistical support for American troops 
in Iraq, supporting the building up of  Iraq in regards to the many construc-
tion projects going on, and a Turkey in relationships with many different ethnic 
groups in Iraq, trying to help their inclusion in the political system.”18
Turkey’s latest efforts in the Israel-Palestine conflict are also noteworthy. In 
November 2007, Turkey hosted Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian 
President Mahmoud Abbas just prior to the prospective international conference 
on the Middle East in Annapolis. Both leaders gave speeches in the Turkish Par-
liament and expressed their willingness for peace in the region. This visit was part 
of  a larger plan entitled Industry for Peace Initiative, commenced by the Turkish 
Union of  Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) in cooperation with the 
Turkish Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, and aimed at building a permanent dialogue 
mechanism between Palestinian, Israeli and Turkish business communities with 
more focus on private sector development and employment generation projects 
in the West Bank. It is now exploring opportunities to embark on an industrial 
park project in the region.19
17 Bülent Aras, Turkey’s War on Terror, in: SETA Policy Brief, No. 2, November 2007, pp. 1–6. 
18 Bülent Aras interview, in: Today’s Zaman, 22 October 2007.
19 For more information, see: <http://www.industryforpeace.org>.
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As the cases presented above have shown, in the recent years a shift has occurred 
from a “peripheral” and “uneasy” Turkey to a more central and involved one in 
the Middle East. Particularly in the post- September 11 context, Turkey began to 
present itself  more actively as a mediator between Islamic and Western civiliza-
tions through its noteworthy efforts and projects, especially with regards to creat-
ing common platforms for both sides, while vigorously seeking to pursue a more 
constructive role in the region despite concurrent crises. However, occurrences 
such as Hamas’ visit to Turkey in February 2006 (immediately after its election 
victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections) and its repercussions on inter-
national and local media have shown how Turkey fails to create effective dialogue 
mechanisms in matters related to its involvement in Middle Eastern affairs, and 
how Turkey lacks an ability to make itself  fully understood by others. Again, con-
trary to the repeated claim of  Turkey being a bridge between Europe and Asia, 
Western and Islamic civilizations, Turkey has not yet been able to fulfill this role 
of  understanding both cultures, and hence having a unique role as interpreter of  
both.20
One of  the barriers for Turkey to pursue a constructive policy towards the 
Middle East is the fact that Turkey’s foreign and security policy is largely shaped 
by its internal politics as much as by international and regional dynamics – these 
include the domestic balance of  power, civilian-military relations, identity and cit-
izenship debates, elections and society’s political outlook. The way problems are 
handled within domestic politics highly affects Turkey’s relations with its neigh-
bors. Occasionally, an introspective Turkey and the rising politics of  nationalism 
and insecurity reinforce a hard-security approach, which prefers national security 
over human security, and prevents prospects for a more democratic foreign and 
security policy in the Middle East.
Towards a More Constructive Foreign Policy
Conditions emerging in the post-Cold War era, namely the advance of  global-
ization, have changed trends in the world security agenda. The new definition 
emphasizes new security threats, such as economic and developmental threats, 
environmental pollution, ethnic conflicts, international migration, drug trafficking 
and smuggling, and some other problems regarding the threats aimed at the well-
being of  citizens. Such a broadened security agenda requires a more comprehen-
sive security approach and policies, which transcend the narrow confines of  hard 
security strategies that focus on military means. This new agenda further neces-
20 Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, New York, 1991, p. 14.
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sitates the engagement of  civil society, as well as international and local organiza-
tions in formulating security policies.
Having pointed out different trends and dynamics in Turkish foreign policy to-
wards the Middle East, Turkey needs to take into consideration this new security 
trend and re-think its policies accordingly. Such a policy re-formulation would 
perhaps require a more idealist approach in terms of  foreign and security policy. 
The above analysis of  Turkish foreign policy revealed that there is a two-fold 
strategy in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. There is a realist hard 
security approach prioritizing national security by all means, which is dominated 
by the view that “Turkey’s existence is always in jeopardy and has no friends but 
itself.”21 Recent developments, regarding the discussions of  sending troops to 
northern Iraq fortify such a security-first logic. Public opinion, shaped by media 
and other means of  socialization, can also help to support this line of  thinking. 
The military’s role and civilians scoring badly in respecting the difficult balance 
between national security and human security are major obstacles to avoid this 
hard security approach. And then there is also the rather idealist approach based 
on attempts to foster mutual dialogue, diplomacy and economic, social and 
cultural relations. This approach, facilitated through AKP’s limited efforts, EU 
candidacy and other regional and international factors, is helpful in defining a 
21 Meliha Altunışık, Turkey’s Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond, in: Journal of  Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 14, 
No. 2, August 2006, p. 19.
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leading role for Turkey in regional affairs as a mediator between conflicting par-
ties. Such a role necessitates Turkey to be more active in the region and engage in 
better political and economic relations and closer ties with the countries of  the 
region. When this foreign policy took over, Turkey approached its neighbors as a 
reliable partner primarily through concrete projects aimed at assisting economic, 
social and political development. However, too much emphasis on being a politi-
cal model for the countries of  the Middle East (and even Central Asia and the 
Caucasus) has not proven to be very efficient.
Conclusion
To ensure the sustainability of  the second approach in Turkish foreign policy, 
certain conditions have to be fulfilled. First, the hard security approach should be 
avoided in order to pursue a more democratic foreign and security policy. Second, 
decisions about foreign policy should be subject to truly deliberative discussions 
where Turkish parliament, civil society, and media take on more energetic efforts 
to monitor and control the policies.22 Third, Turkey should not abandon Europe-
anizing its foreign policy. A nationalist and inward looking Turkey has the poten-
tial to be an uncomfortable and peripheral neighbor to the Middle East. Fourth, 
Turkey should use its foreign policy to create more strategic communication 
platforms with groups in Iran, Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, to express their 
wills and interests more effectively. Fifth, Turkey should prove its distinction by 
transferring its know-how commensurate with the specific needs of  each country 
in the region, which may contribute to the advancing economic regional integra-
tion. Sixth, Turkey needs to start more credible and less ambivalent strategies for 
its actions in the Middle East. Turkey’s communication strategy has proved to be 
mostly unsuccessful. In its economic and developmental relations, Turkey also 
needs to adopt effective dialogue mechanisms not necessarily through govern-
ment to government communication; but instead through the interaction of  
NGOs in different fields such as women, children, education, rights movements, 
interest groups, and business association networks from both sides.
22 For further reading on the role of  civil society in foreign policy making, see Gencer Özcan, Turkey’s Changing Neigh-
bourhood Policy (FES Briefing Paper), Istanbul, September 2004, p. 6, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/50027.
pdf>.
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ESDP Missions and European Union Mechanisms for Police 
Reform: The Cases of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
Isabelle Maras
Since the 1970s, the interdependency and consistency between security and 
development have been advanced in the European Union (EU), according to the 
paradigm: “Development needs security and security needs development.”2 More 
recently, institutional underpinnings for inter-pillar civil-civil and civil-military 
cooperation have been developed progressively within the framework of  the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 2007 reforms for EU external 
intervention instruments attest that the European Commission (EC) will improve 
the security-development nexus by reinforcing the linkages between Commu-
nity activities endorsing a development-driven logic and ESDP-led activities 
motivated by external and security considerations.3 The EU has strengthened its 
support for security sector reform (SSR) through official communications the 
past years. As regards crisis management, all ESDP civil and military operations 
have focused in some manner on SSR-related activities, by addressing capacity- 
and institution-building issues, police and justice reform as well as border crisis 
management with the primary objective of  political stabilization in post-conflict, 
development or transition situations.4 ESDP police missions in particular have 
been “at the forefront of  the operationalization of  the civilian component of  
ESDP,” in contributing to improve collective and individual security towards 
best standards. Support to police reform is crucial to peace-building, eradication 
of  poverty and the establishment of  democratic standards, and makes a major 
tribute to the transition process from a disrupted society to a more developed 
country governed by the rule of  law.5
A comprehensive and factual analysis of  the practical interplay of  the Council and 
Commission’s achievements in the field of  police reform is still lacking. Thus the 
role-sharing between the Council and Commission, and subsequent “interface 
areas” regarding police reform as a core SSR component can be questioned. To 
1 The author would like to thank the participants and organizers of  the 10th New Faces Conference in Madrid, Spain 
(5–7 November 2007), as well as Claire Craanen and Pierre Antille for their comments on the earlier version of  this 
paper.
2 Isabelle Tannous, Schnittstellen von Entwicklung und Sicherheit der EU Strategien und Mechanismen für mehr Poli-
tikkohärenz (Konzeptpapier, Bonn International Center for Conversion—BICC), Bonn, March 2007, p. 4.
 Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Sicherheit + Entwicklung = Frieden? Zur Rolle der Entwicklungspolitik der zivilen ESVP (Kon-
zeptpapier, BICC), Bonn, March 2007, p. 2.
4 Ehrhart, op. cit., p. 25.
5 Michael Merlingen, Rasa Ostrauskaité, ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges, in: Euro-
pean Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10, 2005, pp. 215–25, p. 219.
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examine the possible shifts between policy statements and practice: How have the 
EU SSR-related activities been articulated and coordinated through ESDP mis-
sions and European Commission initiatives regarding police reform? And ulti-
mately, to what extent is the European institutional interplay relevant in this field?
This paper provides an overview of  the overlapping areas and of  the resulting 
practical coherence characterizing Council and Community initiatives targeted at 
police reform in two Western Balkan countries; and thus aims to shed light on the 
relevance of  both institutions’ role-sharing in this field regarding the continuum 
binding short-term crisis management to long-term development.6 The first part 
of  the article introduces police reform as part of  the European approach towards 
SSR and its impact on the security-development nexus. The second part will fo-
cus on the cases of  the Former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia (FYROM) and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), where ESDP police missions have been carried 
out simultaneously with police-related Community activities.
Role-Sharing and Coordination of EU-SSR Activities in Police Reform
Security Sector Reform: a Bridge-building Concept
Developed since the late 1990s, SSR can be defined as a process applied in post-
conflict, developing or countries in transition, in which development is hampered 
by structural weaknesses in their security and justice sectors, often exacerbated 
by a lack of  democratic oversight.7 Following the European Security Strategy 
(2003) and the Communication on Governance and Development (2003) which 
explicitly referred to SSR,8 both the EU Council and the European Commission 
have specified their approaches to SSR in two distinct but complementary docu-
ments: the EU Concept for ESDP Support to SSR (November 2005) developed 
by the Council, and the Concept for European Community Support for Security 
Sector Reform (May 2006).9 This latter document focuses on its responsibilities 
in the developing world and holds that SSR “is an important part of  conflict 
prevention, peace building and democratization and contributes to sustainable 
6 Annika Hansen, Against all odds – The evolution of  planning for ESDP operations: civilian crisis management from 
EUPM onwards, Berlin 2006, p. 8.
7 Damien Helly, Security Sector Reform: From Concept to Practice, in: European Security Review, ISIS Europe, No. 1, 
December 2006, p. 1.
8 European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, December 200; European Commission Communica-
tion from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and Social Committee, Governance and Develop-
ment, COM(200) 615 final, 20 October 200.
9 As a milestone for the definition of  an inclusive SSR approach, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) guidelines developed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are the driving force 
behind the development of  both EU concepts. See OECD-DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, 2001; 
and OECD, Security Reform and Governance, Policy and Practice, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, Paris 2004.
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development.”10 Within the EU, SSR is fundamentally a cross-pillar issue cutting 
across EC and Council competencies.11 A large number of  EC activities therefore 
contribute directly or indirectly to security sector reform.12 ESDP operations are 
in turn hardly separable from the whole range of  Community instruments avail-
able on the external scene, with which they are led in parallel or combined.
Police Reform: a Core SSR Component to the Security-Development Nexus
The delineation of  roles and competencies remains a contested issue within the 
EU.13 In the field of  SSR and with regard to police reform in particular, both 
the Commission, in the context of  its long-term approach to conflict prevention 
and crisis management, and the Council with its short-term ESDP operations 
are significant players. In the field of  civilian crisis management,14 the European 
Council notably set the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG) calling for closer 
collaboration between the Council and the Commission, particularly with regards 
to planning and implementing ESDP missions.15 Ongoing discussions regarding 
crisis management capacities relate to where the “dividing line” between CFSP-
ESDP actions and Community development cooperation should lie.
At the operational level, the ESDP police missions have greatly contributed to 
the Union’s growing ESDP civilian capacity with the number of  personnel on 
the ground, but also by the number of  ongoing missions.16 Some scholars have 
argued that the key objective pursued by these civilian ESDP operations is to 
contribute to reforming the security sector of  war-torn countries and failed 
states in order to fight organized crime and establish adequate security condi-
tions for sustainable peace.17 Since police reform directly impacts on the security 
10 The more specific issue of  Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) is addressed in a separate, but 
consistent way with the SSR concept. See Council of  the European Union, EU Concept for ESDP support to Security 
Sector Reform (SSR), November 2005; and EU Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegra-
tion (DDR), December 2006.
11 SSR requires a double legal basis: Articles 11 and 14 TUE for CFSP/ESDP joint actions, and Article 08 TEC for 
Community actions.
12 EC SSR activities are conducted through geographic and thematic programs. See European Commission, Directorate 
General for External Relations Supporting Peacebuilding. An Overview of  European Community Action, Brussels, 
1 June 2006, p. 8.
13 Catriona Gourlay, Civil-Civil Co-ordination in EU crisis management, in: Gourlay, Damien Helly, Isabelle Ioannides, 
Radek Khol, Agnieszka Nowak and Pedro Serrano, Civilian crisis management: the EU way (EU Institute for Security 
Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 90), Paris, June 2006, pp. 10–122.
14 See Göteborg European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annex 1, 15/16 June 2001. Civilian management capacity 
was developed at the European Council of  Feira in June 2000. Member States agreed on action in the area of  policing 
as one of  the four priority areas where the EU should play an active role. Following the adoption of  a “Police Action 
Plan,” (Göteborg European Council, 2001), the European Council adopted the “Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of  
ESDP,” June 2004. 
15 Civilian Headline Goal 2008, Council of  the European Union, 1586/04, Brussels, 7 December 2004, para. 7.
16 Merlingen, Ostrauskaité, op. cit. (fn. 5).
17 Grégory Mounier, European Police Missions, From Security Sector Reform to Externalisation of  International Secu-
rity Beyond the Borders, in: HUMSEC Journal, No. 1, 2007, pp. 47–64, pp. 49–50.
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environment, the development of  accountable behaviors among officers and 
of  trust in security institutions by the citizens, and thus on the “redesigning of  
social order,”18 SSR also contributes to the development and transition process 
in post-conflict countries. The rationale for launching civilian ESDP operations 
mostly depends on the context and circumstances,19 with political will being the 
necessary preliminary condition. The different driving forces range from NGOs, 
through interested Member States and impulses from political institutions to the 
role of  international organizations and demands emanating from third countries.20
EU-led Police Reform in the Western Balkans
Highlighting the EU-led police reform initiatives implemented in the Western 
Balkans, particularly in Macedonia (FYROM) and Bosnia-Herzegovina helps 
provide “keys of  understanding” to shed light on the EU inter-institutional 
role-sharing. In this area, police forces have been deeply involved in the conflict 
dynamics with distinct policy settings. Addressing their reform is pivotal to assist-
ing sustainable peace dynamics and improving long-term stability. In the Western 
Balkans, both the Commission and ESDP operations—the police mission EUPM 
& the military operation EUFOR Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina), the military 
mission Concordia & the Proxima police mission (FYROM)—focus on building 
institutions that guarantee “democracy, rule of  law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of  minorities.”21 The ESDP missions established in the Balkans 
have been closely related to the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), thus 
paving the way towards a future EU accession of  the Western Balkan countries.22
The ESDP Police Mission Proxima in Macedonia (FYROM)
The completed ESDP police mission Proxima represents a kind of  “test case” 
since EC activities have been simultaneously carried out to complement and fol-
low-up the operation’s implementation and achievements. As a cornerstone of  
the FYROM’s pacification, the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement put an end to 
months of  fighting between security forces, mainly composed of  ethnic Mace-
donians and ethnic Albanian militia. In the aftermath, a EU Special Representa-
18 Marta Martinelli, Helping Transition: The EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of  Congo (EUPOL Kin-
shasa) in the Framework of  EU Policy in the Great Lakes, in: European Foreign Affairs Review, 11, Autumn 2006, 
pp. 79–400, p. 81.
19 According to the assertion “each EU engagement will have a unique character,” see European Union, GAERC, Exter-
nal Relations, 2728th Council Meeting, 90001/05 (Press 126), 2005; quoted in: Ehrhart, op. cit. (fn. ), p. 27. 
20 For European Council ESDP operations: <http://consilium.europa.eu/cms_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&m
ode=g>. This is also valid for ESDP military operations, resulting from international arrangements, such as EUFOR 
Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or requests from third countries (operation CONCORDIA in the FYROM).
21 Heiner Hänggi and Fred Tanner, Promoting Security Sector Governance in the EU’s Neighborhood, (Chaillot Paper 
No. 80), Paris, July 2005, p. 28.
22 Ibid., drawing on the call for “police reform, judicial reform and border security management”. See EU Crisis Re-
sponse Capability Revisited (International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 160), Brussels, 17 January 2005, p. .
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tive (EUSR) was appointed to contribute to ensuring “the coherence of  the EU 
external action” and “co-ordination of  the international community’s efforts” in 
the country.23
In line with the 2001 Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), EC pro-
grams in Macedonia have striven to focus on long-term institution building 
projects.24 Launched in 2003 as a follow-on mission to Concordia,25 EUPOL 
Proxima’s mandate was primarily to advise local police on fighting organized 
crime and to promote European policing standards, thus involving the support to 
various elements of  the police reform process.26 EU efforts towards the reform 
of  the Macedonian police have been pursued along a “dual track” approach: the 
EC has provided assistance to the long-term structural changes in the Ministry 
of  Interior (MoI) and the police to encourage institutional development, accord-
ing to the SAP, while the completed EUPOL-Proxima coped with “urgent needs” 
in support of  the Framework agreement.27 Regarding the coordination of  these 
“interface areas,” the 2005 EC programs in the sectors of  police and fight against 
crime were expected to form a continuation of  former activities, complementing 
and enhancing interventions under earlier Community Assistance for Reconstruc-
tion, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) programs.28 Similarly, in the area 
of  JHA, the CARDS program on police reform should explicitly reinforce the 
work of  the Proxima police mission operating at that time in the country.
Despite comprehensive meetings,29 EU inter-institutional organization experi-
enced difficulties mostly due to the competition between EU entities in the field. 
The transfer of  institution-building projects from the EC Delegation to the 
23 Ioannides, EU Police Mission Proxima: testing the “European” approach to building peace, in: Gourlay, Helly, Ioan-
nides et al., op. cit. (fn. 1), p. 70.
24 After the 2001 crisis, the EC used for the first time the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (programs on police reform) and 
had recourse to the CARDS Emergency Assistance Programme, and then the Police Reform Project (ECPRP) was 
carried out. See European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, Rapid Reaction Mechanism 
End of  Programme Report Former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia, June 2004; and Annual Action Programme for 
2005 for Community Assistance to the Former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia, Skopje, EAR, 2005.
25 CONCORDIA aimed to further contribute to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of  the 
August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement (with use of  NATO assets and capabilities). See Council Joint Action 
200/92/CFSP, 27 January 200, for the establishment of  Concordia, duration: 1/0/200–1/09/200; extended 
1/09/200–15/12/200. 
26 Such as the consolidation of  law and order, fight against organized crime and the creation of  a border police. See 
Council Joint Action 200/681/CFSP, 29 September 200, for the establishment of  EUPOL Proxima – European 
Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia, duration: 15/12/200–14/12/2004; extended 
from 15/12/2004–14/12/2005 with an emphasis on more operational needs.
27 Ioannides, op. cit. (fn. 2), p. 71.
28 European Commission, Annex of  the Annual Action Programme for 2005 for Community Assistance to the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia, p. 26. 
29 It took the form of  weekly informal coordination meetings among EU institutions, chaired by the EUSR and gather-
ing the EU Presidency and the Heads of  the EC Delegation, the EAR, Proxima and the EUMM office in Skopje. See 
Ioannides, op. cit. (fn. 2), p. 77.
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European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), the EC’s fear to lose its competen-
cies on the external scene, as well as its difficulties to recruit police officers for 
its missions, might explain this atmosphere of  rivalry.30 However, the double-hat-
ted EUSR and Head of  Delegation in the FYROM has been “instrumental in 
smoothing all the coordination process” since November 2005.31 Furthermore, 
the “dual-track” approach endorsed by the EU in its police reform efforts might 
have created confusion among the Macedonian authorities and population about 
the “very nature” of  the Proxima operation that sustained the Commission’s long-
term police reform in an operational way.32
The European Council was conscious of  the need for a lasting EU presence in the 
FYROM, and assistance to police reform as well as further activities in the SSR 
were pursued through Community activities and programs.33 In mid-December 
2005, the EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT)4 concretely bridged the gap between 
the termination of  the Proxima police mission and the launch of  the European 
Community field level project.5 With a number of  difficulties partially overcome, 
lessons learned driven from the Proxima experience in relation to EC activities in 
police reform can provide useful insights for current and future crisis management 
operations. The mission highlighted the benefits of  such an ESDP operation, for 
instance through professionalism, presence on the ground of  EU police officers 
and faster set-up of  the mission by the Council. Nonetheless, the question remains 
of  how capability can be mobilized in order to “maximize its effectiveness.”36
The ESDP Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
After the 1995 Dayton agreement that put an end to the ethno-religious conflicts 
in the early 1990s, EU intervention in BiH has developed in a context of  post-
conflict transition. ESDP military and civilian operations were deployed in a mul-
30 A 2004 evaluation of  the EAR advances that the Agency model is questioned because of  “unclear interpretation of  
the division of  roles and difficult co-ordination between the Agency, on the one hand, and the Commission and the 
Delegation on the other hand.” See Evaluation of  the Implementation of  Council Regulation 2667/2000 on the EAR, 
Vol. 1–Part C, Main Evaluation Report, June 2004, p. 57; see Ioannides, op. cit. (fn. 2), p. 78.
31 Interview by the author with a representative of  the EC Delegation in Skopje, 15 October 2007. Mr. Erwan Fouéré 
was simultaneously appointed by the Council and Commission, as the first ever joint representative of  the two EU 
institutions.
32 Ioannides, op. cit. (fn. 2), p. 81. The notion of  EU “crisis management” and its implementation was questioned.
33 Ibid. (fn. 2), p. 8. Following a FYROM government’s request, a twinning project was launched by the EC in October 
2005, with a Member State’s team being located within the MoI.
4 EUPAT was a smaller mission including around 30 police advisors and set up a monthly “consultation mechanism,” 
see Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP, 24 November 2005, for the establishment of  an EU Police Advisory Team 
– EUPAT, duration: 15/12/2005–14/06/2006. 
5 The crucial importance of  the CARDS follow-up after the end of  ESDP missions was further emphasized in the 2006 
Progress Report. See Commission Staff  Working Document, The Former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia 2006 
Progress Report, COM (2006) 649 final, 8 November 2006, p. 5.
36 On how to hand over missions (from Concordia to Proxima for example), to plan and set-up a mission, the need for 
joint Commission-Council fact-finding missions, and the use of  benchmarking for assessing achievements and prog-
ress, see Ioannides, op. cit. (fn. 2), p. 85.
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tilateral context, first through the initial ESDP police mission (EUPM) launched 
in January 200, and then with the largest ESDP military mission to date, the 
Operation Althea in 2004. Negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agree-
ment began between BiH and the European Union in November 2005.
An important milestone in the peace process, the Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC) Conference in Bonn (December 1997) requested the High Representative 
to urge public officials to respect their legal commitments to the Dayton Peace 
Agreement while imposing laws.37 In February 2002, the EU General Affairs 
Council (GAC) appointed the High Representative (HR) and EUSR in BiH. The 
HR/EUSR provides an overview of  the range of  activities carried out in the field 
of  the rule of  law. From the Dayton Peace Agreement derives the sharing of  
most competencies to the two entities, the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federa-
tion of  Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH).
The EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) was the first ESDP 
mission in the Western Balkans and took over from the United Nation’s Interna-
tional Police Task Force (IPTF) mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2003.38 The 
7 The governing principle of  domestic responsibility characterizes the Office of  the High Representative’s engagement 
in BiH, see Office of  the High Representative and EU Special Representative, <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-
info/default.asp?content_id=8612>.
8 See Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP, 11 March 2002 for the establishment of  EUPM, duration: 01/01/200–
1/12/2005; extended from 01/01/2006–1/12/2007 and significantly reduced in size.
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EUPM’s initial mandate was to monitor, mentor and inspect the Bosnian police 
forces with special emphasis on developing management capabilities at the mid to 
senior level in accordance with best European and international practice. Follow-
ing its foreseeable extension, the mission has recently had an explicit focus on 
police reform and the fight against organized crime.
Along the EUPM’s mandate, the European Commission has supported progress 
with the aim to establish a unified and centralized police in BiH, pursuing this goal 
according to three principles: transferring all the legislative and budgetary pow-
ers at state level (separate entities still exist); establishing mechanisms to impede 
interferences with the operational level; creating local zones (policy districts).39 
Previous CARDS assistance focused on “training of  police officers at all levels 
in management and investigation techniques […] in close co-ordination with 
EUPM,” while recent assistance has specifically focused on supporting measures 
set out in the BiH’s Action Plan to fight organized crime, according to the recent 
2005-2006 Multi Annual Indicative Program (MIP).40 Since 2007, the Instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) replaced CARDS and covers 2007–201.41
With regard to police reform in BiH as a core SSR component,42 the European 
inter-pillar coordination has proved to be quite well articulated.43 In spite of  joint 
efforts, there has been significant but limited progress in police reform, mostly 
due to domestic political reasons, according to an EC representative.44 The slow 
path for police reform seems to be confirmed by recent news. In summer 2007, 
the political leaders of  SBiH (Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina), and SNSD 
(Alliance of  Independent Social Democrats, Republika Srpska) refused to sign 
an agreement on police reform. This led the HR/EUSR to warn the BiH leaders 
that without significant progress, the EU would be unable to conclude a Stabiliza-
tion and Association Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina.45
9 Interview by the author with a representative of  DG Enlargement (EC), 21 October 2007.
40 CARDS regional programme will complement assistance provided under the MIP, in particular with training and 
fostering regional police cooperation. See CARDS Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Multi-annual Indicative 
Programme 2005–6, p. 6; and Bosnia-Herzegovina Country Strategy Paper 2002–2006, p. 18, <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
enlargement/key_documents/cards_reports_and_publications_en.htm>.
41 The Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) 2007-2009 is the main strategic planning document for as-
sistance to BiH in the framework of  IPA (EUR 226 million for the period 2007–2009). 
42 In SSR, the community assistance under IPA will continue to help consolidate the rule of  law, human rights, public 
administration reform and the improvement of  the overall functioning of  the judiciary in BiH. In addition to CARDS, 
IPA and EIDHR assistance, Community funds support the EU Police Mission, the Office of  the High Representative, 
the EU Monitoring Mission and the EU Special Representative, <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/financial_assis 
tance/cards/bilateral_cooperation/bosnia-and-herzegovina_en.htm>.
4 The co-location of  European Commission staff  working on joint EU CARDS-EUPM projects significantly facilitated 
the coordination and division of  labour with regard to the follow-on mission in BiH, see Hansen, op. cit. (fn. 6), p. 41.
44 Interview by the author with a representative of  DG Enlargement (EC), 21 October 2007.
45 BiH could thus be far behind its neighbors in the EU integration process. See Lajcák, There is no alternative to achiev-
ing progress in BiH, Press release, OHR/EUSR, 11 September 2007.
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Lessons Learned: An ESDP Mission in Kosovo?
Depending on the current political developments regarding the province’s status, 
a future civilian mission to Kosovo is likely to form “a major test case for the 
EU’s adolescent foreign and security policy.”46 The EU’s much-criticized “politi-
cal vacuum” during the 1999 Kosovo crisis constituted a major incentive for 
the subsequent development of  the ESDP. In this regard, there seems to be the 
proper momentum to capitalize on previous missions conducted in police reform, 
notably those undertaken in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, while integrat-
ing the overall regional perspective in devising a more consistent policy.47 Several 
major issues might indeed come out from the status talks.48 Some analysts con-
sider cross-pillar coordination in Kosovo “crucial for a well planned transition 
from the shorter-term ESDP mission to the longer-term measures pursued by 
the Commission.”49 A number of  issues drawn from previous and ongoing police 
ESDP missions have been raised by scholars and could be taken into account in 
the current context, namely a more accurate definition of  the “kind of  policy 
product” the EU wishes to offer, the improvement of  recruitment, professional-
ism and accountability of  police officers in order to comply with the missions’ 
statements, the need to address the shift between the missions’ achievements and 
their original purpose of  crisis management and the development of  genuine lo-
cal ownership of  the reforms undertaken.50
Conclusion
The current European discourse on SSR endorses “a renewed willingness to 
integrate the model into its security and development programmes” and repeats 
calls for inter-pillar coherence, but institutional mechanisms needed for imple-
mentation are still lacking.51 The EU’s biggest challenge in SSR is to translate its 
theoretical discourse and tools into a “coherent and co-ordinated practice” for 
46 Thomas Zehetner, Waiting in the Wings – The Civilian ESDP mission in Kosovo, in: European Security Review, ISIS 
Europe, No. , May 2007, pp. 4–7, p. 4.
47 In post-status settlement Kosovo, the EU’s role will be two-fold: it will contribute to the future International Civilian 
Office (ICO) in Kosovo, led by an International Civilian representative, “double-hatted” as EU Special representative 
(ICR/EUSR); and will deploy an ESDP mission in the broader field of  the rule of  law (police, judiciary, customs and 
correctional services). See European Union Factsheet, Preparing for a future international and EU presence in Kosovo, 
May 2007.
48 Similar to most conditions the ESDP mission in BiH had to cope with the overall project for further democratization 
in Kosovo, the state of  ethnic divisions, and minority positions. See Milan Sekuloski, A New EU Mission to Kosovo: 
Political Context, in: European Security Review, ISIS Europe, No. 29, June 2006, pp. –6.
49 Zehetner, op. cit. (fn. 46), p. 5.
50 Dominique Orsini, Future of  ESDP: Lessons from Bosnia, in: European Security Review, ISIS Europe, Special 
Kosovo edition, No. 29, June 2006, pp. 1–12; and Reinhardt Rummel, Krisenintervention der EU mit Polizeikräften 
(SWP-Studie 2005/S22), Berlin, August 2005.
51 Mark Sedra, European Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Examining Trends through the Lens of  Afghanistan, in: 
European Security, Vol. 15, No. , September 2006, pp. 2–8.
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more effective European engagement in developing and transition countries.52 
The Council’s conclusions on security and development recently reaffirmed the 
paradigm, highlighting the complementary nature of  the nexus. Identifying SSR 
as an area where “pragmatic actions” will be undertaken, the document calls 
for in-depth and experience-based analysis to find ways to better sequence and 
coordinate EU activities.53 Far from being exhaustive and to be completed by 
extensive field research, this contribution first emphasizes that any thorough 
analysis of  EU initiatives implemented in the field of  SSR, a fortiori concerning 
police reform, implies that case studies be carefully observed according to their 
respective context and distinct political “reading grid.” Indeed, the overall picture 
of  the European role sharing appears mitigated and deserves nuances. The EU 
has also made tremendous efforts in the field of  SSR towards better-coordinated 
and goal-oriented achievements through ESDP operations and EC activities. 
This has led to substantial progress and valuable outcomes in the field of  police 
reform, impacting in turn on security settings and social order, thus contributing 
to the overall capacity- and institution-building as well as development in target 
countries. The FYROM is exemplary of  successful hand-over phases from ESDP 
police operations to community follow-up regarding police reform. But much 
progress remains to be achieved to overcome crucial challenges facing the ESDP. 
The elaboration of  a consistent police reform concept in the framework of  the 
EU civilian crisis management policy, for instance, could streamline reform-relat-
ed activities undertaken by the European Union and positively impact on institu-
tional coordination between EU security and development actors.
52 Safer World/International Alert, Developing a common security sector reform strategy for the EU, Post-seminar paper, 
November 2005.
5 Council of  the European Union, Council Conclusions on Security and Development, 281st External Relations Coun-
cil Meeting, Brussels, 19/20 November 2007.
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The Western Balkans and Sustainable Security
Tomislav Ivančić
Security and development are deeply intertwined in the politics of  the Western 
Balkans. The era of  security seems to have passed and a new epoch of  peace and 
development has begun to rise from the rubble of  the wars in the former Yugo-
slavia. Naturally, development has played an important role since the 1990s, but 
it would be a mistake to state that the progression from security to development 
has been stable and linear. With the exception of  European Union (EU) Mem-
ber State candidate, Croatia, which is the Western Balkans country with the most 
notable transformations in politics, the rest of  the countries in the region still 
largely suffer from insecurity and thus are unable to progress towards sustainable 
development. Accordingly, the EU cannot avoid analyzing the problems between 
security and development in the Western Balkans, for it has taken a central role in 
trying to entice progress through the possibility of  eventual membership. In true 
European spirit, the EU visibly strives to maintain order in the region through 
the strategies on which it based itself  after World War II. But the problems of  
the Western Balkans have proven to be much more resilient. Since the 1990s, the 
political turmoil has been frozen and concrete solutions have yet to be devised. 
The key factor interconnecting all countries in the Western Balkans is their large 
dependence on the stability and development of  their neighbors (and their ethnic 
groups) in order to attain security. And as such, analyzing the ebb and flow of  
stability in the Western Balkans, investigating the conceptualization of  the West-
ern Balkans as a region, examining European development instruments / initia-
tives, and current realities in Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia, all highlight the fact 
that the true nexus between security and development can only be achieved once 
outstanding problems are addressed.
De-Coding the Western Balkans
In exploring the security-development nexus, it is important to assess the under-
pinnings of  the Western Balkans as a concept. To the average onlooker, there is 
little difference in a Balkans or a Western Balkans, yet this is far from the current 
reality of  the region. The former represents an antiquated area including Greece, 
Bulgaria, Slovenia and at times, Romania and Turkey; the latter is a contemporary 
term, which is fixed to a select group of  former Yugoslav republics, less Slovenia 
and with the addition of  Albania. Regardless of  whether the intention of  creating 
a new, recreated space was a conscious or unconscious decision, it was nonethe-
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less defined and nourished by external international actors for the stabilization of  
the region and the implementation of  development initiatives.1
Tracing its first usage in political dialogue, the Western Balkans as a regional 
concept first grew from the threat of  a third war in the former Yugoslavia. The 
US-EU Statement on Cooperation in the Western Balkans (1998) marked a turn-
ing point in foreign policy, alleviating US efforts in the area and making way for a 
new European “cooperative” approach to security and development. The state-
ment illustrated that “the political, civil and economic instability of  the Western 
Balkans… threatens peace and prosperity in all South-Eastern Europe and poses 
serious challenges across Europe and beyond.” The communiqué further stresses 
a European effort to securitize the region through its respective strategies.2 The 
re-categorization of  the Balkans transpired when Europe was beginning to de-
velop as a joint political actor, thus consolidating the “Western Balkans” concept 
at the US-EU Summit, only months after the EU’s declaration of  a new Regional 
Approach in South-Eastern Europe (1997).
Slovenia? Bulgaria? Romania? Balkan, but not as Western Balkan as Albania
An interesting twist to external decisions to build upon regional security was 
the conscious exclusion of  Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania from the Western 
Balkans puzzle. Owing to their previous political agreements with Brussels and 
Washington, the triad managed to escape the region amid external efforts to 
stabilize the Balkans. Slovenia had managed to elude the Western Balkans brand 
through a new political categorization once it jump-started EU negotiations with 
its membership application in 1996, a Europe Agreement in 1997 and its rela-
tive stability among instability. Hence, Slovenia evaded a regional political label 
and became disassociated with its aforementioned (Western) Balkans counter-
parts. The heartland of  the Balkans, namely Bulgaria, also escaped a connection 
to a European Western Balkans, along with its associate Romania.3 Having had 
long-standing relations and previous agreements with the EU, an association with 
the Regional Approach and the politicized Western Balkans would not have been 
appropriate as it would have downgraded or dismissed their previous connectiv-
ity to Brussels through regionalization. Lastly, associated to Brussels through 
PHARE (1992), Albania was segregated significantly from the EU and was an 
1 Most commonly used by the European Union and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (among others), the 
Western Balkans are politically fixed to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania.
2 Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Western Balkans, US-EU Summit 1998, Washington 1998, <http://www.useu.
be/TransAtlantic/US-EU%20Summits/Dec1898USEUSummitWashington.html>
 Bulgaria and Romania both began their associations with the European Economic Community in May 1990 by signing-
up for PHARE support. Subsequent developments included Europe Agreements (199), application for membership 
(1995), beginning of  negotiations (1999/2000), ratification of  the Accession Treaty (2005) and accession in 2007.
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obvious target for becoming part of  the Western Balkans. Therefore, it is debat-
able whether the Western Balkans were in fact created to be escaped, as gradu-
ation from this externally created region would mean eventual de-Balkanization 
through Europeanization.
The Balkan as Other: Explaining the Western Balkans through a Theoretical Lens
In addition to the chain of  events, which created a new Western Balkans, theory 
is also extremely relevant in explaining why a re-classification has transpired on 
the region. The aforementioned “graduation” from the (Western) Balkans signi-
fies an external, or top-down social understanding of  what the Balkans represent 
in Europe. As an area commonly understood as backwards, hostile, and on the 
margins of  European civilization, recent European and international initiatives 
have clearly sought to instigate security and de-Balkanize the negation of  the 
Balkans. Notwithstanding, even if  the Western Balkans fall within the geopoliti-
cal boundaries of  the European continent, their external perceptions are clearly 
in opposition to what is deemed as European, both in political and social terms, 
and are evidently marked in an Orientalist framework. Reiterating the notions 
of  Edward Said in Orientalism (1978), the Balkans have regularly been deemed 
as “other” within the notions of  civilization, akin to other peoples designated as 
inferior in global power politics. Edward Said writes: “Along with other peoples 
variously designated as backward, degenerate, uncivilized, and retarded, the Ori-
entals were [and are] viewed in a framework constructed out of  biological deter-
minism and moral-political admonishment. The Oriental […] is thus linked to 
elements in Western society (delinquents, the insane, women, the poor) having in 
common an identity best described as lamentably alien. Orientals were rarely seen 
or looked at; they were seen through, analyzed not as citizens, or even people, but 
as problems to be solved or confined or [...] taken over.”4
The Balkans and the Orient are two overlapping, parallel concepts through their 
common inferiority in relation to the West. The inability of  a peaceful divorce 
in Yugoslavia reinforced negative connotations of  the area, a situation that was 
displayed in external political dialogue and its foreign policy.
A plethora of  negative, often generalized Balkan comments were commonly 
portrayed by external political leaders, which inevitably reinforced sentiments 
of  otherness. This includes former British Shadow Defence Secretary David 
Clark (who failed to declare government expenses during a four day, all expense 
paid gathering with war criminal Radovan Karadžić at the Richemond Hotel in 
4 Edward Said, Orientalism, New York 1978, p. 207.
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Geneva in 199), who was, as an anti-interventionist in the wars of  the former 
Yugoslavia, insisting on “treating it as a civil war between barbarians.”5 This is fol-
lowed by more ‘subtle’ comments of  otherness, including that of  Sir Peter Hall, 
former British Ambassador to Belgrade, who expressed the following to former 
Prime Minister John Major in 1991: “Prime Minister, the first thing you have to 
know about these people is that they like going around cutting each other’s heads 
off.”6 These few statements are clearly not representative of  all international 
actors during the war in the former Yugoslavia, but do represent aspects of  how 
the West viewed the Balkans. Said’s notions of  otherness and barbarism were 
thus as visible and relevant in the Balkans during the 1990s, as they were during 
colonial times in Asia and Africa.7 What is interesting is the concerted European 
and international efforts to restructure these observations of  the Balkans as alien, 
or other. After a history of  negation, the powers of  discourse and deconstruction 
have been used in power politics to try and refurbish the connotations of  the 
Balkans through an alternative classification of  a Western Balkans.
European Instruments for Security and Development
Moving from an internationally coordinated security and development force, the 
shift to European administration has resulted in piecemeal strategies trying to 
pull the Western Balkans out of  their turmoil. Following the short-lived Regional 
Approach (1997) mentioned above, a more solidified endeavor was established 
with the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in 1999. The SAP strength-
ened the targeted approach of  dealing with the Western Balkans “five” as a 
regional strategy,8 but was also designed as a more interactive policy, offering each 
country preferential trade agreements and assistance, financial and otherwise, to 
promote democratization, institution-building and political dialogue. More pre-
cisely, within the SAP structure, contractual relations with the EU were designed 
to help stabilize the Western Balkans by:
1. Associating them with European Integration
2. Improving existing economic and trade relations between the EU and those 
countries
3. Helping advance democratization, the development of  civil society, educa-
tion and the establishment of  institutions
4. Establishing cooperation in as many areas as possible, including justice and 
home affairs
5 Tom Gallagher, The Balkans after the Cold War: from Tyranny to Tragedy, London 200, p. 151.
6 Ibid., p. 45.
7 See Said, op. cit., and for a Balkan perspective on Orientalism, Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (1997).
8 Now six with the addition of  Montenegro.
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5. Establishing political dialogue, including the political dialogue on the region-
al level.9
To maintain a step-by-step process, the EU introduced a Stabilization and Asso-
ciation Agreement (SAA), which signaled significant domestic development, pav-
ing the way for the possibility of  becoming a candidate member for accession.10 
In return, each Western Balkans country is obliged to agree on a package of  EU 
measures designed to induce widespread political, economic and institutional re-
form. The SAA, as the highest point in approaching the EU institutionally, would 
give the targeted countries the status of  an associate EU member.
In a region with deeply divided societies, which only recently had emerged from 
war, the SAP lacked a concrete goal (or “carrot”), which could activate sustain-
able security and cordiality between often unfriendly neighbors. Not until the 
Thessaloniki Agenda of  200 did the SAP / SAA gain significant momentum in 
instigating change in the Western Balkans, where member states clearly reiter-
ated “unequivocal support to the European perspective of  the Western Balkan 
countries […] encouraging them to prepare for integration into the European 
structures and ultimate membership into the European Union.”11 The Thessalon-
iki Agenda not only marked a European promise for the Western Balkans, but it 
also gave Brussels a considerable amount of  weight to prompt domestic change, 
reform, regional security and cooperation. Once the respective countries of  the 
Western Balkans were provided with an impetus for change, cooperation became 
possible, even if  domestically unfavorable.
EU membership was and still remains largely organized around the principle of  
conditionality. For the Western Balkans, the scrutiny and demands from Brus-
sels are immensely more intense than what was seen with previous enlargements, 
including that of  the EU10.12 Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to state that 
conditions are ill founded or should not be applied, for it can be a very construc-
tive device if  used properly. In its 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, the Commis-
sion highlighted the importance of  conditionality, illustrating that “Enlargement 
policy needs to demonstrate its power of  transformation in a region where states 
9 Multilateral Relations, Stabilization and Association Process, Croatian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs and European Inte-
gration, <http://www.mvp.hr/MVP.asp?pcpid=1287>.
10 Directorate-General Enlargement, Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) Serbia and Montenegro, in: Europa 
Online, <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/serbia_montenegro/serbia_montenegro_eu_relations.htm>.
11 The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving Towards European Integration, <http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/76201/pdf>.
12 This refers to a wide array of  issues, including the recognition of  a Macedonian minority in Greece, the Cyprus issue, 
corruption in Romania and Bulgaria, amid numerous other situations that were overlooked in previous conditionality 
enlargement strategies.
 
New Faces Conference 2007 128
Panel V: 
Europe
are weak and societies divided. A convincing political perspective for eventual 
integration into the EU is crucial to keep their reforms on track. But it is equally 
clear that these countries can join when they have met the criteria in full.”13
Hence, in order to become part of  the club, the Western Balkans must (under-
standably) prove that they are respected members of  the European and inter-
national communities through a series of  reforms. Rightly so, the conditionality 
clause has prompted the arrest of  several War Criminals, instigated revolutionary 
reforms in some countries and has been quite successful. However, while some 
such as Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro have begun the reform process, 
others such as Serbia / Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina have seen some 
advancement, but the prospect of  EU membership has not taken hold owing to 
severe internal divisions.
Current Realities: Security vs. Development
The case of  the Western Balkans is one in which the lines between security and 
development have been significantly blurred, even if  the bloodshed has ended. 
Frozen instability is characteristic of  this region where wars have been glossed 
over by European instruments or peacekeeping forces that have not solved the 
ultimate root of  tensions. Of  course, it is clear that some in the Western Balkans 
have greatly benefited from EU influence. Examples such as Croatia, Macedo-
nia and even Montenegro demonstrate that institutions are becoming stronger, 
human rights are being addressed and development has emerged in these select 
countries of  the region. However, while EU strategies have sought to boost 
national economies and regional connectivity, they have not outwardly addressed 
the fundamental issues of  ethnic division and sustainable security. The tempo-
rary “band-aid” initiatives implemented by international and European actors as 
a means to halt bloodshed have done precisely this, yet they have not managed to 
solve the root of  the problems. Glazing over the reality of  regional insecurity has 
been the common characteristic of  interplay in which Brussels seeks to thwart 
violence in the Western Balkans while also having the capacity to reinitiate insta-
bility with one wrong decision. The following excerpts will briefly touch upon the 
state of  affairs in Kosovo, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, highlighting their 
problems with EU or internationally administered security plans.
Firstly, factors for instability are important to take into consideration when 
analyzing the current reality in the Western Balkans. While the respective coun-
tries are extremely different in regards to levels of  progress and security, Leeda 
13 Enlargement Strategy Paper 2005, Communication from the Commission, 9 November 2005, COM (2005), 561 final.
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Demetropoulou defines the commonalities which some in the Western Balkans 
share in socio-political culture, outlining their confining conditions in their path 
towards stability, democratization and EU membership.14 Even if  these notions 
do not apply equally to each country for an analysis of  security-development, 
they are useful for the novice of  the Western Balkans to overview some of  the 
institutional and social problems which plague progress.
Kosovo / Kosova
A peril to the image of  European competency as an international actor, global 
defense, regional progression and a current source of  Serbian nationalism, the 
Kosovo situation is one, which jeopardizes myriad levels of  security. For Serbia, 
this small region represents its historical civilization, maintains its international 
rights of  sovereignty and continues to highlight the fact that Kosovo had never 
been an independent entity in the history of  the region. To Serbs, the thought of  
loosing its cradle of  identification is unbearable, not least the psychological dif-
ficulty that Serbian citizens have experienced in reluctantly accepting the demise 
of  Yugoslavia, where Serbia held a position of  ascendancy among other republics. 
In contrast, the Kosovar Albanians are estimated as comprising 90 percent of  
14 For a full description of  confining conditions in the Balkans, see Leeda Demetropoulou, Europe and the Balkans: 
Membership Aspirations, EU Involvement and Europeanization Capacity in South Eastern Europe, in: Southeast 
European Politics, Vol. III, No. 2–, London 2002, p. 91.
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Kosovo, outnumbering Serbian claims and still scarred from the attempted ethnic 
cleansing by Serbian forces.
EU Member States are divided as to their approach to Kosovo: accepting its 
independence could likely unearth dangerous messages in their own respective 
domestic bids for independence, including Spain and France, among others. To 
decide the future of  Kosovo is to open a Pandora’s box of  European problems, 
which is why almost a decade has passed without a concrete European conclu-
sion. The European Commission has constantly played the safety line and indi-
cated that the question of  Kosovo is an internal one, where final decisions must 
emanate from Serbia or Kosovo: “Progress in the Western Balkans towards a 
future in the European Union includes the implementation of  the future status 
settlement for Kosovo. A positive outcome is also key to a significant improve-
ment in Serbia’s progress on its path to the EU.”15
The final decisions for the status of  Kosovo will be external, with forced internal 
acceptance, regardless of  the outcome. The international community (or UN) has 
been mediating for years and the Martii Ahtisaari (UN Special Envoy to Kosovo) 
Plan for a settlement was announced in 2007, but neither has done much in 
terms of  resolving the frozen conflict. The EU inability to manage or adminis-
ter the Kosovo situation16 questions its acting power as a regional overseer and 
global player. Accordingly, many Western Balkans countries rely on a decision 
for Kosovo in order to secure their own respective sustainable progress.17 While 
Brussels and Washington have put off  the Kosovo issue for years, its citizens 
have been living in limbo and pondering their futures, in addition to the fact that 
the neighboring countries are stagnated and tied to its future stability. The nexus 
between security and development in Kosovo is essentially non-existent, con-
sidering that security has yet to be addressed by external actors and a consensus 
has not been reached among domestic players in Serbia or Kosovo. And without 
security, development is relative and only piecemeal.
Serbia / Srbija
Striving to maintain political order, the Republic of  Serbia is arguably the furthest 
behind on the path to European integration. High levels of  nationalism within 
domestic politics, corruption and economic underdevelopment place Serbia in a 
dangerous position, which may possibly control the security of  the entire re-
15 Annual Policy Strategy 2008, European Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/doc/aps_2008_en.pdf>. 
16 As the only international force left in the region, Kosovo has been under UN administration since the conflict in 1999.
17 Refugee flows from Kosovo to neighboring countries remains a matter of  high security primarily in Macedonia, but 
also in Montenegro and Serbia.
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gion. With regards to its on-and-off  relationship with the EU, Serbia was given 
an Enhanced Partnership Dialogue (EPD) with the EU in 2004, which aimed to 
encourage and monitor reforms on the basis of  European Partnership. Owing 
to the fact that the dispute with Kosovo prevented Serbia from completing the 
SAP process, it was the closest type of  agreement which the EU could provide 
and maintain some form of  official ties with Serbia and gain from conditionality. 
Unfortunately, the unwillingness of  the Serbian Government to assist in captur-
ing war criminals Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić, and cooperate with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), was cause 
for suspending talks of  concluding an eventual SAA with the EU. In its Annual 
Progress Report (November 2006), the Commission highlighted many problem 
areas in Serbian progress, particularly with the new Constitution, which did little 
for the case of  Kosovo, while corruption, bankruptcy and privatization were 
other key stagnating factors inhibiting proper development.18
Not surprisingly, the European perspective within Serbia is relatively bleak. To 
Serbs, the cost of  entering into the EU would mean loosing its sovereignty over 
Kosovo, and the EU itself  is not very popular in Serbia. Serbia recently held 
parliamentary elections, in which the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party won 
the greatest share of  the vote. Its leader, Vojislav Šešelj, is on trial before the 
ICTY.19 In further delineating the state of  internal disorder in Serbia, parliamen-
tarians elected Tomislav Nikolić, the interim leader of  the Serbian Radical Party 
as long as Šešelj is on trial, as Speaker of  the Serbian Parliament in May 2007. On 
his second day as Speaker of  Parliament, Nikolić met with Russian Ambassador 
Aleksandr Alekseyev and later presented a speech to Parliament in which he ad-
vocated making Serbia a part of  a Belarus-Russia super-state, presenting the idea 
that Serbs would “stand up against the hegemony of  America and the European 
Union.”20 Being offered more stick than carrot, many Serbs feel cheated from the 
EU, and the West should indeed prepare for the possibility of  Serbia turning in-
creasingly away from Europe and more towards Moscow. Under Serbia’s current 
government, the EU’s strategy of  using the prospect of  integration and accession 
is highly problematic and seemingly ineffectual. The EU and US have lost sub-
18 Key findings of  the progress reports on Kosovo and the potential candidate countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, Montenegro, Serbia, MEMO/06/412, Brussels, 8 November 2006, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=MEMO/06/412&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>.
19 Radical in Name Only – Serbia’s Election, in: The Economist, 27 January 2007.
20 Serbian Parliament Speaker Calls for Closer Russia Ties, in: Radio Free Europe, 9 May 2007. Nikolić resigned from 
Parliament on May 1, 2007, after the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of  Serbia formed a preliminary alli-
ance in preparation for a coalition government. Nikolić told the Democratic parties that if  they “peacefully accept” the 
independence of  Kosovo the Radical Party “will not sit calmly and wait.”
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stantial leverage through repeated concessions and now have even fewer policy 
tools than before to influence Belgrade.21
Bosnia and Herzegovina / Bosna i Hercegovina
Significantly more stable than either Serbia or Kosovo, Bosnia sits on a two-
throne chair. On one side is Sarajevo, seated as the capital of  the Federation, 
in which Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks primarily reside,22 on the other is Banja 
Luka, the seat of  the Republika Srpska, an entity primarily composed of  Bosnian 
Serbs (with substantial Bosniak communities).23 These divisions result from the 
Dayton Peace Accords, which managed to generate peace, but maintained ethnic 
division through territorialization. This divided country has become a European 
problem, where the international presence has been ceded to Brussels. The 
EU, for instance, has taken over the police monitoring mission, now called the 
EUPM, as well as the NATO force, now called EUFOR, and can be called the 
most “European” of  the Western Balkans by administrative default. Additionally, 
the internationally implemented Office of  the High Representative (OHR)24 will 
hand its mandate to the EU Special Representative (EUSR) in 2008. The task for 
the EU is difficult, as it must carry through the peace implementation, facilitate 
resolution of  conflicts between sides and push hard for new laws and other state 
building steps.
Complicating matters, the looming decision on the Kosovo status will test the 
very fabric of  the Bosnian state. Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of  the Repub-
lika Srpska (RS),25 and the Serbian Premier Vojislav Kostunica, have exploited 
the prospect of  Kosovo’s independence to stoke separatist sentiments. Dodik’s 
threat to call a referendum on RS’s status if  Kosovo becomes independent has 
increased tension with the (Bosniak-Croat) Federation.26 An increasingly assertive 
Dodik is openly challenging international authority to oversee the implementation 
of  Dayton and the construction of  viable state-level institutions. The EU aims at 
minimal strategies towards reunifying the divided country, most recently by trying 
to push for a unified police force, which is currently split in two: one comprising 
of  Bosniaks and Croats in the Federation, and the other of  Bosnian Serbs in the 
21 Serbia’s New Government: Turning From Europe, International Crisis Group, Europe Briefing, No. 46, 1 May 2007.
22 Bosniak is a term, which emerged shortly after the Dayton Agreements and refers to the Muslims of  Bosnia. 
23 Only after Dayton did many Bosnian Serbs migrate to the Republika Srpska from Western Bosnia (now the Federa-
tion), and Bosnian Croats or Bosniaks to the Federation (in addition to Croatia and Serbia) in refugee movements that 
have yet to be settled in Bosnia.
24 The OHR holds extraordinary powers in Bosnia, which makes it the ultimate authority in the country. With its Bonn 
Powers, the OHR can dismiss senior officials, ban politicians and enact controversial legislations.
25 Republika Srpska is the Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not to be confused with the Republic of  Serbia.
26 Ensuring Bosnia’s Future: A New International Engagement Strategy, International Crisis Group, Europe Report, 
No. 180, 17 February 2007.
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Republika Srpska. Not surprisingly, leaders in each territory declined the external 
recommendations of  unifying the two forces, a situation which was unsettling for 
Brussels and its objectives of  assisting the country towards stability. Javier So-
lana, the EU’s foreign policy chief, urged the sides to overcome their differences, 
stating, “Bosnian politicians are gambling with the future of  their own country.”27 
The real problems now have begun to surface for an EU which has organized its 
stance around many instruments and initiatives that have had small impacts in 
relation to the reality of  the state of  affairs in a divided Bosnia. For the first time 
since 1997, there is a real prospect of  instability, and the RS may do more than 
merely obstruct. Security is both questionable and extremely fragile in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
Conclusions
Security and development are multifaceted in the Western Balkans, and no clear 
nexus exists for many countries in the region, which continue to be plagued by 
internal, multi-ethnic disputes. European enlargement incentives have relied on a 
balance of  push-and-pull factors, which have been substantially different. As the 
costs of  ethnic pride outweigh the benefits, which Brussels boasts, the differenc-
es have led to disequilibrium between Western Balkans countries. Nevertheless, 
European efforts have tried to reduce the security risk and instigate progress, and 
the entire conception of  the Western Balkans was created as a security strategy 
that could hopefully lead to development. The identification of  six countries, 
minus other Balkan states such as Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia, elucidate the 
EU’s desire to contain and target the threat of  volatility in the broader Balkans. 
The Regional Approach was the first concentrated European effort to coagulate 
the newly found region, but quickly lost substance due to the complex tribu-
lations of  regional coalescence. The subsequent SAP / SAA was much more 
comprehensive and advanced a graduated process with individual countries, 
which still applies today. With the muscle of  conditionality, the EU managed 
to accomplish wonders in the candidate states of  Croatia and Macedonia, but 
struggles with the rest, possibly owing to the lack of  clear membership potential 
amid problems with the EU’s enlargement capacity. The reality of  the security-
development nexus at country level is significantly bleak, particularly in Bosnia, 
Serbia and Kosovo, where ethnic security problems could easily irritate spillover 
violence. Without a concise and tangible view of  EU membership, the respective 
countries in the Western Balkans are confused about the final objective, especially 
when painful reforms and internal scrutiny are required. Until the EU solves its 
problems with enlargement and its integration capacity, conditionality will remain 
27 Nidzara Ahmetasević, Bosnia Faces Deadline for Closer EU Ties, in: Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, 29 Sep-
tember 2007, <http://www.birn.eu.com/en/105/10/507/> .
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piecemeal and ill effective.28 As elucidated by the International Commission on 
the Balkans, the EU must augment its commitment to the Western Balkans in 
order to maintain regional cooperation and stability: “Unless the EU adopts a 
bold accession strategy which integrates all Balkan countries into the Union in 
the next decade, it will remain mired as a reluctant colonial power at enormous 
cost in places like Bosnia, Kosovo and even Macedonia. The real referendum on 
the EU’s future will take place in the Western Balkans.”29
The EU cannot divorce itself  from the Western Balkans; at this stage it can only 
choose what kind of  relationship it will have.30 If  the Western Balkans can prove 
security and development to the world and join the EU, the relationship may be 
beneficial. If  this does not happen, the relationship could continue to be costly, 
and instability could mushroom into a problem for all of  South-Eastern Europe.
28 Under the Treaty of  Nice, the EU can comprise of  only 27 members, which was reached with Romania and Bulgaria. 
Moreover, Member States have begun to put a further cap on how enlargement is to be accepted; the most notable 
instance being the French government amending the national constitution to ensure that all future accessions after 
Croatia are to be subject to a positive referendum vote, which impedes EU potential in securitizing and developing the 
Western Balkans.
29 Statement from the International Commission on the Balkans, 9 May 2006, <http://www.balkan-commission.org>.
30 Adele Brown and Michael Attenborough, EU Enlargement: the Western Balkans, United Kingdom House of  Com-
mons, International Affairs and Defense Section, Research Paper 07/27, London 2007, p. 26.
Discussant Claire Craanen brings in her experience from working with the Crisis Manangement 
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Kosovo and the Divided Region of Mitrovica
Gabriella Save
The Mitrovica region in Kosovo is a concrete example of  how security and 
development are mutually interlinked. Dividing lines between communities must 
be put into their context and the reason whether the conflict will remain in status 
quo or be resolved is closely linked to other factors of  the society besides pure 
politics. Mitrovica is an example of  a region where different communities used 
to live and function together but where conflict has changed it all. As different as 
the cultures are and as deep the historical wounds might be, the only way to ad-
dress them is, alongside the political process, through a comprehensive approach 
addressing the roots and causes of  conflict. The Mitrovica region has become a 
symbol for the difficulties linked to the stagnated on-going talks between Serbia 
and the Kosovo provisional government. Mitrovica is a striking example of  a 
post-conflict region where negative economic and social development and the 
serious environmental situation makes the wounds of  the conflict even more dif-
ficult to heal. In turn, this makes the reconciliation process difficult and main-
tains the status quo. The international community needs to address these aspects, 
particularly now when most focus is on the political process, in order to be able 
to create long-term stability in the Balkans.
Background: Kosovo after the Conflict
Kosovo was the poorest region of  the former Yugoslavia, and is now one of  the 
poorest in Europe. About 90 percent of  the inhabitants are ethnic Albanians. 
The Serbs are the biggest minority group, but there are also others, including 
Roma-Ashkali, Bosniaks, Goranis, Egyptians and Turks. The administrative capi-
tal of  Kosovo, Pristina, has some 600,000 inhabitants. Kosovo’s GDP per capita, 
ca. 800 Dollar, is among the lowest in Europe. The growth mainly derives from 
foreign aid and money transfers from Kosovars abroad. The economy is prone 
by low productivity and lack of  revenue creating production. Exports constitute 
only .7 percent of  imports.1 The unsolved status question and Kosovo’s overall 
unclear political future makes it difficult for Kosovo to get international loans 
and credits, which is a major obstacle for foreign investments and economic 
development. At the same time, international development aid is decreasing. The 
population of  Kosovo is the youngest in Europe, with over 50 percent under 20 
years of  age. A very young population with no job opportunities and no future 
expectation is obviously a situation that easily gets volatile.
1 Strategi för utvecklingssamarbete med Kosovo, <http://www.ud.se/sb/d/108/a/11492> (20/11/2007).
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The United Nations (UN) has administered Kosovo, since Slobodan Milošević’s 
regime came to end with the 1999 NATO campaign. The United Nations Interim 
Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was set up by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 on the situation relating to Kosovo,2 which consists of  four pil-
lars: UN police, UN civil administration, democratization and institution building 
led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and 
economic development and reconstruction (funded by the EU). UNMIK is a 
special mission in the sense that for the first time other multilateral organizations 
are full partners under United Nations leadership. Furthermore, UNMIK oper-
ates closely with the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which currently has 15,000 soldiers 
deployed in Kosovo.3 UNMIK is presently downsizing considerably to prepare 
for the hand over to the new EU-led presence, which will include an ESDP mis-
sion, the European Commission, and an International Civilian Office (ICO), led 
by an International Civilian Representative double-hatting as EU Special Rep-
resentative (ICR/EUSR). A political entity in the ICO/EUSR will oversee the 
settlement. An operational entity in the ESDP mission will support the Kosovo 
authorities in the area of  rule of  law. The European Commission through its 
liaison office will promote Kosovo’s approximation to the EU within its SAP 
Tracking Mechanism.4
Mitrovica: Areas of Development and Security
The municipality of  Mitrovica is situated 40 kilometers north of  the Kosovo 
administrative centre of  Pristina and consists of  one city and 49 villages. Before 
1999, different communities lived together in Mitrovica. After the conflict, the 
town has been ethnically divided along the river Ibar between Albanians and 
Serbs, with Serbs living on the northern side of  the river and Albanians on the 
southern side. All of  the 300 Kosovo Serb families who used to live in the south 
have now moved to the north.5 There is practically no freedom of  movement 
between the two communities. The lack of  sufficient social and economic devel-
opment, as well as increasing distrust towards the political leadership, are among 
the main reasons for the emergence of  intolerant nationalism, which led to the 
violent riots starting in Mitrovica in March 2004, and quickly spreading across 
Kosovo. Tensions can be foreseen to increase when the status talks proceed.
Mitrovica is a clear example of  the Kosovo stalemate. Achieving a positive solu-
tion for Mitrovica could have stabilizing spill-over effects in Kosovo and other 
2 S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999, via <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm>.
 Topics: NATO in Kosovo, <http://www.nato.int/issues/kosovo/index.html> (20/11/2007).
4 The European Commission Liaison Office, <http://www.delprn.ec.europa.eu/en/about_us/role.htm> (20/11/2007).
5 OSCE Municipal profile of  Mitrovica, <http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/12/1191_en.pdf> (20/11/2007).
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vulnerable regions, such as the Presevo valley, the Sandžak region, Republika 
Srpska and the Former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia (FYROM). Realistic op-
tions are either to split Mitrovica (which is not desirable with regard to negative 
spill-over effects in the region) or to develop strong economic, social and cultural 
ties which would in the long term ease up tensions. Since the will of  co-operation 
between the local institutions is lacking, the international community will contin-
ue to play a great role in this respect. Some areas of  attention will be mentioned 
below, including obvious ones such as economic development and institution 
building and more indirect areas such as the link between environment and secu-
rity and the strengthening of  civil society.
Economic Situation
Poverty in Kosovo has clear implications for short-term stability and represents 
a challenge for the development of  the region on a long-term basis. Economic 
development and poverty reduction are the central areas for cooperation in order 
to reduce the risk of  future conflicts. Before the conflict, Mitrovica was one of  
the wealthier towns in Kosovo. As in other parts of  Kosovo, 15 percent of  the 
population now lives in extreme poverty. The unemployment rate is very high: 
approximately 77 percent of  the Mitrovica population is jobless.6 The stagnated 
economic growth is caused by, among other things, the unclear status question, 
corruption and the absence of  basic services, such as reliable energy and water 
supplies. The uncertainty regarding the future status of  Kosovo makes it difficult 
to attract investors to Mitrovica, since there would not be any guarantees for their 
investments. The absence of  a status is also an obstacle to get World Bank loans. 
The lack of  a reliable energy supply is also a serious problem, since investors are 
reluctant to invest capital when 24 hours energy supply cannot be guaranteed and 
power cuts occur several times a day.
There is high expectation among the population that the former mining complex 
Trepca, the biggest lead and zinc producer in former Yugoslavia, which used to 
employ 20,000 people, would become operational again. Trepca was partially 
closed by KFOR due to severe environmental hazards, and went bankrupt in 
2005. However, Trepca’s privatization could encourage economic development, 
although its economic importance would certainly not be as it once was in the 
past. Raising awareness that no privatization process or status solution will be 
a definite solution to the employment problem is important; and building plat-
forms to boost entrepreneurship and strengthen business opportunities among 
the communities is necessary. Economic and employment measures and the 
6 Ibid. (fn. 5).
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creation of  increased trust towards local authorities are factors closely linked to a 
sustainable peace and stability in Mitrovica, Kosovo and the broader Balkans.
Environment
The link between environment and security is another issue of  importance in 
Mitrovica, one of  the most polluted areas in Europe. One of  the main sources 
of  income, the Trepca battery factory, had to be closed down by force due to 
environmental hazards (levels of  atmospheric lead measured were around 200 
times the World Health Organization acceptable standards).7 The impact on the 
Kosovar population is considerable, especially among the most impoverished sec-
tors. Therefore, it is fair to say that the lack of  proper environmental standards is 
having implications for economic development and consequently also for security. 
The area will be lead contaminated for a long time and the serious environmental 
situation is one of  the reasons for the bad health condition of  Mitrovica inhab-
itants. High levels of  lead in the environment of  Mitrovica and its surround-
ing areas are a significant risk for mental and physical health, especially among 
children. Child mortality is among the highest in Europe and life expectancy is 
decreasing consistently. The health sector in Mitrovica and in Kosovo is facing a 
serious crisis. This will have social consequences, which may also have implica-
tions for the security situation in the long-term. The environmental sector has 
nevertheless been one of  the few areas where co-operation between the different 
communities has been possible and has shown certain results. Such cooperation 
and dialogue is perceived as necessary to benefit all communities, and has led to 
some positive developments, for example in the areas of  environmental clean-up 
and water and waste management.
Lack of Stable Institutions and Rule of Law
To create a solid democratic society, the development of  institutions and 
strengthening of  the rule of  law is fundamental. This will be one of  the interna-
tional community’s biggest challenges in the years to come even after status talks 
conclude for Kosovo.
In Mitrovica, as well as throughout Kosovo, there is a lack of  stable institutions. 
Mafia and clan structures rule business life and corruption affects most of  the 
society. Furthermore, there are numerous unsolved property disputes due to the 
occupation of  houses after the conflict and the division of  the town among eth-
nic lines. No working cadastre system exists, since most records were destroyed 
7 UNMIK Kosovo State of  The Environment Report, <http://enrin.grida.no/htmls/kosovo/Kosovo_SOE_part1.
pdf> (20/11/2007).
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during the conflict. The ordinary crime rate is relatively low in Kosovo, but orga-
nized crime has a strong base due to its unclear status and non-functioning judi-
cial system. Considerable proportions of  consumer goods, which are commonly 
available for sale throughout the region, are counterfeit. The sale of  these goods 
occurs openly and there is only limited enforcement against counterfeit products 
due to legal loopholes. Funds generated from intellectual property crime are sus-
pected to benefit both criminal organizations and extremist groups.8
The issue of  human trafficking is also a serious threat to security with important 
repercussions throughout Europe. Kosovo is both a country of  origin and a tran-
sit country for trafficking, and is also gradually developing into a final destination. 
The badly functioning judicial system makes it easy for the traffickers to circum-
vent laws and only a few criminals have actually been prosecuted. Trafficking in 
its different forms is undoubtedly linked to the mafia and is suspected to finance 
other organized crime structures such as international terrorism.
Civil Society and Human Rights
Civil society is still underdeveloped in Mitrovica and in Kosovo. Women, youth, 
and minority groups, such as the Romas, are particularly marginalized. Basic 
fundamental rights such as gender equality and the rights of  women, neces-
sary for the development of  civil society, need to get attention on all levels. The 
implementation of  UN SC Resolution 125 on Women, Peace and Security,9 
which calls for the full and equal participation and involvement of  women in all 
efforts of  maintaining and promoting peace and security, is of  great importance 
for long-term stability. A practical example of  this can be found in the disarma-
ment process, where the implementation of  Resolution 125 and the important 
role carried out by women has facilitated the process considerably in the densely 
armed Mitrovica region.
Regarding education, the percentage of  children who attend school is relatively 
high in Kosovo, especially in primary school. However, the school day is divided 
into shifts, which is not enough to guarantee sufficient quality of  education. The 
division of  Mitrovica along ethnic lines and the current political situation has 
had a significant impact on the education system. Kosovo-Albanian students and 
other non-Serb minorities attend schools in the south while Kosovo Serbs and 
Romas attend schools in the north, where schools function with a Serbian cur-
8 The links between intellectual property crime and terrorist financing. Public testimony by Ronald K. Noble, Secre-
tary General of  INTERPOL, before the United States House Committee on International Relations, July 16th 200, 
<http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/speeches/SG2000716.asp> (20/11/2007).
9 S/RES/125 (2000), via <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm>.
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riculum. This division is preoccupying, since the education system plays a vital 
role in societal reconciliation.
The possibility of  entering university is linked to corruption, which creates 
frustration due to the lack of  equal opportunities. The university programme is 
largely out-dated and there is a considerable brain-drain of  professors who leave 
to Western Europe. Moreover, there is an important number of  internally dis-
placed people (IDPs) in the Mitrovica region, many of  whom are of  the Roma 
minority. The size of  the Roma population in Kosovo is difficult to assess due 
to a lack of  proper information and statistics. In 2004, the number of  Roma in 
Kosovo was estimated to be between 42,000 and 150,000.10 Since the situation 
in Kosovo has gained relative stability in comparison with the situation of  1999, 
many Roma have been sent back from countries in Europe where they do not 
have refugee status anymore. In Mitrovica, the Roma’s situation is particularly 
precarious, since the division leads to the Roma being marginalized in both the 
Albanian and Serbian communities of  Kosovo.
How to Move Forward?
UNMIK is phasing out of  Kosovo and is handing over activities to a new, con-
siderably smaller, EU-led presence. Currently, the EU has a better image among 
the local population than UNMIK and expectations are high. However, in order 
to benefit from this momentum, trust can not be taken for granted. The EU 
will have to respond to the problems that UNMIK has not managed to solve, 
otherwise this fragile trust and confidence may disappear rapidly. The planned 
ESDP mission will also take place within the framework of  a wider international 
community engagement in Kosovo. The UN will remain an actor, via the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), which could undertake a leading co-or-
dinating role for all UN agencies after status negotiations conclude.
Once the status question is solved, there is a risk that international political atten-
tion will diminish. In this phase, it will be important to put international develop-
ment aid into a bigger context and to promote an integrated strategy, resulting in 
heavy pressure on the EU. Due to the blocked political situation in Mitrovica, the 
international community will still show a special commitment after a future status 
settlement. However, it is vital to emphasise a bottom-up approach at the same 
time as the political process continues to move forward, and the need to work 
closely with local institutions both sides of  the river Ibar in Mitrovica in order to 
achieve local ownership in all areas of  development. Trust can not be created by 
10 Swedish Assistance to the Roma Population in the Western Balkans, <http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida> 
(20/11/2007).
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the international community artificially. Only if  the different parties see real ben-
efits of  co-operation, as has been the case in environmental issues, confidence 
can hopefully be built in a natural way. The international community can facilitate 
confidence building by creating platforms for engaging local authorities in prac-
tical multi-ethnic projects which address everyday problems, including private 
sector improvement and entrepreneurship, capacity building and environment 
projects.
If  the objective is a multi-ethnic independent Kosovo with an integrated Mitro-
vica region, the international community must offer an alternative to the Kosovo 
Serb community to attract them to take part in the society. The will has to come 
from the communities themselves and local ownership will be key. The link 
between the ICO/ESDP mission and European integration is essential, as well 
as the work to fully involve the local institutions from both sides in this process. 
Better donor co-ordination will be needed and equally important is the coordi-
nation between development and security actors. Traditionally, there have been 
dividing lines between the “hard” security perspective and the “soft” develop-
ment side on how to deal with conflict solution. Creating bridges between these 
cultures and working fully from the basis that these are mutually dependent and 
reinforce each other is of  paramount importance to fight the root causes of  
conflict.
Gabriella Save and Tomislav Ivančić taking questions on Kosovo
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Conclusion
Security is a multi-dimensional concept and a society built on the rule of  law, 
democratic institutions and economic growth is less likely to be conflict-prone. 
The divided town and region of  Mitrovica illustrates that an evolution towards 
increased tensions or a lasting peace highly depends on the way the region will 
manage to develop economically and socially. Economic growth and stable 
democratic institutions might not only lead to better living conditions in general, 
but also to a feeling of  self-sufficiency and responsibility which can create posi-
tive tolerance towards other communities. In time, ethnic dividing lines could be 
erased, which would pave the way for even greater economic growth. From the 
international perspective, local authorities must be engaged in order to create a 
sense of  responsibility in attaining stability and a lasting peace. Currently, there 
is great focus on the top-down political process; it is crucial that the bottom-up 
work acquires more, if  not equal attention.
Closing Session with Emilio Cassinello and Patricia Perez-Gomez from CITpax
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Armenia and the EU: Geo-strategic Democracy
Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher
Armenia does not rank very high on the international agenda. Geographically and 
politically, the country is landlocked, and lacks energy resources and transport 
facilities. In addition, Armenia depends largely on Russian support. The economy 
runs on relatively cheap Russian oil and gas deliveries and Russian “military aid” 
is indispensable in Armenia’s almost two decades old conflict with Azerbaijan 
over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK). Nonetheless, Yerevan’s foreign policy has opened 
up in recent years looking for new geostrategic partners that can help end its po-
litical isolation. Relations with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) have deepened, and democratization is firmly on 
the agenda. Is the EU interest on Armenia, however, substantial enough to pull 
the country out of  Russia’s orbit and increase chances of  coming to a peaceful 
settlement over NK?
Context: neighbors and desirable alliances
Democracy, security and energy issues are mostly related to Azerbaijan and 
Georgia, Armenia’s best-known Southern Caucasus neighbors. Discourse tends 
to overlook Armenia, which finds itself  at a crossroads between two elections 
that most likely will determine the main policy vectors for the next ten years.2 In 
terms of  foreign policy, but also domestic reform, the EU’s European Neighbor-
hood Policy (ENP) and NATO’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) are 
important assets for Yerevan to exit its stagnated political situation. In the first 
years of  these programs, Armenia acquired a reputation of  being a pragmatic and 
realistic partner that implements agreed upon reforms.
With its eastern and western borders closed due to the NK conflict,3 Armenia 
only has two exits: via Georgia to Russia and Europe, and via Iran. However, 
close ties with Russia strain relations with Georgia. Complicating Armenia’s 
1 Thanks to the support of  Richard Youngs and Jos Boonstra (FRIDE), and especially to Stuart Reigeluth (CITpax), 
without whose help this paper would not have been published.
2 Parliamentary elections were held on 12 May 2007, and Presidential elections will be in February 2008.
 EU accession talks with Turkey may have several impacts for Armenia: on the one hand, Turkey’s accession may bring 
Armenia’s accession closer. Apart from this, Turkey’s accession will apparently only be possible with the recognition by 
this state of  the genocide earlier last century. This recognition may bring some economically substantive advantages to 
Armenia, but may also open up borders between the two countries, which may boost its economic relations with the 
West, through Turkey. See Turkey faces international pressure over Dink killing, in: Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty 
(RFE/RL), 20 January 2007. This recognition from the Turkish state may take some time, if  indeed it ever does come, 
however. Even in the US Republicans and Democrats are pushing for recognition, and being hampered by the very 
strong Turkish lobby in the country; see US unable to name new Armenia envoy amid genocide row, in: Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, 2 January 2007.
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geostrategic position even more, Russia closed its border with Georgia.4 But even 
if  its partnership with Russia were not an issue, Armenia’s relations with Georgia 
would not be easy either. The Armenian minority living in southern Georgia, in 
the Santskhe-Javakheti region, is a source of  current and potential future conflict, 
also taking into account oil and gas pipelines crossing the region.
The current international scene also complicates Armenian relations with Iran. 
Though limited to economic ties, foreign aid may be conditioned on Armenia’s 
“good behavior,” implying adherence to US and EU policies, or more concretely, 
its compliance with international constraints. Iran, as well as the US, is a key 
political partner for Armenia,5 as demonstrated by the agreement signed by the 
Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and Armenia’s Energy Minister 
Vardan Movsisian to carry out studies for the construction of  a railway linking 
the two countries and energy facilities at their border.6 Many observers say Arme-
nia is pursuing a “multidirectional complementarity” to maintain simultaneously 
strong relations with the EU, Russia, Iran and the US.7
Democratization and the role of the OSCE
Armenia’s interest in being perceived as a serious partner by the EU and US 
prompted the government to demonstrate to the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe / Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(OSCE / ODIHR) that free and fair elections would be held in Armenia in May 
2007. Several improvements in the electoral procedures were then made, since 
earlier elections were characterized by ODIHR as flawed.
To contextualize the democratic process: in 200, Robert Kocharian was reelect-
ed in a presidential campaign that was widely regarded as rigged. In the run-up 
to the elections, authorities put more than 200 opposition supporters in deten-
tion for unsanctioned demonstrations. The constitutional court rejected appeals 
from opposition leaders to invalidate the election results, but proposed holding 
a “referendum of  confidence” on Kocharian within the next year to support the 
4 For more information on the tense relations between Russia and Georgia, see the Abkhazia and the South Ossetia 
conflicts, two other “frozen conflicts” in the Caucasus that could develop into open conflicts, both of  which also have 
important implications for Georgia’s bid to enter NATO.
5 See Haroutiun Khachatrian, Armenia debates its relations with US, Iran, in: Eurasianet.org,  April 2007. Coopera-
tion with Iran, which diversifies Armenia’s energy supplies, “diversifies the political orientation of  the country, even 
bringing it closer to the ‘European choice’” because of  decreasing dependence on Russia. See The European Union 
as an External Democracy Promoter in the South Caucasus Region, in: Jünemann Annette and Michèle Knodt (eds.), 
Externe Demokratieförderung durch die Europäische Union / European External Democracy Promotion, Schriften-
reihe des Arbeitskreises Europäische Integration e.V., Vol. 58, Baden-Baden, 2007, p. 285.
6 Armenia, Iran plan to expand economic cooperation, in: Armenian Daily Digest, 2 July 2007.
7 Armenia: internal instability ahead, ICG Europe Report, Nº 158, 18 October 2004.
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questioned validity of  the election results. Kocharian did not comply with the 
proposal and a standoff  emerged with the political opposition, formed mainly by 
two opposition groups: Artarutiun (Justice Bloc)8 and the National Unity Party 
(AMK), which eventually chose not to attend sessions at the National Assembly. 
In October 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly of  the Council of  Europe (PACE) 
adopted a resolution expressing concern about the lack of  investigation into the 
flawed 200 elections.9 But only after a referendum in November 2005, and upon 
exhortation from the Council of  Europe (CoE), the government adopted modifi-
cations to the electoral code.
Before the parliamentary elections held on 12 May 2007, the election procedures 
seemed unlikely to differ much from those of  past ballots. A number of  oppo-
sition members were arrested some months before the elections, charged with 
plotting a coup against the government. Internationally, as well as domestically, 
concerns were raised over the political motivation of  these detentions.10 Never-
theless, foreign minister Vartan Oskanian said in an interview in late 2006 that 
“everyone must realize that we simply have no more room for holding bad elec-
tions, because this time the damage to our people would be not only moral, but 
material.”11 What he meant was that foreign aid to the country might be jeopar-
dized in the case of  flawed elections,12 or as a senior analyst stated: “As time goes 
on, there are [fewer] reasons, not more, for Western states to promote engage-
ment with an Armenian government that seeks to rule through anti-democratic 
methods.”13
The OSCE / ODIHR observer mission, which also included members from the 
CoE and the European Parliament, nonetheless concluded in a preliminary report 
on May 13 that the electoral process had been “an improvement from previous 
elections and were conducted largely in accordance with international standards 
for democratic elections.”14 This was a boost to the international reputation and 
democratic image of  Armenia’s political elite, mainly Robert Kocharian and Vaz-
8 Artarutiun comprises a union of  nine opposition parties. 
9 Freedom in the World – Armenia (2006), Freedom House, 25 January 2007.
10 Arrest of  Armenian ‘coup plotters’ raises questions, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 9 January 2007; Armenia, Crisis Watch, 
ICG, 1 January 2007, Nº 41.
11 Armenia: Junior coalition partner warns against election fraud, RFE/RL, 18 February 2007. This quote comes from an 
interview published in autumn 2006 in the opposition daily Haykakan zhamanak.
12 See OSCE official discusses Armenian elections, Armenia Liberty, 16 January 2007; and Sabine Freizer, Armenia’s 
emptying democracy, Open Democracy, ICG, 0 November 2005.
13 US and EU unlikely to ostracise Yerevan, despite election warnings, in: Eurasia Insight, 20 March 2007.
14 See Armenian party of  power wins parliamentary elections, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 4, Nº 96, 16 May 2007; and 
Armenia back pro-presidential parties, in: The New York Times, 20 May 2007.
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gen Sarkisian; and according to a veteran member of  Parliament, meant “not the 
victory of  the ruling party, but the defeat of  the opposition.”15
Elections may have been conducted well in comparison with previous occasions, 
but this did not mean they were entirely democratic, free and fair. What underlies 
OSCE statements is a two-fold strategy: 1) the EU and US fear the destabiliza-
tion of  Armenia through a possible democratic revolution and perceive a stable 
Armenia as a fundamental precondition for resolving the NK conflict; and 2) the 
pro-Russian position of  the government (against the pro-Western opposition) 
may actually impede resolution, since Russia is not interested in seeing the “fro-
zen conflicts” resolved. Two contradictory strategies are therefore at play. What 
can the EU do to resolve this stalemate?
The role of the opposition
Internally, the potential of  the opposition as a real alternative has been debat-
able. In 2004, the perception was that the opposition did not offer a credible 
alternative to governmental parties.16 At that time, leading opposition forces were 
holding negotiations regarding the possibility of  forming new alliances ahead of  
the 2007 parliamentary elections. Indeed, the National Unity Party (AMK), led by 
Artashes Geghamian, indicated its willingness to join another opposition heavy-
weight, Stepan Demirchian, and his People’s Party of  Armenia (HZhK).17 But the 
opposition failed to form a united front against what it considered an “illegiti-
mate” government. Demirchian did not form an electoral alliance with any party, 
despite having received offers by three different pro-Western parties, led respec-
tively by Aram Sarkisian, Vazgen Manukian and US-born former Foreign Minister 
Raffi Hovanisian.
Artur Baghdasarian and Artashes Geghamian, who came third in the disputed 
2003 presidential elections, also decided to go it alone in the elections.18 This gave 
Kocharian a better chance to retain control of  the Armenian parliament: “In 
effect, the opposition has decided not to participate in the elections, as participat-
ing independently means creating favorable conditions for the reproduction of  
15 Kocharian was former President of  NK, before becoming Prime Minister, elected President in 1998, and re-elected in 
200. See Armenia: internal instability ahead, (2004), op. cit; since the sudden death of  the former Prime Minister An-
dranik Markarian in March 2007, Sarkisian is President of  the Republican Party and Prime Minister, see Armenia: PM’s 
death has minimal impact on parliamentary election campaign, in: Eurasia Insight, 0 March 2007; and Haroutiun 
Khachatrian, Armenia: a new era for a new opposition?, in Eurasianet, 16 May 2007.
16 Armenia: internal instability ahead, (2004), op. cit. 
17 Armenia: Opposition leaders mull new alliances, in: RFE/RL Reports, 11 January 2007.
18 Armenian parliamentary election race kicks off, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 4, Nº 5, 20 February 2007.
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the current regime”.19 With voter frustration over previous elections, this factor 
fuelled political apathy in Armenia.20 The result has been that most of  the op-
position leaders, including the two men who had nearly unseated Kocharian in 
the last presidential ballot, failed to win a single parliamentary seat and now face 
political oblivion. Only Raffi Hovanisian, who had served as Foreign Minister in 
Petrosian’s previous government, strengthened his position: his Heritage Party 
got almost six per cent of  the vote and seven seats in the National Assembly, 
becoming one of  only two opposition groups represented in the 131-member 
legislature.21
Via expensive advertising campaigns, the Armenian government did its best to 
discredit opposition members, like Artur Baghdasarian, which often worsened 
the opposition’s situation and forced them to travel from region to region.22 Cred-
ible opinion polls are practically non-existent while the seizure of  voters’ pass-
ports, and other issues also impinged on the results.23 There were efforts to make 
progress on the lack of  proper voter databases, an issue that undermined the 
2003 elections in accordance with OSCE standards,24 but many people still felt 
that “this has been one of  the worst elections possible,” according to opposition 
party representative Vartan Mkrtchian, who also said: “we recorded widespread 
violations in many forms … Some pro-government parties were giving bribes of  
between 4,000 and 20,000 drams right in front of  polling stations.” Election of-
ficials, however, said there were no major violations.25
Sarkisian and his Republican Party won the ballots with a sufficient majority to 
govern alone, but agreed to share the burden with Prosperous Armenia (a new 
party funded by the populist oligarch Gagik Tsarukian) and the Armenian Revo-
lutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutiun). The alliance was clearly formed to mobi-
lize broad-based political support for Sarkisian’s aspiration to succeed Kocharian 
in the 2008 presidential elections.26 But, since October 2007, Ter-Petrossian, for-
19 Civil society: Armenian opposition divided ahead of  election, in: Eurasianet.org, 8 March 2007.
20 Marianna Grigoryan, Voter apathy appears widespread on eve of  parliamentary poll, in: Eurasianet.org, 9 May 2007.
21 Emil Danielyan, US-born politician reshapes Armenian opposition camp, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 4, Nº 124, 26 
June 2007.
22 Emil Danielyan, Armenian security services suspected of  spying on opposition leader, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 8 
May 2007; Marianna Grigoryan, Armenian opposition: TV campaign ad prices a political handicap, in: Eurasianet.org, 
14 February 2007. 
23 Armenia’s murky politics, in: The Economist, 11 April, 2007; Gayane Abrhamyan, Armenia: Demands for voter pass-
ports spark election controversy, in: Eurasianet.org, 4 April 2007.
24 Improved voter register presented in Yerevan with OSCE Office support, OSCE Press Release, 5 February 2007.
25 Opposition says Armenia poll flawed, Al-Jazeera, 1 May 2007.
26 Emil Danielyan, Armenian PM forms new cabinet after election triumph, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 4, Nº 114, 12 
June 2007. If  Sarkisian steps in when Kocharian steps down, Kocharian could still stay in government and exert power. 
According to the constitution, the president is elected for a five-year term and can serve a maximum of  two mandates. 
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mer President of  Armenia (1991–1998), has become a credible opponent to the 
duo Kocharian-Sarkisian. Seen as more prone to find a negotiated solution to the 
NK conflict, his candidacy is favored by the West. His governmental experience 
and possible broad civil society support make of  him the ideal pivot for Armenia 
to slowly move away from Russia.27
Democracy: a point in question?
The democratic future of  Armenia depends nonetheless largely on its own 
actions, partly with regard to good governance and human rights promotion, 
through liberalization and social policies aiming at tackling poverty. How is 
Armenia pursuing democratization? Is the rhetorical part of  reforms preponder-
ant or is a real path visible towards foreign-inspired democratization? And more 
specifically, how can the EU assist in this process?
Since June 2004, a program was included in the ENP, aimed at strengthening 
EU relations with neighbors to promote EU common values and standards.28 In 
November 2005, the Council welcomed the decision to establish Action Plans 
with several countries, among them Armenia, thus inviting the country to enter 
intensified political, security, economic and cultural relations with the EU, along 
with enhanced regional and cross border cooperation and shared responsibility in 
conflict prevention and conflict resolution.29 The ENP Action Plan was signed in 
November 2006.30 Among the different priorities of  the EU towards neighboring 
eastern and Mediterranean countries are the “strengthening of  democratic struc-
tures, of  the rule of  law, including reform of  the judiciary, and combat of  fraud 
and corruption,” and the “strengthening of  respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, in compliance with the international commitments of  Armenia 
(PCA, CoE, OSCE, UN).”31 According to the EU, the accords should help defuse 
separatist disputes in the three South Caucasus countries.32
He appoints the prime minister and cabinet, without approval from Parliament; see Arnenia: internal instability ahead, 
(2004), op. cit.
27 Emil Danielyan, Ter-Petrossian gains supporters in Armenia, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 4, Nº 212, 14 November 
2007.
28 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Armenia, Country Strategy Paper, 2007–201.
29 Proposal, Commission of  the European Communities, Brussels, 25 October 2006, COM (2006) 627 final.
30 EU: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia sign accords, in: RFE/RL Reports, 14 November 2006. For information on 
what the EU actions in relation to an approach to Armenia, an ENPI Country Strategy Paper 2007-201 exists, as well 
as a National Indicative Programme 2007–2010, both adopted on 7 March 2007. There is also an ENP Action Plan for 
Armenia, approved on 14 November 2006.
31 Proposal, Commission of  the European Communities, COM (2006) 627 final, Brussels, 25 October 2006. 
32 EU: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia sign accords, in: RFE/RL Reports, 14 November 2006.
Armenia and the EU:  
Geo-strategic Democracy
149
 
New Faces Conference 2007
However, despite the amount spent by the EU (€80 million)33 in Armenia since 
its independence in 1991, the question remains over whether economic incen-
tives have advanced democratic objectives. Doubts focus on Armenia’s perceived 
strategy of  consistently pleasing the EU, by making some systemic, but rather 
limited, reforms related to human rights and democratization, while maintaining 
Russia’s military presence and control over energy resources. According to the 
European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument’s (ENPI) National Indica-
tive Program 2007–2010, European support has not focused on the first priority 
area (“strengthening of  democratic structures and good governance”), but im-
provement on this front is considered important to further improve trade and the 
investment climate in Armenia, and to strengthen European values in all possible 
fields. For this period, the ENPI has made available €98.4 million for investment 
in three priority areas, the other two being “support for regulatory reform and 
administrative capacity building” and “support for poverty reduction efforts.”4 
EU democracy promotion through ENP is thus largely through indirect projects 
and objectives.
Nagorno-Karabakh: insurmountable?
Armenia’s internal situation and external relations with the EU are conditioned 
in part by the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict, as well as by its dependence on 
Russia.5 Though a non-violent resolution of  the NK conflict is vital,36 Armenia 
is not aiming at just any kind of  political resolution, but rather the independence 
of  the territory from Azerbaijan and maintenance of  the Lachin corridor be-
tween Armenia and NK.7 As a predominantly ethnic Armenian enclave within 
Azerbaijan’s territory, NK seceded in 1988, due in part to Yerevan’s efforts. Ar-
menian forces gradually took control of  the mountainous region before seizing 
a number of  adjacent Azerbaijani administrative districts, which they continue 
to occupy to this day.8 The OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by representatives 
from Russia, the US and France, has overseen negotiations since the 1994 cease-
fire came into effect.9 Azerbaijan is only in favor of  giving the territory maxi-
mum autonomy within its borders, and is opposed to the possibility of  calling a 
33 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Armenia, Country Strategy Paper, 2007–201.
4 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument for Armenia, National Indicative Programme, 2007-2010.
5 The Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) region is located within Azerbaijan’s borders, but is populated mainly by Armenians. 
NK was transferred to Azeri jurisdiction in 192 by Stalin, to appease Turkey, and in the hope of  also sovietizing 
Turkey after the sovietization of  Transcaucasia.
36 On “frozen conflicts,” see: East: frozen conflicts not so ‘frozen’ alter all, in: RFE/RL, 10 November 2006.
7 Armenia: internal instability ahead, (2004), op. cit.
8 Nagorno-Karabakh: OSCE says solution in sight, in: RFE/RL, 5 December 2006.
9 Azebaijani president says Karabakh talks nearing “final stage,” in: RFE/RL, 29 November 2006.
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referendum on the status of  NK.40 The resolution of  the conflict would open 
borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, which would enhance economic trade with 
its neighbors and with the EU.41 Russia would most probably lose influence in the 
region, and a regional cooperation agreement could take place, which would be in 
the interest of  the Southern Caucasus countries and Western players.
Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to agree on the deployment of  a United Nations 
force to secure the zone and on the reparation of  the infrastructure, but disagree 
on the possibility of  a referendum, as suggested in the draft peace plan of  the 
Minsk Group.42 Azerbaijan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Asimov said in early 
2007 that the parties are also divided on the return of  Azerbaijani refugees to 
Karabakh4 and the status of  the strategic Lachin corridor linking the enclave to 
Armenia. Some Armenian sources also say that a peace settlement was prevented 
in 2006 by another issue: the time frame for Armenian withdrawal from Kelbajar, 
one of  the two Azerbaijani districts sandwiched between Karabakh and Armenia 
proper. Apparently, Armenia will relinquish control of  Kelbajar only after hold-
ing the referendum, a condition that Azerbaijani officials have publicly rejected.44 
Added to all this, due to its energy revenues, Azerbaijan’s defense budget now 
equals Armenia’s entire state budget, which puts even more pressure on Armenia 
and increases its dependence on foreign support. Though it is currently unlikely 
that Azerbaijan would start a war now, by 2012, with depleted energy resources, 
the probability of  hostilities erupting will augment.45
Armenia and Russia: a possible breakthrough
The EU faces an uphill struggle if  it is to compete with Russia in the Cauca-
sus, particularly due to Armenia’s difficult geopolitical situation and because of  
the EU’s energy interests in Azerbaijan, which could override democratic ef-
forts in the region. However, the High Representative for the Common Foreign 
40 Caucasus: Azerbijani, Armenian, Karabakh officials assess talks, in: RFE/RL, 1 December 2006. With all these ref-
erenda, the question persists as to who is entitled to vote: only people actually living in NK (Armenia’s option) or all 
Azerbaijani citizens, including all the Internally Displaced People (IDP) (Azerbaijan’s option).
41 See Armenia urges Turkey to talk, in: RFE/RL, 14 January 2007; and Armenia: internal instability ahead, (2004), op. cit.
42 See Caucasus: Azerbijani, Armenian, Karabakh Officials assess talks, in: RFE/RL, 1 December 2006; Yerevan, Baku 
discuss Nagorno-Karabakh referendum, in: RFE/RL, 2 December 2006; and Azerbaijan says sticking points remain 
on Karabakh, 5 December 2006, and Armenia/Azerbaijan: has a new chance emerged for Karabakh peace?, in: RFE/
RL, 15 February 2007.
4 See Statement by the Head of  Delegation of  the United States of  America Under-Secretary of  State for Political Af-
fairs R. Nicholas Burns at the fourteenth OSCE Ministerial Council, Brussels, 4 December 2006.
44 Emil Danielyan, Armenian/Azerbaijan: has a new chance emerged for Karabakh peace?, in: Eurasianet.org, 18 Febru-
ary 2007.
45 According to the ICG, Azerbaijan oil production may peak and start decreasing in 2012. As its economy is almost 
fully dependent on its natural resources, this will mean economic crisis. To divert attention from this crisis, the ICG 
forecasts an increase of  the likelihood of  war; see Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War, ICG Europe Report, Nº 187, 14 
November 2007.
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and Security Policy, Javier Solana, said “most of  the EU’s energy doesn’t come 
from Azerbaijan. For us Azerbaijan is not as important a source of  energy as 
other countries are. We would like Azerbaijan to develop because it’s an impor-
tant country, and we would like Armenia to develop because it’s an important 
country.”46 But despite official EU declarations, the fact is that the potential for 
EU energy investments exists in Azerbaijan and is non-existent in the case of  
Armenia, at least with regard to primary resources. Russia is in this sense more 
“reliable,” since it is not interested in Azerbaijan’s growth as an energy supplier. 
Russia may therefore have more to offer to Armenia than the EU does, since full 
EU integration is not on the table.
Armenia’s links to Russia are the result of  a historically conditioned pragmatism, 
which may also be an impediment to further development. Armenia could only 
escape by moving towards an independent position, resolving the NK issue, and 
becoming not only a transit country for energy, while using its human capital 
to boost its economy. Historically, Russia has been the guarantor of  peace for 
Armenia, which it defended from the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century 
and incorporated in the Soviet Union for most of  the twentieth century. After 
gaining independence in the 1990s, Russia impeded a collapse of  the Armenian 
state after the war against Azerbaijan, and saw it as an economic partner in the re-
gion. The military alliance with Moscow has served as the backbone of  Armenian 
foreign policy since the collapse of  the USSR in 1991. The presence of  Russian 
troops at military bases in Yerevan and Gyumri, as well as along the Turkish and 
Iranian borders with Armenia are seen by successive governments as a national 
security necessity.47 This pro-Russian sentiment has prevailed over time, and in re-
turn, Russia uses Armenia as a stepping-stone to the Southern Caucasus. Russian 
interest in helping to resolve the NK issue, as a member of  the Minsk Group, is 
therefore minimal. The resolution of  this conflict would mean Russia loses lever-
age as peace guarantor for Armenia and thus loses a stronghold in the Caucasus.
Armenia’s dependency on Russia is reflected furthermore in its rather limited 
commitment to NATO. Although it takes part in NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
program since 199448 and agreed to an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) 
in December 2005, Armenia is also member of  the Collective Security Treaty 
46 EU: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia sign accords, in: RFE/RL Reports, 14 November 2006; EU: Solana says mem-
bership for Caucasus ‘A different story’, 15 November 2006.
47 The EU’s relationship with Armenia, EU External Relations, 2006. Armenia signed a collective defence clause in its 
Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Russia, and is part of  the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), 
that followed the Tashkent Treaty; Azerbaijan is not. See Alberto Priego Moreno, Las elecciones parlamentarias de Ar-
menia, la presidencia española de la OSCE y la resolución del conflicto de Nagorno-Karabakh, in: ARI (Real Instituto 
Elcano, Madrid), Nº 81, 18 July 2007.
48 See Bilateral relations, in: International Cooperation, Ministry of  Defense, Republic of  Armenia. 
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Organization (CSTO) – the Russian counterpart of  NATO. The duality of  co-
operation with NATO and membership in CSTO is unclear for Armenia in the 
future. NATO does some democratic defense reform in Armenia and promotes 
democracy in general terms through diplomacy and advocacy, but leaves most 
of  the practical programs and critical assessments to the OSCE and the CoE.49 
Nevertheless, taking the economic pull of  the EU and opportunities of  the ENP 
into account, Armenia may one day lean more towards the European side of  the 
equation. If  Armenia were to move away from Russia, it would need enhanced 
ties with other regional partners, especially Turkey. While other South Caucasian 
countries are still looking for this balance, Armenia remains relatively isolated.
One option for the EU and US to increase leverage on Armenia is to help diver-
sify its energy sources.50 Currently, Armenia’s main energy supplier is Russia, and 
nearly all its energy infrastructure is owned by Russia, including the Medzamor 
nuclear plant, thermal power plants, and the electricity distribution networks. In 
its energy-diversification efforts, Yerevan is building a network of  new thermal 
and hydroelectric power stations while the new gas pipeline from Iran is also 
crucial to its efforts.51 Russia has made gas supplies from Iran conditional on not 
facilitating further commerce with Europe via Georgia. The EU and US there-
fore have a special interest in resolving the NK issue: Armenia could then import 
as well from Azerbaijan and even Central Asia, as well as becoming an intermedi-
ate state, like Turkey, for bringing Iranian and Caspian gas to Europe. Surprisingly, 
the proposed peace plan envisages a gradual resolution of  the NK dispute that 
would require policy continuity in Baku and Yerevan, suggesting that the EU / US 
would prefer to avoid regime change in either country.52 This was until former 
President, Ter-Petrossian, came back into the picture.
Conclusion
The EU and Russia want a stable Armenia, but for different reasons. Russia’s 
interest is to maintain its influence in the region; the EU’s to resolve the Na-
gorno-Karabakh conflict for regional Southern Caucasus contacts to blossom. 
The question arises whether democracy or the resolution of  the NK issue come 
first. The EU (mainly through the OSCE) will push for the latter, while trying 
to please Russia (member of  the Minsk group). Europe will thus aim to assuage 
49 For more on NATO and democratization, see Jos Boonstra, NATO’s Role on Democratic Reform (FRIDE Working 
Paper Nº 8), Madrid, May 2007.
50 Haroutiun Khachatrian, Armenia media: plans for new Russian investments raise hopes and spark skepticism, in: 
Eurasianet.org, 1 February 2007. 
51 Armenia: Making the best of  a difficult neighbourhood, in: RFE/RL, 22 November 2006.
52 Emil Danielyan, Armenian/Azerbaijan: has a new chance emerged for Karabakh peace?. op. cit. 
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Russia’s concerns about losing yet another allied republic, while simultaneously 
pressuring the Armenian government via the ENP and possible NATO member-
ship; but neither incentive will be a one way policy. The EU has security interests 
that are not entirely consistent with its democratization objectives, and therefore 
is not pushing the issue. In the meantime, while agreeing only to reforms that 
do not endanger external relations, Armenia has been pragmatic in its approach 
to the ENP, producing limited but tangible results in improving its democratic 
credentials, as evidenced by the latest parliamentary elections. Increased EU as-
sistance and political commitment is necessary to encourage Armenia to make a 
leap towards a consolidated democracy.
 
New Faces Conference 2007 154
Panel V: 
Europe
Participants and Organizers
155
 
New Faces Conference 2007
Participants and Organizers
Participants
Stephanie Ahern, Major in the US Army currently assigned as Assistant Professor 
in the Department of  Social Sciences at the US Military Academy at West Point, 
New York, USA.
Richard Akum, Programme Manager at the Office of  the Executive Secretary for 
the Council for the Development of  Social Science Research in Africa (CODES-
RIA), Dakar, Senegal.
Kamal Amakrane, Political Affairs Officer in the Department of  Political Affairs 
of  the UN Secretariat, New York, USA.
Pierre Antille, Directorate for Security Policy, Ministry of  Defense, Berne, 
Switzerland.
Saponti Baroowa, PhD candidate at the Centre for European Studies at Jawahar-
lal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
Pablo Barrera Cruz, Middle East Representative for the Spanish Fundación Pro-
moción Social de la Cultura (FPSC), Beirut, Lebanon.
Claire Craanen, Crisis Management Policy Section at NATO Headquarters, Brus-
sels, Belgium.
Teresa Cravo, PhD candidate at the Centre of  International Studies of  Cam-
bridge University, UK.
Benedikt Franke, PhD candidate in International Studies and Kurt Hahn Scholar 
at the University of  Cambridge, UK.
Özge Genç, PhD candidate at Istanbul Bilgi University and Project Assistant with 
the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), Istanbul, Turkey.
Felix Heiduk, Research Associate at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs), Berlin, Germany.
Tomislav Ivančić, Researcher at Development Assistance Research Associates 
(DARA), Madrid, Spain.
 
New Faces Conference 2007 156
Participants and Organizers
Bonn Juego, Visiting Doctoral Scholar at the School for Postgraduate Interdis-
ciplinary Research on Interculturalism and Transnationality (SPIRIT), Aalborg 
University, Denmark.
Joachim Koops, PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of  Kiel, Ger-
many, and Analyst in the Security and Defense Section of  the Oxford Council on 
Good Governance.
Isabelle Maras, PhD candidate in European Security Studies at the Institute for 
Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), University of  Hamburg, Germany.
Zoë Marriage, Lecturer in the Development Studies Department of  the School 
of  Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of  London, UK.
Alexander Mattelaer, Researcher in European security and defense at the Institute 
for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit, Brussels, Belgium.
Robert Mudida, Lecturer and Researcher at the Institute of  Diplomacy and Inter-
national Studies of  the University of  Nairobi, Kenya.
Michael Polyak, Master’s candidate at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of  
Government, Cambridge, USA.
Gabriella Save, Security Policy Department, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, Stock-
holm, Sweden.
Isabelle Tannous, Institute for Peace Research and Security Studies (IFSH) at the 
University of  Hamburg, Germany.
Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher, Junior Researcher in the Area of  Democratisation divi-
sion at the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo (FRIDE), 
Madrid, Spain.
Participants and Organizers
157
 
New Faces Conference 2007
Organizers
Kathrin Brockmann, Program Officer of  the International Forum on Strategic 
Thinking, DGAP.
Emilio Cassinello, Director-General, CITpax.
H. E. José María Figueres Olsen, International Advisor to the Board of  Trustees 
of  FRIDE and former President of  Costa Rica (1994–98).
Hans Bastian Hauck, Head of  Program of  the International Forum on Strategic 
Thinking, DGAP.
Carlos Oliver, Project Officer, DARA.
Patricia Perez-Gomez, Projects Coordinator for the Latin America Programme, 
CITpax.
Stuart Reigeluth, Projects Manager for the Africa and Middle East Programme, 
CITpax.
Manuel Sánchez-Montero, Director of  Humanitarian Action and Development, 
FRIDE.
Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto Wolff-Director of  the Research Institute, 
DGAP.
 
New Faces Conference 2007 158
Participating Institutes
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
www.dgap.org
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and promotion of  human rights and democratic values. Besides trying to end and prevent vio-
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to offer innovative, workable solutions to international and national situations of  conflict. It 
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initiatives and acts as a mediator and facilitator in negotiations, as well as in the implementation 
of  peace agreements.
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emphasis on Columbia; and the third is a transversal programme inter-related to both – Conflict 
Prevention and Resolution..
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research interests of  peace and security, human rights, democracy promotion, and development 
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As a prominent European think tank, FRIDE benefits from political independence, diversity of  
views and the intellectual background of  its international staff.
FRIDE concentrates its work in the following areas:
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Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). The HRI is a unique exercise based largely on over 1,000 ques-
tionnaires conducted in eight crisis countries and major humanitarian agencies.
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